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Industrial Concentration and the Declining Labor Share. The labor share of national
income in the United States has declined since the 1980s and especially after 2000. My
paper focuses on the role played by technological change in this process. In particular, firms
that adopt new technologies achieve a low labor share, and grow and take a larger market
share over time. An example is online retailers such as Amazon, empowered by information
technology, that have a lower labor share than traditional retailers, and have continually
expanded over the last 20 years. This reallocation process drives down the aggregate labor
share. I first document three facts: (i) across sectors, there is a negative correlation between
change in concentration and change in the labor share; (ii) large firms usually exhibit a
smaller labor share; (iii) in sectors where the labor share declines, the decline is especially
strong among large firms. Specifically, gains in labor productivity are not associated with
comparable increases in wages. Then I provide a rationale for these facts by assuming that
capital and labor are complementary inputs and technological progress is labor saving and
embodied in the capital stock. Under these assumptions, my model predicts a negative
xi
correlation between firm size and labor share. Further, the adoption of new technologies
diminishes the labor shares in large firms and increases their market share. As a consequence,
the aggregate labor share declines. This technological channel is consistent with the evolution
of labor productivity across sectors during the last 30 years.
Social-Economic Change and its Impact on Violence: Homicide History of Qing China.
This paper constructs a quantitative history of the homicide rate in Qing China and inves-
tigates its social and economic drivers. Estimates based on historical archives indicate that
this annual rate ranged between 0.35 and 1.47 per 100,000 inhabitants during the 1661-1898
period, a low level unmatched by Western Europe until the late 19th century. China?s
homicide rate rose steadily from 1661 to 1821 but declined gradually thereafter until the
turn of the century. Although extreme, homicide represents a random sampling of the entire
distribution of interpersonal violence; hence the homicide rate serves as a proxy for overall
violence, and its rise implies a decline in personal security. We use national and cross-
provincial panel data to show that population density, state capacity, local self-governance,
interregional grain market integration, and grain price level (which captures crop failure and
other survival distress) are all statistically significant drivers of the homicide rate in 18th-
and 19th-century China.
Labor Unions and the Labor Wedge: A Macroeconomic Perspective. The measured labor
wedge, defined as the difference between marginal product of labor and marginal rate of
substitution, is relatively stable from 1940s to 70s, and declines secularly from 1980s onwards.
This paper aims to investigate the effect of a particular labor market institution, labor union,
on labor wedge. Labor unions command a wage premium, which invites job application
queues and job rationing in the unionized sector. This waiting values of unionized jobs creates
a wedge between wages and households’ willing to work. We provide sectoral evidence that
supports a union-wedge connection in the manufacturing sector. A quantitative model which
features two labor market, one competitive and the other unionized, is developed to estimate
xii
the effect of union power on labor wedge. Based on our quantitative results, approximately
20% of the decline in labor wedge from 1970s to 2000s is accounted for by the decrease in
union densities.
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Chapter 1
Industrial Concentration and the
Declining Labor Share
Lijun Zhu
1.1 Introduction
The long-run constancy of labor share (LS) is typically viewed as a stylized fact of economic
growth. Among other things, it justifies the widespread use of an aggregate Cobb-Douglas
production function in macroeconomics. However, the recent literature documents the break
of this constancy: in the United States the share of national income that goes to labor has
oscillated cyclically during the whole post-WWII period and, more relevant in this context,
it has clearly been declining for more than three decades. Albeit to different extents, this
long-term decline is visible also in other advanced countries (Elsby et al. (2013); Karabarbou-
nis and Neiman (2014b); Piketty and Zucman (2014)). My paper studies the role played by
technological change in this process. In particular, new technologies create, or are adopted
by, firms that achieve a low labor share, and grow and take a larger market share over time.
1
An example is online retailers such as Amazon, empowered by information technology, that
have a lower labor share than traditional retailers, and have continually expanded over the
last 20 years.1 This reallocation process drives down the aggregate labor share.
My research is motivated by three empirical facts documented in the paper. First, there
is a negative correlation between change in market concentration—measured as the share
of total revenue in a sector attributable to its largest firms—and change in labor share, in
that sector. Even though the aggregate labor share has declined, the decline is not universal
across sectors. The decline concentrates in several sectors, namely, manufacturing, retail and
wholesale trade2, and transportation & warehousing. These are also sectors where concen-
tration has increased the most. From 19973 to 2012, the revenues share of the 50 largest firms
increased from 20.3% to 27.6% in wholesale trade, from 25.7% to 36.9% in retail trade, and
from 30.7% to 42.1% in transportation. This negative correlation between change in concen-
tration and change in labor share also holds across more disaggregated manufacturing sectors
(i.e. at various digits North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) sectors), and
is robust for different periods, for a range of cutoffs for what constitutes a "large" firm, and
to adding other control variables and sector fixed effect. Concentration ratio for the whole
manufacturing sector is relatively stable from 1960s to around 1980, and increases thereafter.
The manufacturing labor share shows a similar but opposite pattern: relatively stable until
around 1980, and declines in the last 3-4 decades. In almost all the other service and fi-
1The payroll-sales ratio in "Electronic shopping and mail-order houses" subsector is 30% lower than that
in the retail trade sector in 2012. From 1992 to 2014, the share of nonstore sales (the majority of which
are electronic shopping) in retail sales increases from about 6% to 13%. Of course, electronic commerce
increases labor demand in the transportation sector. However, the increases in labor productivity in retail
trade and in the distribution sector which contains trade and transportation are almost the same, suggesting
this spillover effect is secondary.
2To avoid confusion I should point out that the term "trade" is used to denote wholesale trade and retail
trade in the text.
3The NAICS system replaced the old Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system in 1997, so the data
used for non-manufacturing sectors are from 1997 onward.
2
nance sectors, the labor share did not fall and concentration increased at a much slower pace.
Second, the relative labor share of large firms, defined as the ratio between the labor
share in these firms to the average in the sector, tend to be smaller than that of other firms.
In 2002, labor share for the 50 largest manufacturing firms4 was 67% of that for the man-
ufacturing sector as a whole. In the same year, the relative labor share for 50th to 100th,
101st to 150th, 151st to 200th largest firms, and 201st largest and smaller firms in the man-
ufacturing sector were 73%, 82%, 97%, and 121%, respectively. Large firms typically offer a
higher wage than do small firms. However, wage differentials compensate only partially for
the even wider gap in labor productivity between large and small firms, which results in a
lower labor share in the former.
Third, the relative labor share for large manufacturing firms has been declining since
around 1980 and this coincides with the time when the labor share in the manufacturing
sector began to decline. The relative labor share for 50 largest firms in manufacturing was
98% in 1967, 97% in 1977, 92% in 1987; it then declined steadily to 72% and 59% in 1997
and 2012, respectively. The implication is that, in comparison with other firms, the decline
of labor share in large manufacturing firms has been especially pronounced. From 1967 to
1977, the relative labor productivity of top-50 firms increased from 128% to 143% and their
relative wage increased at about the same rate: from 127% to 139%5. However, there has
been an increasing divergence between the two series since the late 1970s. From 1977 to
2012, the relative labor productivity of top-50 firms increased from 143% to 242%; yet at
the same time, their relative wage was essentially stable: 139% in 1977 and 144% in 2012.
4These Census data give concentration ratios for the 50, 20, 8, and 4 largest firms. In the baseline case,
I use the 4 largest firms for 6 digit NAICS sectors, and the 50 largest firms for 2 digit sectors. As shown in
the text, the empirical pattern is robust to different choices in this regard.
5Relative labor productivity (resp. wage) of large firms is defined as the ratio of labor productivity in
these firms to labor productivity (resp. wage) in their sector.
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Increasing concentration, i.e. the rising market share of large firms that have a lower labor
share and the decline of labor shares within large firms are the driving forces behind the
overall decline of aggregate labor share in manufacturing.
Large firms in non-manufacturing sectors also have a lower labor share. However, their
relative labor share exhibits a different time pattern across sectors. In particular, it declines
in the trade and transportation sectors, but does not exhibit a clear trend in most service
and finance sectors. For trade and transportation, just as for manufacturing, the relative
labor share of large firms decreases over time owing to a combination of these firms’ in-
creasing relative labor productivity and a fairly stagnant relative wage. From 1997 to 2012,
the relative labor productivity of the top-50 firms in wholesale trade increased by 95.9%
yet their relative wage increased only by 16.2%. In transportation, the increase in relative
labor productivity of top-50 firms was 32.8%—significantly greatly than the 1.6% increase
in relative wage. In retail trade, the increase in relative labor productivity of large firms is
4.2% greater than the relative wage.
I provide a rationale for these empirical facts that is based on two assumptions. First, for
a given technology—embodied in machines—capital and labor are complementary inputs.
In a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, this is equivalent to an
elasticity of substitution that is less than 1. Second, technological progress is labor saving
in this sense: new technology embodied in new machines allows for less labor input per unit
of output. I start from a static model featuring N vintages of capital. Under these two
assumptions, my model predicts a negative correlation between firm size6 and labor share.
In particular, more advanced technologies increase output and decrease the labor share. The
6In the static case, each technology is interpreted as a firm. This presupposition will be relaxed when I
discuss the general equilibrium.
4
intuition is as follows. Technology complements capital and increases its productivity, which
further increases demand for effective labor.Therefore firms using more advanced technolo-
gies produce more output with less labor, reducing the labor share of income.
I then extend the static model to a dynamic general equilibrium one by incorporating
heterogeneous firms and capital accumulation. Each firm is endowed with a level of own-
productivity, and each firm optimally choose to adopt one technology from all feasible ones.
The fixed cost of installing a machine is assumed to be an increasing function of the tech-
nological vintage it embodies. Firms with low own-productivity find it optimal to avoid the
large fixed cost of advanced technologies by adopting less advanced and cheaper ones. On
the other hand, firms with high own-productivity find it convenient to pay the fixed cost
of adopting advanced technologies and therefore use them. Due to the negative effect of
technology on labor share, more productive firms exhibit a lower labor share.
Given a fixed number of technological vintages, capital-labor complementarity and fixed
labor supply, the economy arrives at a steady state. When a new and more advanced tech-
nological vintage becomes exogenously available, the most productive firms find it profitable
to switch to that new technology. This response increases their market share because, as
established for the static case, technology has a positive effect on firm size; in other words,
concentration increases with technological change. Furthermore, the more advanced technol-
ogy reduces the labor share as firms increase in size. As a consequence, the aggregate labor
share declines. Next, to illustrate the dynamics of the model in the simplest possible case, I
calibrate a steady-state economy in which, initially, there are two technological vintages and
a third more advanced one becomes available.
For a CES production function in which capital and labor are complementary inputs,
5
any labor saving technological change that reduces the labor share will simultaneously in-
crease labor productivity. Hence we should observe a faster increase in labor productivity in
sectors, or in periods, characterized by declining labor share. From 1987 to 1997, the labor
share in manufacturing declined 10.3% while labor productivity increased 34.7%. Since the
late 1990s, both decreases in labor share and increases in labor productivity have acceler-
ated. From 1997 to 2007, the labor share fell 20.2% while labor productivity rose 59.0%.
From 1987 to 2016, the economy-wide labor productivity has increased by 72.7%; during the
same period, labor productivity increases in manufacturing, wholesale trade and retail trade
amounted to (respectively) 146.4%, 123.5%, and 128.8%. This evidence strongly supports
the technological channel - as opposed to monopoly power - as the main driver of the negative
correlation between concentration and labor share. Labor productivity is measured as the
ratio of real value added (net of price changes) to hours worked. An increase in monopoly
power, alone, would have driven up prices but would have not increased labor productivity.
Two recent papers, Barkai (2016) and Autor et al. (2017), also independently document
a negative correlation between change in concentration and change in labor share. Barkai
(2016) focuses on the fact that an increase in monopoly power decreases both labor and
capital shares while increasing the share of profits. Autor et al. (2017) conjectures that
the concentration-LS correlation is driven by the rise of superstar firms, which have a lower
labor share since the fixed overhead labor cost is distributed over a larger output base. My
paper differs from both in that I emphasize both increasing concentration, which accounts
for approximately 30% of the decline, and decrease of labor share in large firms are critical to
the decline of the aggregate labor share, and argue that both are driven by the labor saving
technological advancement.
Koh et al. (2016) claim that the decline in the U.S. labor share is accounted for by the
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growing share of Intellectual Property Products (IPP) in total capital stock: two thirds of the
decline is driven, in the data, by the higher depreciation rate of IPP capital. Karabarbounis
and Neiman (2014a) finds that capital depreciation explains about 45% of the 4.7% decrease
in gross labor share in the U.S. corporate sector, and that both net and gross labor shares
have declined ’meaningfully’, worldwide, since 1975. In light of these facts I have adjusted
the labor shares I use by netting out the depreciation of capital (but not the net return to
IPP capital as in Koh et al. (2016)), both traditional and IPP, and found that the patterns
studied in my paper are robust to these adjustments.
This paper relates most closely to the macroeconomic literature on the determinants of
the aggregate labor share, which dates back to at least the early-to-middle 20th century (e.g.
Kaldor (1957); Solow (1958)), and the recent studies of its decline in the United States and
in other developed countries. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014b) attributes the decline of
labor share to decreases in the relative price of investment goods while Piketty and Zucman
(2014) attributes it entirely to the process of capital accumulation. In a CES production
function, these channels lead to a lower LS if capital and labor are substitutes, i.e. if the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is greater than 1. My paper departs from
these approaches by featuring a production function for which the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor ranges between 0 and 1, which is consistent with the majority of
empirical estimations7. In addition, at the aggregate level the return to capital, measured
using National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables while accounting for changes in
7For example, Brown and DeCani (1963) estimates that the elasticity of substitution ranged from 0.08 to
0.44 over the period from 1890 to 1958. David and van de Klundert (1965) estimates an elasticity of 0.32,
and the estimate in Wilkinson (1968) is 0.5. Most recent estimates also obtain values between 0 and 1. The
estimated elasticity of substitution between capital and (skilled) labor is 0.67 in Krusell et al. (2000). In
Antras (2004), the estimated elasticity of substitution between capital and labor ranges between 0.6 and 0.9.
Klump et al. (2007) estimates the elasticity to be 0.51. Herrendorf et al. (2015) estimates the elasticity of
substitution to be 0.80 in manufacturing, and 0.84 for the whole economy. Oberfield and Raval (2014) use
plant level data, and they estimate the elasticity of 0.51 at that level and 0.71 for the Manufacturing sector.
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relative prices of investment goods, has not declined over the last three to four decades. See
Gomme et al. (2011) and the discussion in Section 4.2 of this paper.
Lawrence (2015) shows that rapid progress in labor-augmenting technological change in
the United States reduces the effective capital-labor ratio and labor share under an aggregate
production function where capital and labor are complementrary inputs. Elsby et al. (2013)
decompose declines of aggregate labor share into sectors, and they identify the offshoring
of labor-intensive tasks as a potential driver. My paper complements that research because
offshoring, no differently than other forms of technological change, such as automation, en-
ables reduced (domestic) labor input per unit of output and thus is viewed as a labor-saving
technology. The increase of offshoring is heavily concentrated in Manufacturing8. The LS
declines in both trade and transportation are also substantial, but the extent of offshoring
in these sectors has not changed significantly during the last 15-20 years. The technological
channel proposed in my paper has the potential to explain the decline of labor share in a
wider context.
Several papers use firm level data in seeking to understand the decline of aggregate labor
share. Loecker and Jan (2017) document a rise in the average markups across public firms
since 1980, which they argue could account for the reduction in labor share. Kehrig and
Vincent (2017) also report a reallocation of market share towards hyper-productive manu-
facturing plants, which arrive at a low labor share by gradually increasing value added while
keeping employment and compensation unchanged. These authors show how this pattern
can be explained: the concave response of hiring to total factor productivity shocks is be-
coming more concave over time. My proposed explanation is consistent with the firm-level
evidence, yet it also comports with observed sector heterogeneity in terms of concentration,
8See Figure A in the Appendix.
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labor share and labor productivity.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The empirical facts are documented in section
2, and Section 3 develops a model that rationalizes those facts and presents a quantitative
exercise to illustrate the mechanism. I discuss several related issues in Section 4, includ-
ing the return to capital, the evolution of labor productivity across sectors, and firm level
capital/labor ratios. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Facts
Several empirical facts are presented in this section. First, I document a negative correlation—
across manufacturing sectors—between change in concentration (measured as the value-
added share of large firms)9 and change in labor share. The baseline definition of “large”
firms is the 4 largest firms in an NAICS 6-digit sector or the 50 largest firms at the 2-digit
level.10 If large firms have a lower labor share, then increases in concentration (i.e., an in-
creased market share for large firms) lead to a lower labor share for the sector. I introduce the
concept of relative labor share, defined as the ratio of the labor share in a subset of firms to
sector labor share, and find that the relative labor share for large manufacturing firms is less
than that for other firms. Note also that the relative labor share of large firms is stable from
the 1960s to the late 1970s but declines thereafter. The relative LS for the 50 largest man-
ufacturing firms was 98% in 1967 and 97% in 1977 but then declined steadily to 59% in 2012.
This empirical pattern observed in manufacturing holds also in other sectors. Declining
9Value added is used whenever the necessary data are available; otherwise, I use the share of revenue as
the measure of concentration. Appendix Figure A.6 compares these two measures vis-à-vis manufacturing
and shows that the difference is negligible.
10The choice of 4 and 50 reflect, inter alia, the availability of data. However, the described pattern is
robust to other definitions of a large firm.
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labor share is characteristic not only of manufacturing but also of retail trade, wholesale
trade, and transportation & warehousing. In these sectors, concentration has risen signif-
icantly over the same period while the relative labor share of large firms has declined. In
contrast, the labor share does not decline in most finance and services sectors, where the
relative labor share of large firms does not exhibit a clear time trend.
1.2.1 Manufacturing
Figure 1.1 plots the labor share in manufacturing from 1947 to 2015.11 The manufacturing
LS is relatively stable from the 1940s to the early 1980s and declines steadily thereafter. The
magnitude of decline from 1980 to 2015 is nearly 20%. From 1997 to 2007, the baseline period
for which I have disaggregated data, the labor share in manufacturing decreases by about 6%.
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Figure 1.1: Labor Share in Manufacturing, 1947-2015
Note: Labor share (LS) is measured as the fraction of compensation in value added.
11Labor share in Figure 1.1 is calculated as compensation of employees divided by manufacturing value
added. The general trend—stable then declining—is robust to adjustments for proprietor income and de-
preciation. The nonadjusted series is chosen as the benchmark measure for consistency with respect to the
measure used in manufacturing subsectors, for which data on proprietor income and depreciation are not
available.
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The disaggregated data are from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), a survey
of manufacturing establishments with one or more paid employees. A summarized and sim-
plified version of the ASM data is provided in the NBER-CES data set. Included in the
data are payroll and value added for manufacturing sectors at various NAICS digit levels.
The labor share is the fraction of payroll in value added, and concentration is measured as
the share of value added due to a sector’s 4 largest firms (Share04 ). The concentration data
are available every five years from the Economic Census, for which 2012 is the most recent
publication.
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Figure 1.2: Change in Labor share versus Change in Concentration, MFG 1997-2007
Note: Labor share (on the vertical axis) is the fraction of payroll in value added; concentration (on the
horizontal axis) is the value added share of the 4 largest firms. Each circle represents an NAICS 6-digit
manufacturing sector.
Figure 1.2 plots change in labor share against change in concentration (share04 ), across
6 digit manufacturing sectors, from 1997 to 200712. This graph reveals the negative and
12NAICS has been in use since 1997. I chose 2007 as the ending year because the 6-digit code underwent
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significant correlation between change in concentration and change in labor share. When a
sector becomes more concentrated, its labor share tends to decline. From 1997 to 2007, ASM
data shows that the manufacturing LS decreased by 5.61%, due mostly (73%13 to within-
sector declines. Over this period, concentration has increased in nearly two thirds of the 465
6-digit manufacturing sectors.
The result of a single variable regression, where the dependent variable is change in the
labor share and the independent variable is change in Share04, is14
∆LS = −3.15− 0.17∗∗∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
(0.02)
×∆Share04 + , R2 = 0.1025, N = 464;
As shown in the Appendix (see Table A.1 and A.3 and Figure A.3, the negative correla-
tion between concentration and labor share also holds across manufacturing sectors at the
3-, 4-, and 5-digit levels and across different periods. Moreover, the results are robust to
measuring concentration by the value added share of the 8, 20, and 50 largest firms (instead
of 4 largest firms) within a sector. The result is not affected by the omission of fringe benefits
when measuring labor share. Since 2005, the publicly available ASM tables have provide
information on payroll as well as benefits. "Compensation" is the sum of payroll and total
fringe benefits, which include the employer’s cost for health insurance, defined benefit pen-
sion plans, other defined contribution plans, and other fringe benefits. Appendix Table A.4
reports a similar negative and significant correlation between change in concentration and
change in the revised labor share.15 Last, as shown in Appendix Table A.2, this correlation
a major revision in 2012. A similar result is obtained if concentration is measured in terms of revenue rather
than value added.
13This number is based on a standard within-between decomposition.
14Blank magnetic and optical recording media manufacturing (NAICS code 334613), has a labor share
exceeding 100% in 2007, so that subsector is excluded in my calculation
15In 2012, the total numbers of NAICS 6-digit manufacturing sectors was reduced from 467 to 362. I
therefore use data at the 5-digit level, which are fairly stable: there were 184 5-digit manufacturing sectors
in 2007 and 180 in 2012, of which 175 were unchanged.
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is robust in panel regressions with sector fixed effect and other control variables.
Concentration in Manufacturing has been increasing. For industrial classifications, the
Census of Manufactures (published every five years) used SIC codes before 1992 and switched
to NAICS codes in 1997. Although each system underwent revision, the total numbers of SIC
4-digit manufacturing sectors (444 in 1977) is comparable to the number of NAICS 6-digit
sectors (467 in 2007).16 Manufacturing concentration—measured as the average Share04
(and the average Share08 ) across SIC 4-digit sectors until 1992 and across NIACS 6-digit
sectors starting in 1997—weighted by revenue17. Results from the 1963–2012 period18 are
presented in Figure 1.3.
16For details, see Appendix Table A.8.
17The concentration measure is given in terms of revenue (rather than value added) because that is the
measure until 1992 for disaggregated manufacturing sectors. Yet the pattern is robust to various measures.
See Appendix Table A.8.
18The original full reports of the Census of Manufactures could not be found for 1947, 1954 and 1958, so
those years are excluded from the date set. However, the 1958 summary report indicates that concentration
is stable in most sectors for the 1947–1958 period.
13
1963 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Year
35
40
45
50
55
60
%
Concentration in Manufacturing
Share04-6D
Share08-6D
Share08-5D
Figure 1.3: Concentration in Manufacturing, 1963-2012
Note: The blue (resp. red) line plots the average revenue share of the 4 (resp. 8) largest firms across 6-digit
manufacturing sectors; the yellow line is the average revenue share of the 8 largest firms across 5-digit
manufacturing sectors. All values are weighted by revenue.
Concentration in Manufacturing was relatively stable from the 1960s to the early 1980s,
but it has increased steadily over the past three decades. Before 2000, the increasing con-
centration was due mainly to the 4 largest firms in each sector (the increase in average share
of the 8 largest firms was similar to that of the 4 largest). After 2000, the average share04
was relatively stable but the average share08 continued to increase, which suggests that the
expansion of large firms—though not the very largest—has driven up concentration in the
past decade. From 2007 to 2012, the total number of NAICS 6-digit manufacturing sectors
was reduced from 467 to 364. The figure also plots Share08 at the 5-digit level, which is
consistently defined across the period shown.
The increase in concentration means that market share has been transferred from small
to large firms. If the labor share is lower in large firms, then an increase in concentration
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reduces sector LS in a mechanical way. The labor shares of different firms can be compared
using concentration data from the Economic Census. Toward that end, I define the relative
labor share (RLS) for a subset of firms (e.g. 50 largest firms)—where firm size is measured
by value added or revenue—as the ratio of LS for these firms to the sector’s LS. So if the
top-50 firms have an RLS that is less than 100%, then the labor share of these firms is lower
than the sector average.
The relative labor share for the top-50 firms is calculated as follows:
RLS-top50 ≡ LS-top50
LS-Sector
× 100% = Payroll-top50 / Payroll-Sector
Vadd-top50 / Vadd-Sector
× 100%
That is, the relative labor share for top-50 firms equals their payroll share in the sector
divided by their value added share; the relative labor productivity and relative wage are
defined similarly. Labor productivity (LP) is measured as value added per worker19. The
relative labor productivity (resp. wage) for top-50 firms is measured as the ratio of labor
productivity (resp. wage) for those firms to that of sector. It follows that the relative LS of
top-50 firms equals the ratio of their relative wage to their relative labor productivity.
Table 1.1 presents relevant statistics for manufacturing in 2002. The repirted values for
share of employees, payroll, and value added are from original (sourced) tables; the valued
for relative LP, relative wage, and RLS are calculated as just described.
19The actual labor productivity is output—not value added which is equal to output times price—per
hours worked. As defined in the text, relative LP reflects the differences in actual LP across firms provided
that those firms do not exhibit significant differences in prices and average working hours per worker
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Table 1.1: Share of Industry Statistics (%) for the Manufacturing Sector, 2002
Firm groups Emp. Payroll Vadd. Rel. LP Rel. Wage Rel. LS
50 largest 12.1 16.9 25.3 209 140 67
50th to 100th largest 5.3 6.1 8.4 158 115 73
101st to 150th largest 3.9 4.1 5.0 128 105 82
151st to 200th largest 3.1 3.6 3.7 119 116 97
201st and smaller 75.5 69.3 57.5 76 92 121
Note: Firms/companies are ranked by value added, and a firm/company is defined as a
business organization consisting of one establishment or more under common ownership or
control.
Data Source: "Concentration Ratios: 2002 Economic Census, Manufacturing, Subject Series",
in Census of Manufactures, 2002.
Both labor productivity and wage are higher in large firms, but the labor share in large
firms is lower. The RLS for the 50 largest manufacturing firms (as ranked by valued added)
is 67% of the entire sector. Although the wage in small firms is lower, it accounts for a larger
portion of the per-capita value added in these firms—as reflected in their 121% of relative
labor share. The pattern that large firms have smaller labor shares also holds for other years.
Appendix Table A.9 reports results for 1997, 2007 and 2012.
The trend of relative labor share for 50 the largest manufacturing firms(again ranked by
value added) from 1967 to 2012 is plotted in Figure 1.4. That RLS remains fairly constant
from the 1960s to the 1980s, but the figure shows a clear downward trend thereafter. The
relative labor share for the 50 largest manufacturing firms was 98% in 1967 and 97% in 1977,
but it declined steadily to 59% in 2012.
Recall that the relative LS equals the ratio of relative wage to relative labor productivity.
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Figure 1.4: Relative Labor Share of the 50 largest MFG firms
Note: The relative labor share in this graph is calculated as LS in the 50 largest manufacturing firms
divided by LS in the entire manufacturing sector.
Figure 1.5 displays the trends of relative LP and relative wage for the 50 largest manufac-
turing firms. From 1967 to 1977, the relative LP of these top-50 firms increased from 128%
to 143% while their relative wage increased at about the same rate: from 127% to 139%.
From 1977 to 2012, however, the relative labor productivity of those firms increased from
143% to 242%. Yet their relative wage was practically stable, increasing only to 144% in
2012. The clear divergence between relative LP and relative wage since the 1980s suggests
that marginal workers in large and small firms are easily substitutable with each other. The
Census of Manufactures public data also allows me to calculate relative labor shares for the
100 and 200 largest firms; Appendix Table A.10 establishes that the overall patterns are
similar.20
20The manufacturing sector comprises many heterogeneous subsectors, and the top-50 constitute but a
small subset of total firms. From 1997 to 2012, the value added share of the top-50 firms increased from
24.5% to 26.1%. This small increase reflects the concomitant modest increases for large (but not top-50)
firms in the sector. For instance, the value added share of the 200 largest manufacturing firms increased by
2.9% for the same period; and the average share of the 50 largest firms across 3-digit manufacturing sectors
increases 5.7%. Even so, the RLS of the top-50 firms is still informative—as evidenced by the strongly similar
RLS pattern of the 100 and 200 largest firms. Data for top-50 firms are available also for non-manufacturing
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Figure 1.5: Relative Labor Productivity and Relative Wage of the 50 Largest MFG Firms
Note: Relative labor productivity (, resp. relative wage) is calculated as the LP (resp. wage) in the 50
largest manufacturing firms divided by the LP (resp. wage) in the manufacturing sector.
In the 1990s and 2000s, the relative labor share of large firms was significantly smaller
than for other firms; an increase in concentration thus leads to a decline in sector labor
share. In the 1960s and early 1970s there was not much difference between the labor shares
of large versus small firms, so one would expect that increased concentration would lead
to a relatively smaller decline in labor share. These statements are confirmed in Appendix
Table A.3, which reports results from single-variable regressions (with changes in the labor
share and in concentration as the dependent and independent variable, respectively) from
1963 to 1966 and also from 1972 to 1977. The coefficients for concentration are significantly
smaller than these two periods than those for the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.
The pattern that large firms have lower labor shares continues to hold in more disaggre-
gated manufacturing sub-sectors. I find public data that enables calculation of subsector-level
sectors and are therefore used as the baseline (to ensure consistency across sectors).
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Table 1.2: Relative Labor Share in the Manufacturing Sector, 1977
SIC Index 1-4 5-20 21-50 ≥51
4 digit average 91.0% 99.4 108.8 119.5
4 digit weighted average 91.6 97.2 108.6 119.8
Note: "1-4" denotes the 4 largest firms, (weight=value added).
relative labor shares in the Census of Manufactures report for 1977 but not for more recent
years. The original data include payroll and value added for the 4, 8, 20, and 50 largest firms
in each SIC 4-digit sector. Firms are classified into four groups: "1-4", the 4 largest firms in
terms of value added; "5-20", the 5th to 20th largest firms; "21-50", the 21st to 50th, and
"≥51", the 51th and smaller firms. Table 1.2 summarizes the calculated RLS values, and it
shows the same pattern as before: the relative labor share of large firms is less than that for
other firms.
Compustat data can be used to investigate the evolution of relative labor shares of large
firms within more disaggregated manufacturing sectors. Among Compustat firms, about
85% report sale numbers but only 22% report total staff expenses. The latter include wages,
salaries, pension costs, profit sharing and incentive compensation, payroll taxes and other
employee benefits; this expense category corresponds closely to NIPA’s "compensation of
employees". Because value-added data for firms are not directly available, I use the the
fraction of compensation in sales as a proxy for firm-level labor share. Sector dummies are
assigned for each SIC 2-digit sector (e.g. textile mill products; electronic & other electronic
equipment). From 2010 to 2014, there were, on average 18 firms per sector.
The following regression is performed for manufacturing firms (i.e., SIC ∈ [2000, 3999])
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Table 1.3: Correlation between Size and Labor Share in the Manufacturing Sector
70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 00-04 05-09 10-14
Size 0.41∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.01 −0.88∗∗∗ −1.61∗∗∗ −1.31∗∗∗ −1.93∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13)
Sector D. Yes – – – – – – – –
Year D. Yes – – – – – – – –
R2 0.46 0.40 0.37 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.26 0.32
Obs. 1674 1847 1428 1222 1166 1145 1035 957 1528
Note: ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 1%, ∗∗ : p < 5%; ∗ : p < 10%. Size is measured as assets (in log). LS is the share
of compensation in revenue. Results are qualitatively similar if using employments.
Data Source: Compustat, Manufacturing firms (SIC ∈ [2000, 3999]).
for each five-year period:
LSi = β0 + β1(Sizei) + Sector dummies + Year dummies + εi.
Size is measured by (log) assets. Table 1.3 presents the coefficients β1 for different periods.
The correlation coefficient here also shows a downward trend21 consistent with the aggregate
outcomes. The implication is that the trend seen in Figure 1.4 reflects actual changes between
large and small firms within sectors—that is, rather than simply a shift of large firms towards
less labor intensive sectors.22
1.2.2 Non-Manufacturing sectors
I now turn from manufacturing to non-manufacturing sectors, where the negative correlation
between changes in concentration and changes in labor share holds as well. Furthermore, in
non-manufacturing sectors where the labor share declines, the concentration increases and
21The coefficient is positive in the 1970s and early 1980s, which accords with the top-50s’ RLS being higher
than the RLS of the top 100 and top 200 firms before 1980. This result may reflect relatively stronger union
power in the largest manufacturing firms in the 1970s and early 1980s.
22Of the 50 largest manufacturing firms in 1980, 18 are related to petroleum & coal products, 2 to computer
& other electronic products, and 0 to pharmaceuticals. In 2012, the corresponding numbers are 9, 8, and 5.
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the relative labor share of large firms falls—just as in Manufacturing.
Following Elsby et al. (2013), the change in aggregate labor share can be decomposed
into a within-sector component and a between-sector component. Formally, we can write
LS = ΣiωiLSi =⇒ ∆LS ≈ ΣiLSi∆ωi︸ ︷︷ ︸
between
+ Σiωi∆LSi︸ ︷︷ ︸
within
,
where i denotes a sector and ωi represents the share of sector i’s value added in the
economy. Average values of LS and ω are used to calculate the "between" and "within"
components. The baseline measure of sector labor share is the fraction of compensation in
value added. As shown in Appendix Table A.15, the within-sector component accounts for
most of the decline in labor share; structural change (i.e. the between-sector component)
plays a secondary role.23. Table 1.4 summarizes the within-sector component. Sectors in
which labor share declined significantly are manufacturing, whole trade, retail trade, and
transportation. At the same time, the labor share in most finance and services sectors
sectors did not decrease.
These results are robust to adjusting labor share for depreciation and proprietor’s in-
come. Appendix Table A.16 gives the decomposition results when value added is adjusted
for capital depreciation, which includes depreciation not only of traditional capital (equip-
23The reported statistics exclude agriculture and government; they also excludes mining, construction, and
management of companies & enterprises because these three sectors lack concentration data. The included
sectors together accounted, in 2012, for 77% of gross domestic product (GDP) and 89% of private sector GDP.
From 1987 to 2013, the labor share in mining decclined by about 20%; that decrease was most pronounced
during the years of 2000 and 2003. The labor share in construction declined moderately over this period
and primarily during two recessions. Given the relatively small value added of these excluded sectors, their
changes in labor share have limited effects on overall labor share. The results in Appendix Table A.15 are
in substantial agreement with those of Elsby et al. (2013). The slight difference might be explained by two
factors. First, I depart from their approach by focusing on the nonfarm private sector (rathern than the
corporate sector) and by excluding three subsectors for which there are no concentration data. Second, the
data used here reflect IPP revisions whereas Elsby et al. (2013) use pre-revision data.
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Table 1.4: Within-sector Component of Declines in LS, 1987-2013
Sector Aggr. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆LS -3.62% 2.25 -18.02 -7.36 -6.07 -10.0 -3.79 0.22
ω∆LS 0.06 -3.43 -0.56 -0.51 -0.38 -0.23 0.02
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
∆LS -0.99 8.88 2.36 1.72 5.25 3.97 -0.45 10.21
ω∆LS -0.16 0.70 0.08 0.02 0.42 0.05 -0.02 0.33
Note: LS is the share of compensation in value added. (1)-Utilities; (2)-Manufacturing; (3)-
Wholesale Trade; (4)-Retail Trade; (5)-Transportation and Warehousing; (6)-Information;
(7)-Finance and Insurance; (8)-Real Estate, rental and leasing; (9)-Professional, Scien-
tific and Technical Services; (10)-Administrative and Waste Management Services; (11)-
Educational Services; (12)-Health Care and Social Assistance; (13)-Arts, Entertainment,
and Recreation; (14)-Accommodation and Food Services; (15)-Other Services. Data Source:
NIPA Value-added-by-Industry.
ment and structures) but also of the newly capitalized Intellectual Property and Products
(IPP). Proprietor’s income does not significantly alter the baseline pattern; the reason is
that, in most sectors, the share of proprietors’ income in value added (reported in Appendix
Table A.17) is relatively stable.24
Figure 1.6 presents the relation between change in labor share and change in concentra-
tion across 2-digit non-manufacturing sectors.25. Labor share is measured as the share of
compensation of employees in Value added, and concentration is measured as the 50 largest
24Scholars often adjust labor share for proprietors’ income by assuming a constant labor share for
proprietors and the corporate sector. In this approach, labor share under is defined as compensation/
(value added − proprietor income). The decreasing shares of proprietors’ income in value added for the
health care sector and the professional, scientific, & technical services sector are partly responsible for the
increase of their labor share (reported in Appendix Table A.15).
25Labor share can not be measured systematically for disaggregated non-manufacturing sectors because
value added data are not available. For services sectors and in 1997, concentration measures are available
only for establishments subject to federal income tax. The same measure for these sectors is used in 2012.
See Appendix Figure A.4 for the relation between changes in labor share and changes in concentration
(measured as revenue share) of the 4 largest firms. In some sectors, the LS fluctuates instead of exhibiting
a monotonic trend. Appendix Table A.11 reports the labor shares for all 15 sectors. Based on observing
the trend, I tried to make minimum adjustments to the sample dates selected. In particular, I use the 1996
(rather than 1997) labor share for the information sector,; I also use the average LS between 1996 and 1998
for education services instead of the 1997 valued. The pattern that results from these two revisions are
presented in Appendix Figure A.5.
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Figure 1.6: Changes in Labor Share versus Change in Concentration, NON-MFG 1997-2012
Note: Labor share (on the vertical axis) is the ratio of employee compensation to value added;
concentration (on the horizontal axis) is the revenue share of the 50 largest firms.
firms’ share of a sector’s revenue26.
From 1997 to 2012, there is a similar negative association between changes in labor share
and changes in concentration. The correlation is significant at the 10% level. Out of Manu-
facturing, the decline of LS was most evident in transportation, retail trade, and wholesale
trade; these are also the subsectors in which concentration increased the largest. The decline
of LS in the information sector and in the administrative & waste management sector is
probably more reflective of the temporary increase of labor share around 2000 (due, in part,
to stock options being realized during the dot-com bubble) than of a long run trend.27 In
26For non-manufacturing sectors, the Economic Census reports concentration in terms of revenue instead
of value added. Concentration ratios for the 4, 8, 20 and 50 largest firms in each sector are available. Overall,
average concentration ratios for the 4 largest firms at the 6-digit level are comparable to those for 50 largest
firms at the 2-digit level.
27For the labor share in 2-digit sectors from 1987 to 2015, see Table A.11 and Figure A.7 in the Appendix.
Note that the information services sector is a combination of traditional subsectors (e.g. newspaper publish-
23
most finance and service sectors, labor share actually increased slightly from 1997 to 2012
while increases in concentration were likewise moderate.
For non-manufacturing sectors, relative labor share is approximated by the ratio of large
firms’ payroll share to their revenue share (instead of value added shares, as in the case of
manufacturing sectors). Once again, firms are ranked by revenue.28 Appendix Table A.13
presents the relative labor share in non-manufacturing sectors at various NAICS digit lev-
els.29 Just as in manufacturing, the relative labor share for large non-manufacturing firms
is less than that for their smaller peers. At the 6-digit level, the average labor share in a
sector’s 4 largest firms is 18% lower than that for the entire sector whiere a typical firm of
the smallest size has a LS that is 20% higher than the sector average.
In wholesale trade, retail trade, and transportation—sectors that saw steep declines in
labor share—the relative labor share of large firms also decreased. From 1997 to 2012, the
RLS of the 50 largest firms decreased from 39.9% to 26.9% in wholesale trade, from 96.4%
to 92.9% in retail trade, and from 103.7% to 80.1% in transportation.
As mentioned previously, the relative labor share can be decomposed into relative labor
productivity and relative wage. Table 1.5 presents the relative labor productivity and wage
ing) and othres that are more prone to technological change. In the Broadcasting and Telecommunication
subsector (the sector where AT&T belongs to), there is also a declining trend of labor share and rising
concentration.
28This approximation implicitly assumes that, within a sector, the rank of firms based on value added is
the same as that based on sales—especially for the largest firms. It also assumes that the share of value
added by large firms is similar to their share of revenue. The first assumption seems reasonable enough; the
second can be directly verified from available manufacturing data, which include (for large firm) both share
of value added and revenue. Appendix Figure A.6 confirms that there are only small differences between
these two measures.
29There are several sectors, especially at the 6-digit level, in which the relative labor share exceeds 200%
for the "51st largest and smaller" firms. The value added share and payroll share of small firms in these
sectors are typically both very small. These sectors are excluded from the analysis.
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Table 1.5: Relative Labor Share, Relative Labor Productivity and Relative Wage of Top-50
Firms
Wholesale Trade Retail Trade Transportation
R. LS R. LP R. Wage R. LS R. LP R. Wage R. LS R. LP R. Wage
1997 39.9% 323.7 129.1 96.4 85.3 82.3 103.7 108.7 112.7
2002 36.4 332.1 120.9 95.2 92.9 88.5 86.6 126.1 109.2
2007 30.8 383.3 117.8 95.4 97.4 93.0 81.9 141.3 115.7
2012 26.9 419.6 112.9 92.9 101.0 93.8 80.1 142.5 114.1
∆ 97-12 -13.0% 95.9 -16.2 -3.5 15.7 11.5 -23.6 32.8 1.6
Note: Relative labor share (resp. labor productivity, wage) in this table is calculated as the ratio of labor
share (resp. labor productivity, wage) for the 50 largest firms to the sector average.
for trade and transportation sectors. From 1997 to 2012, the relative labor productivity
of large firms in wholesale trade increased by 95.9% while their relative wage decreased
by 16.2%. In transportation, the 32.8% increase in relative labor productivity is likewise
significantly greater than the 1.6% increase in relative wage. This gap is as wide in retail
trade as in wholesale trade or transportation, but the increase in relative labor productivity
is nonetheless 4.2% higher than relative wage.30
In contrast, the relative labor share of large firms in most finance and services sectors
does not show a clear trend over the past 15-20 years.31 These results all continue to hold
when, instead of the 50 largest firms in each sector, I use the 20 largest (see Appendix Table
A.19) and, for the most part, at more disaggregated levels.32
30The reason that the relative labor productivity and relative wage of large firms are smaller than 100%
in the retail trade sector could be that the top-50 retail firms category is a mix of traditional and new online
retailers. In 2012, for example, Walmart was the largest US retailer in terms of revenue and Amazon was
ranked 15th. The relative LP for the 4 largest firms in this sector was 96.1% in that year; this percentage
was higher (106.6%) for the 5th to 8th largest firms and higher still (108.4%) for the 9th to 20th largest.
31See Appendix Table A.18 for details.
32See Appendix Table A.20. It is worth emphasizing that results at the 2-digit level are less sensitive to
the problem of classifying of multi-establishment firms, changes in industrial code, and reclassification of
firms over time. For example, the retail trade sector’s increase in concentration is partly caused by the rise
of online retailers (e.g. Amazon) that sell goods in various categories. The NAICS 3-digit code for Amazon
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1.2.3 The aggregate pattern
The facts presented so far mar be summarized as follows. In manufacturing, trade, and
transportation sectors, both the sector labor share and the relative labor share of large firms
have been declining. In most services sectors, the labor share has not declined; in these
sectors, the relative labor share of large firms does not exhibit an identifiable trend. Fi-
nally,concentration has increased across all sectors—but more in manufacturing, trade, and
transportation and less in services. Although sector heterogeneity helps to identify the driv-
ing forces, this paper seeks to explain the decline of the aggregate labor share.33
Table 1.6 shows, for the period 1987 to 2012, the economy’s labor share as well as the
concentration and the relative Labor share for the 50 largest firms.34 The reported values
are averaged across 2-digit sectors, with weight equal to the average value added share of a
sector from 1987 to 2012,35
is 454 (nonstore retailers) while the code for a typical book store is 451 (sporting goods, hobby, book, and
music stores). At the NAICS 2-digit level, both types of stores are grouped in 44-45 (retail trade).
33Concentration can increase for reasons that are unrelated to technology. For instance, relaxing the laws
that constraint mergers and acquisitions might contribute to the rising concentration in some sectors. This
paper does not address the services sector’s moderate increase of concentration.
34As before, the labor share is not adjusted for proprietor’s income—for the sake of consistency with the
measure in more dis-aggregated sectors. The choice of 50 is based mainly on data availability. In general,
50 would be too small a number for sectors such as manufacturing (where the 50 largest firms accounted
for 26% of 2012 value added) and would be too large a number for sectors such as utilities (where the value
added share of the 50 largest firms was 69% in that year). Any choice of a simple cutoff would be forced
to make the same trade-off. The relative labor share of top-50 firms in administrative & support and waste
management & remediation sector inexplicably rose from 109% in 2007 to 125% in 2012. The value for
"RLS-Top50" in 2012 would be 75.86 (rather than 73.37) if the 2007 value were used for this sector.
35Recall that the industrial classification standard changed in 1997 from SIC to NAICS. In 1987 and 1992,
both concentration and RLS are available for manufacturing, retail trade, and wholesale trade. For 2-digit
sectors in transportation, finance, and services, I first check for whether concentration and and relative labor
share exhibited any linear trend from 1997 to 2012. When there was a linear trend (significant at the 10%
level), I use that trend to obtain values for 1987 and 1992; When there was no significant trend, I use average
values from 1997 to 2012 as an approximation for 1987 and 1992.
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Table 1.6: Economy-wide Labor Share, Concentration, and Relative Labor Share of Top-50
Firms
Year 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
LS 51.83% 51.48 50.49 51.21 50.30 49.00
Share50 26.00% 26.57 26.69 29.52 30.51 31.31
RLS-Top50 82.20% 81.23 79.37 78.20 74.86 76.37
Note: Labor share is calculated as the fraction of compensation in value added.
Agriculture, government, mining, construction, and management of companies &
enterprises are excluded in the statistics.
Table 1.7: Decomposition of Declines in Labor Share, 1987-2012
∆ LS Increase in concentration Fall in large Fall in small
-2.83% -0.80% -1.48% -0.57%
% contributed 28% 52% 20%
Note: See text for details.
Note that change in LS can be decomposed as
LS = Σi=l,sLSiωi =⇒ ∆LS ≈ ∆Concentration ∗ (LSl − LSs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
increase in concentration
+ωl ∗∆LSl︸ ︷︷ ︸
fall in large
+ωs ∗∆LSs︸ ︷︷ ︸
fall in small
where l and s denote (respectively) large and small firms. The decline in aggregate LS
stems from three sources: decline of labor share in large firms, decline of labor share in
small firms, and increasing concentration. From 1987 to 2012, the economy wide labor share
declines 2.83%. During the same period, economy-wide concentration increased by 5.31%
while the average difference between the LS of large firms and small firms was 15.12%.
The first term, "increase in concentration", is responsible for 0.80% of the decline in labor
share; the respective contributions of the second and the third components can be calculated
similarly. Table 1.7 presents the decomposition results.
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The labor share’s decline is due mainly to the fall of labor share in large firms (which
accounts for 52% of the aggregate decline) and the increasing concentration (which accounts
for another 28%); the contribution of "fall in small" firms is only 20%. It is important to
bear two facts in mind. First, the labor share in small firms is 55.07% in 1987 and 54.28% in
2012. Its contribution would be smaller if the cutoff for "large" firms were relaxed to include
more than 50 firms. Second, the labor share in small firms was 55.85% in 2007. If this value
is used (rather than the 2012 value), then the "fall in small" term actually increases the
aggregate labor share. As a result, in this paper I focus on the first two components.
Large firms in the the 2010s may little resemble large firms in the 1980s. According to
Compustat firm-level data, a large portion of LS declines occurs within the same firms in the
manufacturing and transportation sectors.36 In both wholesale and retail trade, the decline
seems to come mainly from the creation of new firms (e.g. online retailers) that have lower
labor shares and grow large over time. In both cases, large firms in the 2010s had both lower
labor shares and larger market shares as compared with their counterparts in the 1980s.
Each of these trends is associated with declining aggregate labor share.
1.3 Model
In this section I develop a model that rationalizes the empirical facts. As noted earlier, my
model builds on two assumptions: (i) for a given technology (embodied in machines), capital
and labor are complementary inputs; and (ii) technological progress is labor saving. Here I
begin, in Section 3.1, by using a static model to illustrate the effect of technologies on size
(i.e. output) and labor share—namely, more advanced technologies result in larger sizes and
36See Appendix Figures A.8 and A.9 for the labor share (measured as the fraction of compensation in
revenue) in large manufacturing and transportation firms.
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smaller labor shares. Then, in Section 3.2, I add capital accumulation and heterogeneous
firms and extend the static model into general equilibrium. It is established there that the
introduction of new technologies increases concentration and also reduces the labor shares
of large firms. As a result, the aggregate labor share declines.
1.3.1 Static model
There are N vintages of capital, each of which embodies a distinct generation of technol-
ogy. Denote by j = 1, 2, ..., N the vintage of capital. In the static model, a technology is
interpreted as a firm. Technology j combines capital j and labor to produce a single final
goods:
[(1− α)kρj + α(γj`)ρ]
1
ρ
here γj denotes the level of technology embodied in capital j. The assumptions I make are
expressed formally as follows.
Assumption 1. [Capital-labor complementarity] ρ < 0.
Assumption 2. [Labor-saving technological progress] γj increases with j.
The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is given by 1
1−ρ . The first assump-
tion states that, given a technology (embodied in machines), the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor ranges between 0 and 1; that is, capital and labor are comple-
mentary inputs. This assumption is consistent with most empirical estimates (e.g. Antras
(2004); Klump et al. (2007); Herrendorf et al. (2015)). Recently, Oberfield and Raval (2014))
use plant-level data from the Census of Manufactures to estimate an average (plant-level)
elasticity of substitution of about 0.5 for 1987. The estimated aggregate elasticity in manu-
facturing is 0.71 in 1987 and 0.75 in 2007.
29
Assumption 2 states that technological progress is labor saving in the sense that new
technology embodied in new machines requires less labor input per unit of output. Labor-
augmenting technological progress is typically assumed in growth models to be consistent
with a balanced growth path (Barro and Sala-iMartin (2004). see Acemoglu (2003) and
Jones (2005) for theoretical justifications).
Let kj denote the supply of capital j and let L denote the supply of labor. In order to
isolate the effect of technology in the static model, all the kj are fixed at 1 and the inelastic
labor supply is also normalized to 1. Labor moves freely among firms. I study the labor
allocation problem and investigate the effects of technologies on firm size and labor share.
The marginal productivity of labor in firm j is
MPLj =
[
(1− α)
(
kj
`
)ρ
+ αγρj
]1/ρ−1
αγρj .
When the employment in firm j approaches zero, the firm’s marginal productivity of labor is
MPLj(0) = α
1/ργj.
Since capital is fixed at a positive number, it follows that the marginal productivity of
labor at zero employment is not equal to infinity (i.e. the Inada condition does not hold).
Hence some firms might not hire any labor in equilibrium. In addition, firms that use more
advanced technologies have a higher marginal productivity of labor at zero employment. The
employment flow always begins with firm j = N and moves downwards, step by step. Thus
the first unit of labor goes to the most productive firm, N . As firm N accumulates labor, its
marginal productivity of labor declines. As soon as that level falls to the second advanced
firm’s marginal productivity of labor (at zero employment), that second firm begins to hire
labor. This process continues until full employment is reached.
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The labor market equilibrium condition is37
w = MPLj =
[
(1− α)
(
kj
γj`j
)ρ
+ α
]1/ρ−1
αγj.
As a result, technologies that are more advanced (i.e., with a higher γj) will cause a
decline in the adjusted capital/labor ratio, kj/γj`j.38 The labor share in firm j is
LSj =
w`j
yj
=
(
1− α
α
(
kj
γj`j
)ρ
+ 1
)−1
.
Because the labor share is an increasing function of kj/γj`j, firms that use more advanced
technologies have a lower labor share.
Technology also affects firm size, which is (as in the concentration data) equal to value
added divided by revenue. Combining the formula for firm size and the labor market–clearing
condition now yields the following expression:
yj = kj
[
1− α(w/αγj)−ρ/(1−ρ)
1− α
]−1/ρ
.
According to this formula, output is greater if the value of γj is higher. In other words, a
more advanced technology increases firm size. Therefore, the single parameter of technology
(γj) is enough to generate a negative correlation—as observed in the data—between firm
size and labor share. Formally, the following proposition holds.
37This condition holds only for firms that have positive employment in equilibrium.
38I remark that the true capital labor ratio, kj/`j , can be either increasing or decreasing in γj . The
direct effect of technologies with a higher γ is to substitute raw labor. Yet that technology also increases the
productivity of capital, which in turn increases labor demand. The equilibrium kj/`j depends on which effect
dominates (see the appendix for a detailed discussion). In Section 3.2, I show that, if capital is adjustable,
then the capital/labor ratio is a positive function of the technology parameter, γ.
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Proposition 1. [Effects of technology on firm size and labor share]
• If j > j′, then LS(j) < LS(j′); that is, firms that use more advanced technologies have
a lower labor share.
• If j > j′, then y(j) > y(j′); that is, firms that use more advanced technologies produce
more output.
To see the intuition behind this result, recall that technology (γ) both complements
capital and increases the productivity of capital, which further increases demand for effective
labor (γ`). Hence firms produce more when they use more advanced technologies; however,
technology is a substitute for raw labor and so reduces labor’s share of income.
1.3.2 Dynamic general equilibrium
It is now possible to incorporate capital accumulation and heterogeneous firms into the model
just developed. The goal here is to develop a model that can be used to study how concen-
tration and labor share are affected by the creation of new technologies.
Firms are introduced in the tradition of “span of control” models (cf. Lucas (1978)) but
without their career choice component. Production requires three inputs: capital and labor
(as before) and also entrepreneurial skill. Hereafter I shall use the terms productivity and
entrepreneurial skill interchangeably and without prejudice. There is a continuum of firms
i ∈ [0, 1], each endowed with some productivity. Firm i draws its productivity zi from the
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following Pareto distribution39 (at the beginning of time):
zi ∼ f(z) =

λ/zλ+1 if z ≥ 1,
0 otherwise.
Firms optimally choose to adopt one among N technologies, which are embodied in dif-
ferent machines. A firm i that adopts technology j thereby accesses the production function
yi(j) = z
1−η
i [(1− α)k(j)ρ + α(γ(j)`)ρ]η/ρ,
where η (0 < η < 1) is the span-of-control parameter. Note that the time subscript t
has been omitted. To simplify analysis, I assume the following structure of capital. The
household supplies and accumulates what I call the general capital, which firms purchase at
a common interest rate and convert into capital of vintage j at some cost. One unit of the
general capital can be converted into 1/q(j) units of vintage-j capital. In addition, firms
are able to adopt technology j—or, equivalently, to use capital of vintage j—only by first
paying a lump-sum fixed cost φ(j). My last assumption is formalized next.
Assumption 3. Both φ(j) and q(j) are increasing in j; that is, more advanced technologies
require a larger fixed cost. Also, machines that embody more advanced technologies are more
costly to produce.
Firms optimally choose technology j, and employ capital ki(j) and labor `i, while taking
wage and the interest rate as given. If none of the N technologies generates a net positive
39Axtell (2011) documents that the distribution of firm size is well approximated by a Pareto distribution,
as employed by Buera et al. (2011b) and Dinlersoz and Greenwood (2016a).
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profit, then firms will be inactive. Firm i’s optimal choice problem is written as40
Πi ≡ max
{
max
j,ki(j),`i
yi(j)− r(q(j)ki(j))− w`i − φ(j), 0
}
.
For future reference, I define an indicator σi(j) as
σi(j) =

1 if firm i adopts technology j,
0 otherwise.
Note that if firm i chooses to remain inactive and so does not adopt any of the N technolo-
gies, then σi(j) = 0 for all j.
There exists a representative household that accumulates the general capital and also
inelastically supplies L units of labor to maximize present-value utilities:
∞∑
t=0
βt logC(t);
here β is the discount factor and C denotes consumption. The household obtains income
from wages, rental income, and profits, and it distributes total income into consumption C
and investment I. Its budget constraint is
C(t) + I(t) ≤ w(t)L+ r(t)K(t) +
∫
Πi(t) dF (zi),
where F (zi) is the cumulative distribution function of zi. In addition, the household respects
40Firms can freely switch technologies from period to period. The model does not incorporate firms’ growth
because I am focusing instead on how labor share and firm size distribution are affected by technology.
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the following law of motion for the general capital:
K(t+ 1) = (1− δ)K(t) + I(t);
here δ denotes the depreciation rate.
The model economy’s competitive equilibrium is defined as a sequence of prices {r(t)}∞t=0
and {w(t)}∞t=0 and a sequence of aggregate quantities {C(t)}∞t=0 and {K(t)}∞t=0—as well as,
for all i, technological adoption decisions {σi(j, t)}∞t=0 and demand for capital {ki(j, t)}∞t=0
and labor {`i(t)}∞t=0—such that the following statements hold.
1. Given prices, {C(t)}∞t=0 and {K(t)}∞t=0 maximize the representative household’s utility.
2. Given prices, the technology choices σi(j, t) and factor demands ki(j, t) and `i(t) max-
imize firms’ profits for all t.
3. Markets clear:
• capital market,
∫
Σjki(j, t)σi(j, t)q(j) dF (zi) = K(t) ∀t;
• labor market, ∫
`i(t) dF (zi) = L ∀t;
• goods market,
C(t) +K(t+ 1)− (1− δ)K(t) +
∫
Σjσi(j, t)φ(j) dF (zi) =
∫
yi(t) dF (zi) ∀t.
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Technology, labor share, and firm fize The static model showed that more ad-
vanced technologies lead to lower labor shares and higher output. Those findings apply also
in this extended model. To reduce notation, write the conversion cost q(j) as a function of
γ(j)—thus, qγ. The production function of a firm i that uses capital of vintage j is
yi = z
1−η
i
[
(1− α)
(
ki
qγ
)ρ
+ α(γ`i)
ρ
]η/ρ
;
here ki is the general capital which commands a common interest rate r. From the first-order
conditions of firm i′s optimization it follows that the capital intensity (K/L)41 in firm i can
be written as
ki
`i
=
(
1− α
α
w
r
)1/(1−ρ)
(γqγ)
−ρ/(1−ρ).
In other words, firms that use more advanced technologies have a higher capital/labor ratio.
The labor share in firm i is
LSi ≡ w`i
yi
=
ηα
α + (1− α)( r
w
α
1−α
)−ρ/(1−ρ)
(γqγ)−ρ/(1−ρ)
.
Thus a more advanced technology (i.e., a higher value of γ) results in a lower labor share.
All firms face the same wage and so labor productivity, defined as
LPi ≡ yi
`i
=
w
LSi
,
is an increasing function of γ. Observe that all these three properties are independent of
firm productivity zi.
41The capital used in measuring capital intensity is the general capital. In the data, capital stock’s value
already contains price information about different machines that reflects quality differences.
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Firm i′s output yi is42
yi = zi
(
η(1− α)
r
)η/1−η
q−η/1−ηγ
[
(1− α) + α
(
r
w
αγqγ
1− α
)ρ/1−ρ]η(1−ρ)/ρ(1−η)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡g(γ,r,w)
(1.1)
The effect of technology on firm size, measured as output, has two aspects. On the one
hand, more advanced technology increases demand for capital and effective labor and also
increases firm size, as in the static case; on the other hand, the conversion cost makes it
optimally for firms to cut back on their use of not only labor but also capital.
Firms’ technology adoption decision Firm i′s profit is
Πi = yi − w`i − rki − φ
= (1− η)yi − φ
= (1− η)zig(γ, r, w)− φ
where g(γ, r, w) is defined in the firm size formula (1). A nice property is that profit Πi
is a linear and increasing function of productivity zi. If g(γ, r, w) is an increasing function of
γ then the profit function, as a function of productivity zi, has a smaller intercept (−φ) and
a larger slope (g(γ)) for technologies that are more advanced. In this case, the more pro-
ductive firms optimally choose more advanced technologies. Formally, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. [Firms’ optimal technology adoption] Let g′(γ) > 0 for g(γ) as defined in
equation (1). If it is optimal for firm i with productivity zi to adopt technology j, then firm i′
with productivity zi′ > zi adopts technology j′ ≥ j.
42See the Appendix for an expression for capital and labor demand in firm i. Substituting capital and
labor demand into the firm’s production function gives this result.
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Figure 1.7 illustrates the intuition by showing an example case of three technologies,
where technology 1 is the least advanced and technology 3 the most advanced. This figure’s
plot of the profit function associated with technology 1 starts high and increases slowly,
whereas the technology 3 function starts low and increases rapidly. Let Π(zi, γj), j = 1, 2, 3,
denote the profit function when the firm adopts technology j. There are three intersection
points: z¯1, where Π(zi, γ1) intersects the zero-profit line; z¯2, the intersection of Π(zi, γ2)
and Π(zi, γ1); and z¯3, the productivity level at which Π(zi, γ3) surpasses Π(zi, γ2). Firms’
technology adoption therefore follows a threshold rule:43
Ti =

stay inactive if zi < z¯1,
adopt technology 1 if zi ∈ [z¯1, z¯2),
adopt technology 2 if zi ∈ [z¯2, z¯3),
adopt technology 3 if zi ≥ z¯3.
A sufficient condition for g′(γ) > 0 is that the conversion cost qγ being a constant. In
this case, more advanced technology increases firms’ output. The intuition derives from
the static case: advanced technology (γ) complements capital and increases employment of
effective labor (γ`)44. By continuity, , g′(γ) > 0 holds as long as q′(γ) is small enough. In
the quantitative analysis, I always choose the conversion cost function such that g′(γ) > 0.
This procedure rules out the uninformative case in which new machines cost so much that
no firms will adopt them.
Firms that are more productive choose to adopt more advanced technologies. Because
43It is possible for (say) φ3 to be slightly smaller than φ2 and hence for the inequality z¯3 < z¯2 to hold.
This situation is equivalent to the case of only two available technologies. I do not consider that possibility
because the discussion of N technologies is sufficiently general.
44This statement follows also from equation (1) by putting qγ = c.
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Figure 1.7: Profit Functions and Technology Adoption
Note: This graph shows profit functions in an example case involving three technologies. Technology 1
(resp. 3) is the least (resp. most) advanced. The horizontal axis marks firm productivity.
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firm size (as measured by output or value added) is an increasing function of both productiv-
ity and technology, firms with higher productivity are also larger. Recall from the static case
that more advanced technologies induce higher labor productivity and lower labor share.
Hence the extended model predicts a negative relation between firm size and labor share.
Technological change In an economy with N technologies and in which capital and
labor are complementary while labor is fixed, the economy will arrive at a steady state.
In that steady state, productive firms choose more advanced technologies, are larger, and
have a lower labor share. Technological change is modelled as an (exogenous) arrival of
the (N + 1)th technology. This new technology drives the economy to a new steady state.
In this subsequent steady state, the most productive firms find it profitable to switch to
the cutting-edge technology, and become even larger (which increases concentration) and
have lower labor shares than before. As a result, the aggregate labor share declines.45 To
demonstrate this effect more clearly, I next calibrate a version of the model initially with two
technologies and study how concentration and labor shares are affected by the introduction
of new, third technology.
1.3.3 Quantitative evaluation
This section offers a quantitative evaluation of the mechanism proposed in the paper. The
economy initially has two vintages of technology; technological progress is modeled as a third
and more advanced technology being exogenously available. I begin with just two vintages of
technology since it corresponds to the binary division of firms into large and small ones, for
which data is available for calibration; two is also the minimum number needed to demon-
strate the mechanism.
45There will be some equilibrium effect on wage owing to the availability of new technology and associated
capital accumulation. I show in Section 3.3 that this equilibrium effect is small.
40
The model has five parameters in preference and production functions: the discount
rate β, depreciation rate δ, span-of-control parameter η, elasticity of substitution ρ between
capital and labor, labor weight α in the production function, and one-tail parameter λ in the
Paretro distribution of productivity. The model also has five technology and cost parameters,
of which the first four are the levels γ1 and γ2 of labor-saving technology and the two fixed
costs φ1 and φ2. The conversion cost of capital j, denoted q(j), is assumed to be a power
function of γ(j): q(γ) = γε. The fifth parameter is ε, the conversion cost parameter. The
fixed labor supply is normalized to 1.
The discount rate β and depreciation rate δ are widely used in the macroeconomics lit-
erature. I choose β = 0.96 to match an annual interest rate of 4%, and the discount rate is
set at δ = 6% per year. In the model, the span-of-control parameter η determines the share
of profit (which is usually considered to be part of capital income) in firms’ value added. I
pick η = 0.75, which corresponds to 25% of profit share.46
As for the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor—ρ/(1− ρ) in my model—
most empirical estimates obtain values that are less than 1. Using micro-level Census of
Manufactures data and a CES production function, Oberfield and Raval (2014) estimate the
average plant-level elasticity of substitution to be 0.5 and the aggregate elasticity of substi-
tution for the manufacturing sector to be 0.71 in 1987 and 0.75 in 2007. I target an elasticity
of substitution of 0.5 at the firm/plant level and set ρ = −1.
In a 2-digit sector, 50 firms typically account for only a small fraction of the total number
46This value for η is slightly smaller than the 0.85 typically used in literature (e.g., Atkeson and Kehoe
(2007); Midrigan and Xu (2014a)). A slightly larger profit share is targeted because, in my model, firms
must pay fixed costs out of their profit.
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of firms in that sector. Large firms typically have multiple establishments, but the model
presented here does not distinguish between firms and establishments. I implement the fol-
lowing adjustment procedure. Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) data classify firms into
"bins" of different sizes; size is measured by number of employees, so those bins range from
"1 to 4 employees" to "more than 10,000 employees". I use the average number of establish-
ments for firms in the largest-size bin to approximate the number of establishments in the
50 largest firms and then calculate their fraction in the total establishments for each sector.
This sector-level fraction is summed up to obtain the economy-wide values. Calculated this
way, the 50 largest firms accounted for 1.93% of all establishments in 1987.
According to Table 1.6, top-50 firms account for 26% of revenue share in 1987. Concen-
tration in the mode is a combination of two forces: higher productivity which is governed
by the tail parameter λ; and more advanced technology, which is determined by technology
γ and conversion costs ε. We do the following to to back out the tail parameter λ: Table 1.6
shows a negative correlation between labor share and concentration over time. In particular,
results from a single variable regression is
Share50 = 115.6− 1.72 ∗ LS
The labor share is of course affected by technological heterogeneity. In 1987, the relative
labor share of top-50 firms is 82.2%. Based on information in Table 1.6, a hypothetical labor
share in the case where there is no technological heterogeneity (i.e. RLS of top-50 firms is
100%) can be calculated. We then combine this hypothetical labor share and the relation
above to obtain a measure of concentration where there is no technological heterogeneity
among firms. The resulted ratio is 20.9%, i.e. the 50 largest firms (or 1.93% of all firms)
account for 20.9% of value added. These yield the tail parameter of the Pareto distribution,
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λ = 1.66.
There are still six parameters to be determined. labor weight in the production function,
α, technology parameter γ1 and 2, fixed costs φ1 and φ2, and conversion cost parameter, ε.
For technology 1, the level of labor saving technology is normalized to γ1 = 1. Since technol-
ogy affects both labor share and size, the relative labor share and concentration data in 1987
are chosen as two moments to target in the calibration. The labor weight α affects labor
share across all firms and thus the aggregate labor share, which is used as a third moment. A
5% exit rate for firms or establishments is used as the fourth moment since exit is a function
of fixed costs47. A higher conversion cost reduces demand for the general capital; hence the
rate of net labor-saving technological progress, which reduces equilibrium employment, is
amplified by the conversion cost parameter ε.48 The last moment used is concentration of
employment in top-50 firms in 198749. The five parameters are jointly calibrated to match
these five moments.50 Table 1.8 summarizes the calibration results.
Under these parameter values, the aggregate labor share in the model economy is 51.72%
and top-50 firms accounts for 26.07% of total revenue and 25.09% of total employment. In
47The establishment exit rate, calculated using BDS data, was 11.9% in 1987. Because the model does
not have firm entry and exit, I choose a more conservative target of 5% inactive firms.
48To see this, note that the production function in terms of the general capital is
yi = z
1−η
i
[
(1− α)
(
k
qγ
)ρ
+ α(γ`)ρ
]η/ρ
.
given that qγ = γε, the rate of labor-saving technological progress is (1 + ε)γ˙/γ.
49The employment share of top-50 firms is an weighted average of this share across 2-digit sectors. At the
two digit level, the share is interpolated for values in 1987 and 1992 in some sectors. The same interpolation
method as in constructing the revenue share is employed. This share for the aggregate economy is 20.00%
in 1987, 19.85% in 1992, 19.63% in 1997, 21.55% in 2002, 20.66% in 2007, and 20.90% in 2012.
50An equal weights on all five moments would give a relatively large value for the conversion cost parameter
ε; Due to the convexity of the cost function, a large ε would greatly dampen technology adoption of firms
when a new technology becomes available. Generally, the value ε needs to be high in order to match the
employment share and the relative labor share of large firms. To avoid the unwanted case where new
technology are so expensive that no firms would like to adopt them, I choose to assign a lower weight for
these two moments in the calibration.
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Table 1.8: Summary of Calibration Results
Para. Meaning Values Target/sources
β discount rate 0.96 4% interest rate
δ depreciation rate 0.06 6% capital depreciation
η span-of-control 0.75 25% profit share
ρ elasticity of substitution, K and L -1 Oberfield and Raval (2014)
λ shape of Pareto distribution 1.66 20.9% in tail
γ1 technology para. in Tech. 1 1 normalization
jointly calibrated parameters
α labor weight in prod. fun. 0.44 labor share in 1987
γ2 technology para. in Tech. 1.5 relative LS-top-50 in 1987
φ1 fixed cost of Tech. 1 0.16 5% exit rate
φ2 fixed cost of Tech. 2 0.45 revenue share-top-50 in 1987
ε power in conversion cost fun. 0.9 emp. share -top-50 in 1987
equilibrium, 5.2% of firms/establishments stays inactive. The equilibrium wage is 1.11, and
the two productivity cutoffs are 1.03 and 2.57. Equivalently: 4.8% of firms exit, 74.3% of
(small) firms adopt technology 1 and have a labor share of 55.77%; and the remaining 20.9%
of (large) firms adopt technology 2 and have a labor share of 49.77%.
As mentioned earlier, technological progress is modeled as the exogenous availability of a
more advanced technology that is more labor saving. That is, this new and more advanced
technology has a higher value of γ3. Furthermore, The fixed cost φ3 associated with this
new technology is also larger. We choose the technology parameter γ3 and the fixed cost φ3
such that in equilibrium, exactly top-50 firms choose to adopt this new technology, and the
increase in their concentration ratio matches what is observed in data.
When this more advanced technology becomes available, the most productive firms (top-
50 firms in this case) optimally switch to the new technology, which reduces the labor share
in these firms to 45.67%. The concentration ratio, measured as the value-added share of
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top-50 firms, increases from 26.07% to 31.36%; at the same time, the aggregate labor share
declines from 51.72% to 50.35%, or 48.4% of the decline as observed in the data.51 Note that
there is an equilibrium effect when a more advanced technology arrives: capital accumulates
and so the wage’s absolute level might rise.52 Under the calibrated parameter values, the
wage increases, and this slight increase accounts for the reduced output and also for the
increase in small firms’ labor shares. The increase in equilibrium wage also induces more
firms to exit. In the new steady state, 9.1% of firms choose to exit—as compared with 4.8%
before introduction of the new technology.
Large firms in the model grow by adopting labor saving technologies. One implication of
the model is that the increase in employment concentration will be slower than the increase
in revenue concentration. In the data, the employment share of top-50 firms has increased
0.90% from 1987 to 2012, while their revenue share increases 5.31% for the same period.53
While the revenue increase is a target in the model, the implied increase in the employment
share in the model increases 3.43%, much smaller than the increase in revenue share.
1.4 Discussions and Further Evidence
This section addresses three related issues. First, I calculate the return to capital using
NIPA data and while explicitly accounting for changes in the relative prices of investment
goods. Second, I present the evolution of sector labor productivity and show that the (labor-
51The facts presented in the empirical section show that technological progress, particularly labor saving
technological progress, is of first order importance in driving up concentration. It is possible that concen-
tration might increase for non-technological reasons. I tried a more conservative calibration where 50% of
increase in concentration observed in data from 1987 to 2012 is caused by technological change. In that case,
the technological channel accounts for 21.2% of the decline of labor share for the same period.
52The new technology is also a substitute for labor and therefore reduces wages. How the equilibrium
wage changes depends on which of these effects dominates.
53Even though not focusing on concentration, Kehrig and Vincent (2017) use census data and reports that
hyper productive manufacturing firms increases their revenue while maintain their employment relatively
unchanged.
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saving) technological progress that lowers the labor share also raises labor productivity.
Third, because my arguments rely on the assumption of technological heterogeneity across
firms, I document (using Compustat data) the heterogeneity of capital intensity at the firm
level.
1.4.1 The return to capital
With a production function where capital and labor are complementary, a declining rate of
return to capital would encourage capital accumulation and increase the labor share. It has
been well documented that the relative price of investment goods (i.e., the price deflator
of investment goods divided by the price deflator of non-durable consumption goods and
services) has declined since 1950s. Yet changes in the price of investment goods reflect only
the capital gain component of investment, so the return to capital is equal to the capital
gain plus the real return. Gomme et al. (2011) measures the return to capital as
Rt =
After-tax capital income at t
Capital stock at t
+
Relative price of investment goods at t
Relative price of investment goods at t− 1 − 1;
here capital stock excludes housing, and capital income (calculated using NIPA data) equals
after-tax nonlabor income. The second term captures the capital gain of investment—that
is, changes in the relative prices of investment goods over time. Figure 1.8 presents the
(annualized) results from Gomme et al.. The return to capital fluctuates around a value
of 5.16% and shows no declining trend since the 1980s.
1.4.2 Labor productivity
According to the model, new (labor-saving) technologies that decrease the labor share simul-
taneously increase labor productivity. Labor share declines occurred mostly in the sectors of
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Figure 1.8: Return to Capital, 1954-2008
Note: The return to capital is equal to the real return plus capital gains.
Data Source: Table 2 in Gomme et al. (2011).
manufacturing, trade, and transportation. A greater increase in labor productivity should
also be observed in these sectors. Note that there need not be any ex ante relation between
labor share (WL/PY ) and labor productivity (Y/L). For example, in a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, irrespective of changes in labor productivity, the labor share is a constant.
On the empirical side, labor productivity has been increasing for hundreds of years, while
the decline of labor share is a fairly recent phenomenon.
The Labor Productivity and Costs program of Bureau of Labor Statistics provides data
on labor productivity for different sectors. Labor productivity is the ratio of real output
(net of price change) to hours of labor input.54 Figure 1.9 plots labor productivity for the
54BLS uses different output concepts to measure labor productivity. For the non-farm business sector, real
output is measured net of inter-industry transactions and is equivalent to value added. For manufacturing,
retail trade and wholesale trade, what is employed is sector output which is total output minus intra-
industry transactions. intermediates goods are not included value added, but included in sector output. We
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Figure 1.9: Labor Productivity, 1987–2016 (1987=100)
Note: Labor productivity is the ratio of real value added to total working hours.
Data Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Productivity and Costs program.
overall economy (nonfarm business sector) and also for the manufacturing, wholesale trade,
and retail trade sectors from 1987 to 2016 (the 1987 values are normalized to 100).55
Economy-wide labor productivity increased from 100 in 1987 to 172.7 2016—a 72.7%
rise. Increases for the same period in the manufacturing, wholesale trade, and retail trade
can calculate the share of out-of-sector intermediate goods in a sector’s output from input-output tables in
order to evaluate the potential bias. For manufacturing, this share was 26.30% in 1997 and 29.50% in 2016;
for retail trade, this ratio was 30.95% in 1997 and 36.16% in 2016; the same share increases slightly from
27.56% to 27.82 in the wholesale trade sector from 1997 to 2016. These relatively small changes suggest
that the difference in output measures is not likely to be the driver for the much larger divergence in labor
productivity.
55Prior to 1987, labor productivity data were not available for different industries. The BLS Labor
Productivity and Cost by Industry tables do not include labor productivity data for the transportation
& warehousing (NAICS 48–49) sector. The message from subsectors is mixed: labor productivity in air
transportation (NAICS 481) increased 134% from 1987 to 2016; the increase in line-haul railroads (NAICS
482111) was 196% for the same period. From 1987 to 2016, labor productivity increased 16% in postal
service (NAICS 491) but decreased by 43% in couriers and messengers (NAICS 492).
48
sectors were (respectively) 146.4%, 123.5%, and 128.8%. It is clear that, over the last three
decades, labor productivity in manufacturing and trade increased much faster than the rest
of the economy.56 This piece of evidence also supports the technological channel, rather
than monopoly power, as the likely explanation for the negative correlation between changes
in concentration and changes in labor share. Since labor productivity is measured as real
output (net of price changes) per hour, it follows that increasing monopoly power drives up
the price but does not increase labor productivity.57
Appendix Figure A.11 plots the manufacturing sector’s labor productivity and labor
share from 1987 to 2014. From 1987 to 1997, labor productivity increased 34.7% while the
labor share declined 10.3%. Since the late 1990s, both of these trends have accelerated.
From 1997 to 2007, labor productivity rose 59.0% and the labor share fell 20.2%.
Labor productivity in more disaggregated manufacturing sectors can be measured us-
56One example of technological progress in retail trade is adoption of information technology by online
retailers, such as Amazon. From 1987 to 2016, labor productivity in retail trade increased 128.8%; the
corresponding increase in nonstore retailers was 860% and in electronic shopping & mail-order houses was
1486%. In 2012, the share of payroll in total revenue for the retail trade sector (NAICS 44–45) was 8.74%,
for nonstore retailers (NAICS 454) was 7.03%, and for the electronic shopping & mail-order houses (NAICS
4541) was 6.12%.
57Additional evidence against the monopoly power account can be found in the finance sector. In finance
and insurance (NAICS 52), the concentration ratio—measured by revenue share of the 50 largest firms—
increased from 38.6% in 1997 to 46% in 2007 and to 48.5% in 2012. (A similar pattern is observed for
other concentration measures; for example, revenue share of the 20 largest firms increased from 22.6% in
1997 to 28.5% in 2007 and to 31.6% in 2012, and the average revenue share of 4 largest firms across NAICS
6-digit finance sectors increased from 26.0% in 1997 to 36.1% in 2007 and to 35.4% in 2012.) In finance,
the sector labor share (measured as the fraction of compensation in value added) actually increased slightly
from 23.2% in 1997 to 25.4% in 2007 but declined during the financial crisis. The gist of these observations
is that concentration alone cannot fully explain the behavior of labor share. The Compustat data provide
information on labor shares (measured as the fraction of compensation in revenue) in large financial firms;
see Appendix Figure A.10. Over the period in question, the labor share actually increased in most large
financial firms and by a nontrivial amount in many of them. These features of the data reveal the value of
combining concentration and changes of labor shares within firms, especially large ones, for understanding
the behavior of aggregate labor share. That large financial firms continue to have a larger market share and
larger labor share seems not to be a technologically driven phenomenon and so is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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Figure 1.10: Labor Productivity, Labor Share, and Concentration, MFG 1997–2007
2mm Note: Labor share is the fraction of payroll in value added; labor productivity LP is the ratio of real
value added to total working hours; concentration CR is the value-added share of the 4 largest firms. Each
circle represents an NAICS 6-digit sector.
ing Census of Manufactures data. The census data provide—for each 6-digit manufacturing
sector—value added, employment, number of production workers, hours of production work-
ers, and a deflator for the value of shipments (1997 = 1). Total hours are constructed by
assuming that the average working hours of nonproduction workers are the same as those
of production workers. Labor productivity is calculated as the ratio of value added to total
working hours. The deflator for value of shipments is used for each sector to obtain the real
value added. Figure 1.10 plots the change in labor share and concentration against labor
productivity for 6-digit manufacturing sectors. From 1997 to 2007, the following dynamic
prevailed: larger increases in sector labor productivity lead to greater declines in the labor
share and also to an increase in concentration.
Congress (1995) offers a detailed description of how progress in information technology
since the 1980s has transformed the transportation and trade sectors. The use of sophisticated
information systems and automation (e.g., bar-coding) has contributed to the rise of carri-
ers such as UPS (United Parcel Service) and Federal Express. Information technology has
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changed the wholesale trade sector from a system of stocked warehouses to one of fewer but
larger-scale distribution centers. Prominent technologies include electronic data interchange
(a.k.a. computer-to-computer information interchange), which facilitates the communication
of inventory and demand information; bar-coding, which has improved logistics and inventory
control while raising the percentage of accurate deliveries; and automation of distribution
facilities (e.g., a conveyor system). These new technologies replace certain tasks previously
performed by labor, so they increase both productivity and concentration—since facilities
must be large enough to support dedicated automated equipment and achieve economies
of scale.
At the firm level, one implication of my model is that large firms expand by adopting more
advanced technologies that improve their labor productivity. Data from the Economic Census
can be used to identify differences between large and small firms. I therefore calculated, for
different firm groups, the percentage increase in employment if revenue were to increase by
1%. The benchmark period is from 2007 to 2012. "Large" firms are defined as the top 4
firms (in terms of revenue) in a 6-digit non-manufacturing sector; all other firms in that
subsector are then "small " firms. Table 1.9 reports the results. A 1% increase in revenue is
associated with an 0.84% increase in employment by small firms as compared with an 0.62%
increase by large ones. This difference is both statistically significant and economically large.
In addition, the pattern is robust to redefining “large” firms via different cutoffs and to using
various digit levels and different years. These findings indicate that growth in small firms
relies heavily on more hiring whereas most of the growth in large firms is due to improved
labor productivity. Further confirmation is provided by this table’s reported R2 values: the
value for small firms (0.69, in column (2)) is much higher than for large firms (0.29, in
column (1)).
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Table 1.9: Employment Changes associated with 1% Increase in Revenue, 2007–2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)-WLS
Large Small All All
RC_REV 0.62*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.79***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Large 0.02 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02)
RC_REV*Large -0.22*** -0.26***
(0.06) (0.06)
R2 0.29 0.69 0.38 0.35
NO. 489 488 977 977
Note: The dependent variable is the percentage change of employment from
2007 to 2012; the independent variable, ”RC_REV ” the percentage change
of revenue for the same period. ’Large’ is a dummy and denotes 4 largest
firms in a NAICS 6-digit sector. Column (4) uses sector employment in 2007
as weights.
1.4.3 Firm size, concentration and capital intensity
My model implies that large firms adopt advanced technologies which are more capital in-
tensive (higher K/L).58 Firm-level capital intensity can be measured using data from Com-
pustat. The data that I use cover the period from 1980 to 2016; in total, there are 421,501
firm × year observations. Firm size is measured by assets (and also, for robustness checks,
by employment and sales). Capital is defined as the sum of two items: PPEGT (property,
plant and equipment-total (gross)) and INTAN (intangible assets-total). Capital intensity
is defined as capital divided by number of employees (and is log-transformed).
Table 1.10 gives the results of ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions in which the de-
pendent variable is (log) capital intensity and the only independent variable is firm size.
Dummies for each year and each SIC 4-digit sector are included as controls. I find that
58Abow et al. (1999) shows that firms paying higher wages in French are more productive and also more
capital intensive.
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Table 1.10: Results from Regressing Capital Intensity on Firm Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log-assets 0.18*** 0.21***
(0.001) (0.001)
log-sales 0.10*** 0.14***
(0.001) (0.001)
log-emp. 0.03*** 0.07***
(0.001) (0.002)
Year D. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector D. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample 1980- 1980- 1980- 2000- 2000- 2000-
R2 0.62 0.62 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.50
Obs. 225,798 212,927 225,811 107,875 98,103 107,885
Note: Capital intensity is measured as capital divided by number of employees
(and is log-transformed). Sector dummies are assigned for each SIC 4-digit
sector.
Data Source: Compustat, 1980-2016.
capital intensity is positively and significantly correlated with firm size.
The Census of Manufactures also provides values of capital stock for manufacturing sub-
sectors. The capital stock contains equipment and structures both of which are measured in
real terms.59 Capital intensity is defined as the ratio of real capital to number of employees.
Figure 1.11 plots capital intensity against the concentration ratio (measured as the value-
added share of the 4 largest firms) in 6-digit manufacturing sectors. Sectors that are more
capital intensive tend to be more concentrated. Over time, sectors in which concentration
increases also become more capital intensive.
59The recently capitalized Intellectual Properties and Products (IPP) are not included in the Census of
Manufactures data.
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Figure 1.11: Concentration and Capital Intensity in the Manufacturing Sector
Note: Capital intensity, on the vertical axis, is the ratio of capital (equipment + structure) to number of
employees; concentration, on the horizontal axis, is the value-added share of the sector’s 4 largest firms.
Each circle represents an NAICS 6-digit sector.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper documents firm heterogeneity with regard to labor share; in particular, large
firms tend to have a lower labor share. . It also shows that a declining aggregate labor
share is due to falling labor share in large firms combined with the rising market share of
those firms (higher concentration). The sectors of manufacturing, trade, and transportation
exhibit the most decline in labor share; these are also the sectors in which concentration has
increased the most and the relative labor share of large firms has declined the most. The
increases in labor productivity of large firms in these sectors far exceed the increases in wage.
I provide a rationale for these empirical facts by assuming that capital and labor are
complementary inputs and that technological progress is labor saving. Under these assump-
tions, my model predicts a negative correlation between firm size and labor share. Given the
complementarity of capital and labor, (labor-saving) technology increases the productivity
of capital and the demand for effective labor, thereby increasing output; however, technology
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substitutes raw labor and so reduces the latter’s share of income. Furthermore, the adoption
of new technologies diminishes the labor shares in large firms and increases their market
share. Hence the aggregate labor share declines. This technological channel is consistent
with the evolution of labor productivity across sectors during the last 30 years. From 1987
to 2016, economy wide labor productivity increased by 72.7%. For the same period, the labor
productivity increases in manufacturing, wholesale trade, and retail trade were (respectively)
146.4%, 123.5%, and 128.8%.
My paper focuses on post-1980 period. Possibly at a slower pace, there is of course labor
saving technological change before 1980s. Two facts suggest the mechanism proposed in the
paper also work before 1980. First, as reported in Table A.3, the negative correlation be-
tween change in concentration and change in labor share holds in 1960s and 1970s; even the
coefficient has a smaller absolute value, all coefficients are negative and significant. Second,
the labor share calculated using post-2013 revision NIPA data shows a slower and declining
trend before 1980 (See Koh et al. (2016)). The stationary concentration ratio in manufac-
turing in late 1960 and 1970s might be due to counteracting forces (e.g. union power) and I
leave that for future investigation.
The model in paper does not address sector heterogeneity. A promising extension would
be to embed that heterogeneity into the model for quantitative analysis. Also, in some sec-
tors, new technologies are adopted by small firms that grow large over time (e.g. Amazon in
retail trade). Another extension would be to capture a richer firm dynamics by incorporating
the creation and death of incumbents firms into the model.
55
56
Chapter 2
Social-Economic Change and its Impact
on Violence: Homicide History of Qing
China
Zhiwu Chen Kaixiang Peng Lijun Zhu1
2.1 Introduction
Historians often divide China’s Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) into an early period of prosperity
and a late period of stagnation or decline (Rowe, 2011). Starting from the Kangxi reign in
1661 and ending after the Qianlong reign (about 1813), the prosperous period was distin-
guished by high income growth and social tranquility (hence this period is often referred to
1Chen: School of Management, Yale University, 165 Whitney Avenue, New Haven, CT 06511 (e-
mail:zhiwu.chen@yale.edu); Peng: Department of Economics, Henan University, Kaifeng, Henan, China
(e-mail: kaixiangp@qq.com); Zhu: Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, One
Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130 (email: lijun.zhu@wustl.edu). This chapter of dissertation has been
published as Chen et al. (2017), Social-economic change and its impact on violence: Homicide history of
Qing China. Explorations in Economic History, 63, 8-25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2016.12.001. This
work is distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives 4.0 License
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
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as the ’Kangxi-Qianlong Prosperity’); in contrast, the rest of the 19th century was marked
by economic stagnation, or decline, and war2. This conventional view about the Qing is
supported by standard economic measures such as GDP (Maddison, 2007), living standards
Allen et al. (2011), and population gain. According to Maddison, China’s population grew
from 138 million in 1700 to 381 million in 1820 and to 437 million by 1913–a cumulative
growth of 176% from 1700 to 1820 but only 15% for the century that followed. Thus, eco-
nomic growth was far greater in the 18th than in the 19th century. China also experienced
major humiliating wars in the latter period: the First Opium War (1839-1842), the Second
Opium War (1856-1860), the Sino-Japanese Naval War (1894-1895), and the war against the
Eight-Nation Alliance (1900).
Yet standard economic measures are only partial indicators of a society’s development
progress and cannot reflect the full picture. In this paper, we construct China’s homicide rate
history and investigate the socio-economic drivers of changes in violence during the period
from 1661 to 1898. Our goals are to shed new light on Qing China’s economic history and to
improve our understanding of the interacting dynamics between economic growth and social
change. In particular, we focus on ordinary interpersonal violence by excluding war and
other organized intergroup violent acts. Because the lack of suitable data makes it difficult
to estimate general ’ordinary’ violence, we rely instead on the homicide rate as a proxy.
In so doing, we assume that ordinary violence and the homicide rate are highly correlated.
Although the homicide rate is not a performance measure in the vein of income growth,
population change, or other economic measures, it does capture an important dimension of
ordinary people’s well-being and living standards. A society in which the homicide rate rises
is one characterized by reduced well-being of its members and increasingly insecure property
2There is some disagreement over when the Kangxi-Qianlong Prosperity started and when it ended. Gao
(1993) argues that it started in 1681 and ended in 1795, whereas Li (1999) gives 1684 and 1813 as the
respective starting and ending years.
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rights. According to North et al. (2009), the use of violence is restrained by political and
economic institutions that give individuals control over resources, which in turn shapes the
incentives faced by those in a position to commit violent acts. It follows that the level of
interpersonal violence is a good indicator of progress in institutional and economic devel-
opment. The ’civilizing process’ theory of Elias (2000) holds that, at the individual level,
humans have developed a higher level of self-control by way of literacy, education, and cul-
tural consumption (e.g., reading and group learning). Because the homicide rate is driven by
social, economic, and institutional factors, it is also an intertemporally and internationally
consistent measure of interpersonal violence and associated insecurity (Baten et al. (????)).
For these reasons, we seek to assess the different periods of Qing China by using the homicide
rate’s level and trajectory.
Using sources kept at the First National Historical Archives of China, we offer the first
estimate of interpersonal homicide rates for the period 1661-1898. Our main finding is that
the national homicide rate ranged between 0.35 and 1.47 homicides per 100,000 population
annually, which was much lower than in Western Europe at the time3. More specifically,
China’s homicide rate rose steadily from about 0.6 (per 100,000 population) in 1661 to
about 1.47 in 1821–an increase of 145% over the 140-year period! Thus, underlying this
increasing homicide rate was a significant increase in ordinary interpersonal violence during
the Kangxi-Qianlong Prosperity. The opposite occurred from 1821 onward, when the na-
tional homicide rate was indecline.4
3According to Eisner (2003), Western European communities during the 17th-19th centuries had a homi-
cide rate that ranged between 0.6 and12. The European rates did not approach the low levels in China
until the 19th century. Why did China have much less violence among ordinary people than did its Western
counterparts? One could follow North et al. (2009) and develop a complete explanation of the contrast in
homicide rates between China and the West, but that undertaking is beyond the scope of this paper.
4The death rate due to war was probably falling (and lower) during the Kangxi-Qianlong period than
during the post-1820 Qing period, which saw such deadly conflicts as the Taiping Rebellion. We follow
Eisner (2003) and Elias (2000) in focusing on ordinary interpersonal violence.
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In order to explain the intertemporal variation in China’s homicide rate, we propose–and
use cross-provincial panel data to test–several hypotheses. Our population pressure hypothe-
sis states that significant population growth and large-scale migration put considerable stress
on society and cause more conflicts to occur until new norms are firmly established. This
hypothesis is consistent with Buoye (2000) finding that, when large numbers of migrants
enter a region, the effect of ambiguous property rights on disputes may be exacerbated until
new norms emerge. Our survival distress hypothesis assumes that, when grain prices rise
(because of crop failures or other risk events), the ability of ordinary people to survive is
challenged and forces some individuals to seek violence. The link between crop failure and
violence is well established in the literature (e.g., Anderson et al. (2013); Bai and sing Kung
(2011); Jia, 2013).
According to Elias (2000) and Eisner (2003), state formation represents both a civilizing
and a pacifying process because social order is likely to improve once the state monopo-
lizes the legal use of violence, imposes rules, and enforces them. Miller (2013) and Wakeman
(1998) document that state power was on the rise–and civilian self-governance was in decline–
during the Kangxi-Qianlong era, although these trends reversed starting early in the 19th
century. We hypothesize that the level of state power must have effects on violence, though
the net impact may be difficult to determine. There are at least three channels through
which state power affects the level of violence.
First, state power might make government agencies more efficient and improve the overall
society’s law and order, leading to lower violence rates. We refer to this as the state capacity
channel, which in our empirical implementation is captured by a region’s ’Chong’ rating
(applied to key administrative zones) by the Qing government; when a region was rated
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Chong, the government would likely send a more capable official to govern that region and
in that way increase state capacity there (or at least signal such an increase). Second, the
rise of state power might weaken local self-governance institutions and thus reduce the role
of the gentry (Miller (2013); Wakeman (1998)), leading to greater social disorder and more
violence at the local level; we refer to this as the gentry channel. Third, newly gained state
power might be directed at setting up regional border barriers to prevent grains and other
goods from flowing between provinces or other administrative zones. Thus, for example,
grain markets actually became less integrated across regions from the early 18th century to
the early 19th century; as a consequence, ordinary people became less able to cope with crop
failure (and other income shocks), which in turn led to more violence. We refer to this as
the market integration channel.
Our empirical exercise uses Chinese cross-provincial homicide data to show that, dur-
ing the 18th and 19th centuries, provinces with higher population density and higher grain
prices (reflecting both population pressure and food supply conditions) experienced higher
homicide rates–especially if these conditions were accompanied by less integration of grain
markets, lower state capacity (as proxied by a sub-Chong rating at the provincial level), and
fewer gentry in the province. These findings are largely consistent with our population pres-
sure and survival distress hypotheses. At the same time, the channels of state capacity, local
governance, and cross-regional market integration could all serve to reduce ordinary violence.
The cross-provincial regression results allow us to offer a partial explanation for the pre-
1821 upward trend and the post-1821 downward trend of China’s national homicide rate.
We demonstrate that, prior to 1821, China experienced fast population growth, rising grain
prices, and increasing disintegration of the grain market; all these factors contributed to
the observed continuous rise in the national homicide rate. After 1821, however, the oppo-
61
site scenario obtained: population growth slowed down, grain prices stabilized or declined,
grain markets became more integrated across regions, state power weakened, and local self-
governance strengthened. As a result, the national homicide rate declined for most of the
19th century’s remaining decades. Thus Chinese societal pressures due to rapid economic
growth and institutional changes led to a rise in ordinary violence and property insecurity
during the era of Kangxi-Qianlong Prosperity; but as population and economic growth pres-
sures lessened and state power retreated in the 19th century, so did interpersonal violence
and property insecurity.
Our paper introduces historical China data-based insights to the literature on the eco-
nomics of criminal behavior (Becker (1968); Grossman (1991)). In particular, we examine the
effect of grain price shocks on violence in the context of the 18th-19th century China while
exploring how various factors influenced this effect. Higher grain prices could be a response
to crop failure due to natural disasters, which reduced the returns to land-based labor and
increased the gains from violent behavior. In addition, higher grain prices increased land
values and so created more incentives for land-related disputes (Buoye (2000)). Given these
effects, homicide rates tended to be higher when grain prices increased; yet the strength of
these effects depended on the institutional environment. As our empirical work shows, a
higher level of state capacity or more local gentry governance reduced these negative effects
by increasing the cost of violence while reducing its benefits and also by increased sharing
of risks through state and civilian granary networks. Trading networks that were better
geographically integrated would provide a market alternative and improve the capacity of
ordinary people to cope with food shortages, thus reducing the need for violence and (by
extension) acts of homicide.
Besides expanding our knowledge of Qing China’s socio-economic history, our work con-
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tributes to the literature on the history of violence. Much research has addressed the history
of interpersonal violence–in particular, the homicide rate–in Western Europe since the late
Middle Ages. For example, Elias (2000) and Pinker (2011) document a remarkable long-term
decline in interpersonal violence due to the ’civilizing process’ and to institutional, cultural,
and market development. Gurr (1981) collects estimates of homicide cases for 30 English lo-
calities and finds that their annual homicide rates fell from about 20 per 100,000 inhabitants
in the high and late Middle Ages to 10 by 1600 and to a mere 0.1 by the end of the 20th
century. However, we are not aware of any published efforts at estimating China’s rates of
homicide and other violence during different historical periods. It has therefore been difficult
either to evaluate China’s process of civilization quantitatively or to compare China with
other countries. Our paper fills thisgap.
2.2 Data sources and description
In Qing China, local governors were required to report all homicide and other death-penalty
cases to the central government, using a standardized template known as the Tiben, or ’case
memorials’ or simply ’memorials’ in English. For each important case (and certainly for
homicides), the local governor would submit a memorial (i.e., a General Report or Tongben)
to the Grand Secretariat, where it was copied and transmitted to the Ministry of Justice;
the latter would then return a memorial (i.e., the Ministry Report or Buben), along with its
opinion on the case, to the Grand Secretariat. Thus for each case there were two memorial
reports, the General Report and the Ministry Report. These reports were originally kept by
the Red Book Archives (Hongben Ku) of the Grand Secretariat, and most of them ended up
in the First National Historical Archives.
By a 1745 order of Emperor Qianlong, the Ministry of Justice began collecting statistics
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on key cases (including homicides) based on memorials submitted from the previous year
into booklets that we refer to as Case Summary Books5. The extant Case Summary Books
are available for 39 years from 1744 to 1898. No summary statistics on homicide cases (and
other criminal acts) are available before 1743. We therefore rely on the estimates of total Red
Books (1661 being the first year with data available) based on information recorded by Fang
(1934) for 1661-1743. Due to serveal institutional changes after 1860s, we used the extant
Tiben case memorials, which are publicly available at the First National Historical Archives
to estimate homicide rate from 1860 to 1898. Accessible are memorials on two types of homi-
cide: (i)land- and debt-related homicide, and (ii)marriage- and adultery-related homicide.
We refer to these two types of memorilas as Land & marriage memorials. They represent
about half of all surviving homicide case memorials.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for these three data sources, homicide cases from
the Case Summary Books, annual estimates of Red Books, and number of Land marriage
memorials, as well as the annual number of death penalty executions as reported by the Qing
Chronicles. The time series pattens are plotted in Figure 2.1.
5These books are also known ’Yellow Books’ (Huang Ce). Because this term was used with reference to
many of the imperial court’s documents, we use the terminology Case Summary Books to avoid confusion
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for annual data, 1661-1898
Variables First year Last year Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Homicide cases 1744 1896 39 2,422 842 972 4,459
Red Books 1661 1888 96 6,122 2,654 1,170 10,578
Land & marriage memorials 1736 1898 163 1,477 517 178 2,573
Death penalty 1738 1849 82 813 271 296 1,662
Note: ’Homicide cases’ is the total number of homicide cases concluded by local governors
and summarized in the Case Summary Books. ’Red Books’ is the annual total of Red Books
(in the Red Books Archives). ’Land & marriage memorials’ is the annual total of extant case
reports concerning land/debt or marriage/adultery homicide. ’Death penalty’ is the annual
total of death penalties carried out–through Qiushen and Chaoshen deliberations (see the
Appendix) but excluding executions that proceeded without due process.
Figure 2.1: Distribution and trend of homicide-related series, 1661-1898
Note: See note to Table 2.1 for descriptions of each variable.
Figure 2.1 shows that the national homicide total, the Red Book total, the number of
land/marriage memorials (combining both land/debt and marriage/adultery cases), and the
national death-penalty total all track each other closely from 1744 to 1860; this is the period
for which data availability and quality are good for each of the four series. In particular,
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all these reported crimes increased during the 18th century and peaked after the start of
the 19th century–suggesting a general rise in violence followed by a decline. Collecting data
from different sources allows us to cross-check the accuracy of these data, which is crucial
for the discussion to follow. We will rely on this cross-validation when employing either
the Red Books series or the land/marriage memorials series to approximate missing national
homicide totals for earlier and later periods. More institutional background and comparisons
are provided in the Appendix.
2.3 National homicide rate trend
Our homicide statistics for 1661-1898 are estimated separately for three subperiods: 1661-
1743, 1744-1860, and 1861-1898. As explained in Section II, annual homicide case counts for
the 1744-1860 period are taken directly from the Case Summary Books.
For the 1661-1743 subperiod (i.e., prior to the existence of Case Summary Books), we
use the annual Red Book estimates6 to arrive at our approximation. In particular, we di-
vide the annual Red Books (conditional on the number of Red Books being available for
the year in question) by the average Red-Books-to-Homicide ratio rom 1744 to 1850, when
Red Book counts and the national homicide totals (from Case Summary Books) are both
available for 16 year to obtain an estimate for that year’s homicide case total . Altogether,
we have homicide estimates for 34 years for the 1661-1743 subperiod. To limit the effect of
fluctuations in the Red Books series,7 we use the average annual homicide total over con-
secutive five-year periods.8 We thus end up with 11 yearly estimates for the 1661-1743 period.
6See appendix for details on our estimates of annual red books. Note that many non-memorial admin-
istrative files were also recorded in the Red Books Archives. So we can’t use that directly as homicide
estimates.
7We highlight the long-term trend by averaging out short-term fluctuations.
8For example, the average value for 1661-1665 is used as the national homicide total for 1663.
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Several changes were made after 1860 in response to the Taiping Rebellion and other
conflicts. First, the emperors began issuing orders to pardon certain categories of alleged
criminals, such as some homicide cases awaiting the Ministry of Justice’s review; these cases
were excluded from the Case Summary Books homicide statistics even though fatal violence
had occurred.9 Hence the associated Case Summary Books statistics under-represent inter-
personal violence for such years. Nonetheless, local governors should still have filed Tiben
memorials with the Grand Secretariat. Figure 2.1 shows no dramatic change around 1860
in the number of land/marriage case memorials, which suggests that changes in the pardon
policy did not undermine the Tiben reporting practice despite affecting the Case Summary
Books counts. It follows that, after 1860, the number of Tiben case memorials should more
accurately reflect the extent of homicide occurrence–and thus also of ordinary violence. A
second post-1860 change was that, thereafter, local governors were required to follow the
Tiben format only when reporting homicide cases to the Grand Secretariat. Subsequently,
the Tiben template was no longer required for other categories of legal and bureaucratic
matters or for less important criminal cases. This change in practice altered the meaning of
aggregated Red Book counts after that year.
Given these two significant changes, we did not rely either on the Red Books or Case
Summary Books when estimating homicide statistics for the post-1860 Qing Dynasty. In-
stead, we approximated homicide rates by using the total number of land/marriage case
memorials for each year, employing the same approach as the pre-1743 period10. There are
38 annual observations estimated from 1861 to 1898, and averaging this series for each five-
9The Case Summary Books often stated outright that the reported statistics exclude cases in which the
defendant was pardoned or had his sentence reduced.
10i.e. multiplying land/marriage memorials for 1860-1898 by the average ratio of Homicide totals to
land/marriage memorials between 1744 and 1850.
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year interval generates eight homicide estimates for the post-1860 period.
In total, we have 53 data points concerning national homicide totals for the entire 1661-
1898 period: 11 estimates for 1661-1743, 33 for 1744-1860, and 8 for 1861-1898. The homicide
series is graphed in Figure 2.2, where the plot clearly exhibits an inverted U-shape. From
1661 to 1821, the number of homicides rose from fewer than 1,000 annually to more than
4,000, a threefold increase; however, homicides gradually declined in number after 1821 and
for the rest of the 19th century.
Figure 2.2: Total number of homicides in China, 1661-1898
Note: Each solid squares represents the homicide total for that year as estimated from data in the Case
Summary Books. The open diamonds represent five-year averages of homicide cases estimated from the
Red Books, and the open triangles represent five-year averages of homicides estimated from land/marriage
case memorials.
China’s population fluctuated considerably during the Qing Dynasty. Cao (2001) pro-
vides detailed population estimates for six selected years during the Qing Dynasty: 1678,
1776, 1820, 1851, 1880, and 1910. We obtain the country’s population for other years via
interpolation (while assuming a constant growth rate between any two data points). We
then divided the homicide counts reported in Figure 2.3 by the estimated population for the
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corresponding year, thereby obtaining the (unadjusted) homicide rate series. Yet we must
bear in mind that infanticide, as well as killing the killing of a wife or concubine by her
husband, were not treated as homicide in Qing China, so it is not included either in the
Case Summary Books or in the extant homicide case archives. We inflated the unadjusted
homicide rate series for China (as just derived) by 25% (see the Appendix for details).
The adjusted values are presented in Figure 2.3. This homicide rate–like the homicide
totals plotted in Figure 2.2–exhibits an inverted U-shape. From 1661 to 1821, China’s
homicide rate increased from about 0.6 during the 1661–1665 period to 1.47 in 1821 (a two-
fold increase). Our estimates indicate that, in China, the homicide rate at the end of the
19th century was comparable to that of the 1660s.
Figure 2.3: Annual homicide rate (per 100,000 population) in Qing China
Note: A solid circle represents statistics from the Case Summary Books, and the open circles signify
approximations.
Estimates by Eisner (2003) indicate that the average European homicide rate started to
decline around 1500 and continued to do so until the 20th century.11 Western European
11One difference between our homicide series and those reported in Eisner’s work is that our estimation
is at the national level and is based on statistics collected by the Qing Ministry of Justice, whereas Eisner
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cities had average homicide rates of about 6 per 100,000 population during the late 17th
century, 3 to 4 in the late 18th century, and 2 to 3 before 1900. During the same periods,
China’s corresponding homicide rates were much lower: respectively 0.6, 1.5, and 0.6. Eu-
ropean homicide rates did not approach China’s low level until late in the 19th century.
There are several factors that could account for this difference between China and the
West. First, state formation in China began in the Qin Dynasty from 221 bc onward–long
before state formation in Western Europe. According to Elias (2000) and Eisner (2003), state
formation is both a civilizing and a pacifying process because the state monopolizes the legal
use of violence while imposing and enforcing law and order. Given China’s much longer
history of centralized governance, these civilizing and pacifying processes likely explain the
lower ordinary violence there than at the same time in Europe. Second, Confucianism might
have contributed to lower levels of violence (Miller (2013)). Confucianism emphasizes com-
munity governance by local elites or gentry as well as on ancestor worshipping within each
clan, so there was no ambiguity about whom was vested with authority. Clear authority
often goes hand in hand with order, which may be why Confucian societies in general (even
today) have less violence.12
The late introduction of guns to Qing China may also have played a role in China’s low
homicide rate. Guns were invented and widely available throughout Western Europe in the
16th century.13 Yet even though Ming Dynasty soldiers encountered Western matchlock guns
(2003) pre-modern estimates are all local (mainly at the county level).
12According to Baten et al. (????), the homicide rate for 2000-2010 is 0.7 (per 100,000 population) in France,
1.4 in U. K.; 2.5 in Italy, and 6.1 in U. S.; it is 1.6 in China and 0.5 in Japan. According to the ’intentional
homicide’ data compiled by the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5),
homicide rates for South Korea and Hong Kong are (respectively) 1.0 and0.0. Thus homicide rates in
today’s societies that were influenced by Confucianism (China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea) are generally
lower than elsewhere
13The first recorded use of a firearm, in 1364, was in Europe. Handguns were present across Europe by
1380, and the matchlock gun was invented in the 1400s; rifles were popular in Europe by the mid-16th
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in 1521 (when fighting the Portuguese in Canton), handguns were not widely available in
China until the late 19th century.14 Figure 2.4, which is based on the 49,627 Case Summary
Books cases we examined, plots the fraction of cases (by category) in which weapons were
used. Prior to 1850, only 0.29% of criminal cases involved the use of a weapon (e.g., knife
or gun). After 1850, however, the use of weapons rose significantly; this increase resulted
mainly from the introduction of rifles to China in the late 19th century. Even so, China’s
homicide rate did not rise significantly during that time.
Figure 2.4: Fraction of homicide cases involving use of a weapon
Note: A solid circle represents statistics from the Case Summary Books, and the open circles signify
approximations.
2.3.1 Verification and cross-checking
It could be that the decline of homicide during the 19th century is due to under-reporting and
deterioration of local government efficiency (as opposed to real changes in homicide rate).
The Qing state increased its power from the reign of Emperor Kangxi to that of Qianlong
century (http://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/technique/gun-timeline/).
14Interpretative caution is advised, however, since these country estimates are from different types of
data sources: those for China (resp., Western Europe) are based on national (resp., local) data. Because
the reporting of homicides and the administrative dealing with cases is fairly homogenous within a given
country, interregional comparisons within a country are more robust than those across countries.
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(i.e., from 1661 to 1795), so there are reasonable grounds for believing that local officials
during the so-called Kangxi-Qianlong Prosperity would not dare to under-report. Yet after
Emperor Jiaqing began his reign in 1796, the state’s grip on power gradually loosened and
compliance with reporting requirements became less reliable–a trend that continued well into
the 19th century (Miller (2013); Sng (2014); Wakeman (1998)). Thus many homicide cases
may not have been reported to the central government in the 19th century as local gover-
nors shirked their responsibilities, creating a false impression of reduced violence during that
time. That being said, the Qing Code explicitly threatened local officials with punishment
for non-performance. Local governors failing to report homicide cases would be dismissed,
and those who knowingly misreported homicide cases would be demoted and perhaps charged
with acrime.
For the 49,627 cases drawn from the Case Summary Books, we calculated the time lag
between the date violence occurred and the date of Tiben reporting to the Grand Secretariat;
our aim was to see whether there had been structural changes in reporting practices over time.
The average lag, displayed in Figure 2.5, was 15.19 months for the 1717-1795 period and
15.43 months from 1795 to 1850. There is no clear evidence of any decline in administrative
efficiency or state capacity (as reflected in reporting lag) from the 18th to the 19th century.
However, the average time lag did increase to 21.32 months after 1850. There are a number
of reasons for this increase, which include the Taiping Rebellion’s impact as well as changes
to (and the eventual abolishment of) the Tiben memorial system–since those changes led
local officials to be less compliant with reporting standards.
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Figure 2.5: Occurrence-reporting time lag of Case Summary Books cases
Note: The occurrence-reporting time lag is defined as the number of months from the day a crime occurred
to the day of its being reported, via Tiben, to the Grand Secretariat. The dark horizontal line inside each
shaded box (which represents half of the respective subperiods’ observations) indicates the average timelag.
We can cross-check to see whether our collected homicide statistics are consistent with
Qing China’s social conditions as perceived by officials at the time. The Qing government
created a system for rating each prefecture along four dimensions15. In particular, a pre-
fecture was labeled Fan (corresponding to a value of 1 for our Fan indicator variable) if its
administrative burden was heavy and cumbersome. In Figure 2.6 we present both the aver-
age annual homicide total from 1744 to 1860 and the average Fan measure across prefectures
for each of 17 provinces16. The chart demonstrates a significant and positive correlation
between the two. Note that the Chong, Fan, Pi, and Nan ratings were made and recorded
independently of the Tiben case reporting system. This simple correlation exercise suggests
15These dimensions are: Chong (if the prefecture was geographically and/or strategically important); Fan
(if it was administratively burdensome); Pi (if tax compliance/collection was difficult); and Nan (if social
order and local institutions presented challenges).
16Sichuan is not included in this figure. The average annual number of homicide cases for Sichuan was
355 yet the average annual number for the other 18 provinces was 125; hence Sichuan was clearly an outlier.
It had both a large number of homicide cases and a high prevalence of Fan. We plot provincial-level data
owing to the sparsity of county- and prefectural-level cases and to the nonavailability of county population
data.
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that our homicide data series is consistent with the Qing government’s original ratings of
each province’s governability.
Figure 2.6: Average annual homicide cases versus Fan (horizontal axis) for 17 provinces
Note: The vertical axis indicates the average annual homicide case total for each province from 1744 to
1860; the horizontal axis indicates the population-weighted average of the Fan dummy across all
prefectures in the given province.
2.4 Social and economic drivers of the homicide rate
Violence occurs in a social, economic, and institutional context. Before attempting to explain
the homicide rate trends during Qing China, we use cross-provincial data to identify the social
and economic drivers of differences across the provinces: population density, grain prices,
market integration, state capacity, and local gentry governance.
2.4.1 Homicide rates across Qing provinces
Table A.1 in the Appendix presents statistics on homicide cases and homicide rates for 18
provinces in China Proper from 1774 to 1849, all based on the Case Summary Books.17 There
17Since many Case Summary Books were damaged or lost over the past three centuries, our search of
available sources at the First National Historical Archives yielded the required details for only some years.
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are about 30 annual observations for each province. To avoid the bias problems discussed
previously, we exclude data after1850.
Sichuan had the highest average number of homicide cases per year: 357, or almost 3
times the average for other provinces. Its homicide rate was also the highest (1.67), followed
by Guizhou; of all the provinces, these two absorbed the most migrants before and during
the 18th century. Peripheral provinces–such as Guangxi, Gansu, and Yunnan–experienced
fewer homicides (owing to their relatively sparse populations), but their homicide rates were
in the middle of the distribution. The most developed provinces (in the Yangtze River delta)
had the lowest homicide rates. For example, Jiangsu’s rate was 0.39, or about one quarter
of that for Sichuan; Anhui and Zhejiang enjoyed similarly low violence rates.
We can also examine the time trends of provincial homicide rates and make comparisons
across provinces. Figure 2.7 presents the homicide rate history of four provinces: Guang-
dong, Sichuan, Jiangsu, and Shandong. For 1860-1895, we estimate homicides based on
land/marriage memorials data in the same way as for the post-1860 national homicide rates.
The Tiben memorial counts are averaged for each 10-year span from 1856 to 1895, resulting
in homicide rate averages for the decades of 1860, 1870, 1880, and1890.18
For other years, there are no (or only partial) data available for homicide and non-homicide cases. For the
years 1755, 1761, 1823, 1835, and 1848 (and, in some provinces, also for 1748 and 1777), the total numbers of
Case Summary Books cases–that is, including both homicide and non-homicide cases–are available; however,
we are unable to distinguish between these case types because the data are not sufficiently detailed. For
those years, we estimate the homicide total for a province in two steps: (i)calculate the average ratio of the
Case Summary Books case total to actual homicide total for that province in the years for which both types
of case counts are available; (ii)divide the Case Summary Books case total by this average ratio to obtain
that year’s homicide estimate for the province. The highest standard deviation for this ratio is 0.14 for Zhili
(with a mean of 1.2), and the lowest is 0.03 for Jiangxi (with a mean of1.1).
18Provincial homicide rates are not extended to the pre-1744 years because Red Books statistics cannot
be disaggregated into provinces.
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Figure 2.7: Homicide rates in four provinces, 1744-1895
Note: Each diamond represents an estimated annual homicide rate value. The pre-1860 rates are based on
the Case Summary Books; post-1860 rates are based on land/marriage memorials.
All four provinces experienced rising homicide rates from 1744 until about 1821 and a
decline thereafter, although the slopes of the rise and fall differed among them. Sichuan
stood out in this regard also, as its rise and fall were the sharpest among these provinces.
The implication is that the dramatic demographic changes due to migration indeed shook
up Sichuan and led to more violence there (Buoye (2000)). By the 19th century, the early
migrants to Sichuan and other regions had settled in to their new homes, after which the
pressures inciting violence probably decreased relative to the early Qing decades. Thus the
costs and consequences of violence increased as its impetus declined, and these developments
led to a reduction in homicide from the 1820s onward. Population change likely has a strong
effect on homicides, a hypothesis that we test next. Yet because the other provinces also
exhibited a ’rise then fall’ pattern in homicide trends, it is likely that other drivers of violence
were also atplay.
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2.4.2 Explanatory variables of provincial homicide rates
To explain differences across provinces, we need to identify the likely drivers of interpersonal
violence. Our population pressure hypothesis (and first explanatory variable) concern popula-
tion change. As an agrarian society, China had limited ability to cope with rapid population
growth. A rapidly increasing population density could result in degraded living conditions
and hence in Malthusian stress for ordinary people, causing conflict to arise. There was sub-
stantial variation in population growth across the provinces. During the 17th-18th centuries,
the largest migration wave was the movement of ’filling Sichuan with people from Hunan
and Hubei’ (Huguang tian Sichuan). Sichuan’s population was destroyed in the civil war of
1630-1640 and so, when the Qing Dynasty was founded, the government encouraged millions
of peasants from nearby provinces (e.g., Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi) to migrate there.19 From
the mid-18th century onward, hilly and mountainous areas were the main destinations for
migrant peasants as the population pressure in the Sichuan plains intensified (Buoye (2000)).
In agrarian societies, interpersonal trust and behavioral norms are generally established
through repeated exchanges and interactions; that dynamic makes cost-benefit calculations
work, howsoever gradually, against violence. For this reason, large-scale migration will not
only disrupt established bonds and norms in the communities left behind; it will also create
frictions both among newcomers from different regions and between migrants and established
residents. In a new environment, there are fewer costs to a perpetrator of violence against
strangers. Over time, however, new norms will emerge that curb incentives for violence.
Using land homicide Tiben memorials, Buoye (2000) shows that–as the primary destination
of migrants during the 17th-18th centuries–Sichuan indeed experienced many homicide cases.
19Sichuan’s population was decimated by warfare prior to the Ming Dynasty’s collapse in1644. In1776,
migrants and their descendants accounted for some 60% of Sichuan’s 10 million inhabitants (Buoye (2000)).
By 1851, Sichuan’s population was nearly 30million.
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Cao (2001) provides provincial population estimates for five years during Qing China:
1776, 1820, 1851, 1880, and 1910.20 Since our annual cross-sectional regressions focus on the
1744-1849 period, there are only two independent population-growth data points for each
province (1776-1820 and 1820-1851). So for the years during, say, 1776-1820, the annual
population growth rate does not vary; hence the annual provincial population growth is
too similar (for estimation purposes) to the province fixed effect. We therefore use each
province’s annual population density as a proxy for population pressure. Province popula-
tions for each year are obtained by interpolating between Cao’s estimates for the two years
closest to the focal year, and population density–denoted PopDense (in log value)–is calcu-
lated as population per square kilometer ofland.
Our survival distress hypothesis concerns grain prices. We use each province’s price of
grains (averaged across its prefectures), which are probably the most important goods in
agrarian societies, to approximate the overall distress level of that province’s inhabitants.
The effect of grain prices on overall homicide operates through two main channels. First, a
short-term increase in grain prices may reflect crop failure due to drought, flood, or other
natural disasters; in that case, high grain prices proxy for food-supply stress that can induce
otherwise law-abiding citizens to steal, rob, or commit even worse crimes. High grain prices
can also result from wars that cut off normal supply chains of grains and other materials.
The connection between natural disasters and violence is well documented in the literature
(e.g., Anderson et al. (2013); Bai and sing Kung (2011); Jia (2013); Edward Miguel and
Sergenti (2004)). The second channel is that higher grain prices make land worth more and
thereby lead to more land disputes and related violence–especially when land property rights
are ambiguous (Buoye (2000)). In addition, grain price changes may also be a response to
20Maddison (2007) provides national population estimates for only three non-Qing years, whereas Cao
(2001) reports estimates of provincial populations.
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population pressure, thus capturing a different type of survival distress.
During the Qing Dynasty, grain prices were reported by local officials on a monthly
basis; these price reports are now kept in the Grain Price Database for Qing Dynasty at
Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern History in Taiwan. We use the average grain price
across a province’s prefectures as its provincial grain price, denoted by GPrice (in log value).
We advance three hypotheses related to the three main channels though which state
power affects violence. First is the ’state capacity channel’ whereby, according to Elias
(2000) and Eisner (2003), the law and order supported by state power both reduces the
benefits of violence and increases its costs. For example, Buoye (2000) demonstrates that
whether the government created and maintained an unambiguous property rights system
made a significant difference in the occurrence of homicide. Buoye uses this public good to
explain the homicide rate’s inverted U-shaped pattern in 18th-century Guangdong.21 Ac-
cording to Buoye, Sichuan’s increase in property rights related homicide continued well into
the 19th century because this province did not provide similar public goods.
A direct measure of each province’s state capacity is not possible, so we use the Chong
’governability’ rating (averaged across the prefectures within each province) as a proxy.22
Our assumption is that a higher Chong rating implies greater geographic and strategic im-
21Buoye (2000) focuses on the ratio between the occurrences of property rights-related homicide and all
land/debt homicide; in Guandong, that ratio rose steadily from the early to the mid-18th century and
then began to decline. He reports that land rights were ambiguous in rural Guangdong even before rapid
population growth increased the population-to-land ratio and hence the value of land. The combination of
ambiguous property rights and increasing land values created a context for conflicts to rise in the first half
of the 18th century. At the same time, higher land values also incentivized communities and officials to
establish previously absent boundaries and rights ofland. After the Guangdong governor and local leaders
did just that in the mid-18th century, the number and severity of land disputes declined.
22Chong represents that the prefecture was geographically and/or strategically important); See footnote
15 and texts there for detailed explanations of the various ratings.
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portance of that province to the national government; this should increase the likelihood of
an imperial court assigning a more capable governor to that province, from which should
follow better state capacity. Our data for the Chong variable is from Liu (1994).
Second is the ’gentry channel’, reflecting the governance of local communities by local
gentry together with clan leaders. As explained by Miller (2013) and Wakeman (1998),
the rise of state power often forced a retreat of local self-governance–notwithstanding the
possibility, at least in theory, that high state capacity could co-exist with meaningful local
self-governance by the gentry. Our hypothesis is that more local self-governance is associated
with greater social order and less violence. We use the number of local gentry figures in Qing
dynasty, denoted by Gentry, to capture the extent of local self-governance in each province.
Data from Zhang (1991) is used to calculate the Gentry variable for each province.
Third is the ’market integration channel’, through which market development reduces
violence as interregional and interpersonal exchanges improve households’ ability to han-
dle distress and reduce the impetus for resorting to violence.23 When population pressure
was rising from the mid-17th century onward–or in the wake of natural disasters and crop
failures–not all regions felt the same impact. Well-developed and unconstrained interre-
gional markets should help households absorb negative shocks. The literature documents
that commercial networks were indeed expanding beyond local areas in the 17th-19th cen-
turies, although these developments characterized only some of the provinces.
Our analysis proceeds by approximating, for each year, the degree of market disinte-
gration within a province by the coefficient of variation in grain price across its prefectures
23Sen (1982) argues that famine occurs not only from the lack of food but also from poor mechanisms
for food distribution. For instance, the Bengal famine of 1770 was due to an urban boom that raised food
prices, after which millions of rural workers starved because of lagging wages.
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(PriceCV ): the more integrated the regional grain markets, the lower the PriceCV. Although
the rules and order imposed via state power likely reduce violence, such power may actu-
ally impede the cross-regional integration of grain markets if state agencies hinder or block
the movement of goods (Anderson et al. (2013)). In this sense, then, increased state power
could spur more violence and hence a higher homicide rate–especially during times of distress.
In our regressions, we use the PriceCV averaged over the most recent five-year period
to measure the degree of market disintegration for each province in a given year. We also
construct a market integration dummy, Mkt, which is set to1 if PriceCV is in the lowest
quartile (and set to0 otherwise).
Our War variable represents the portion of a province’s counties at war in each given
year; the data for this calculation are from The Chronological Timetable of Wars for Qing
China. Our regressions include, as additional controls, each province’s ’governability’ rating
as assigned by the central government. Three ’emperor’ dummies are used to control for
heterogeneity (in strength of law enforcement, bureaucratic efficiency, etc.) across the periods
during which different emperors ruled: LateQianlong for 1766-1795, Jiaqing for 1796-1820,
and Daoguang for 1821-1849. Table B.2 in the Appendix reports summary statistics for all
of our variables.
2.4.3 Cross-provincial regressions
The panel data used for our regressions cover 15 provinces24 for about 30 nonconsecutive
years during the period 1744-1849 (depending on data availability). As already mentioned,
all post-1850 observations are omitted to preclude any bias due to the Taiping Rebellion.
24We follow Yan and Liu (2011) in excluding Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu because grain price data for
these three provinces are incomplete and of low quality.
81
Our regression results are summarized in Table 3.4.25 The baseline regression in col-
umn (1), which excludes provincial fixed effects (FEs), shows a positive correlation between
GPrice, PriceCV, and the homicide rate; in contrast, the effect of PopDense on provincial
homicide rates is statistically insignificant. In column (2) of the table, where we control for
both province and emperor fixed effects, the coefficients for PopDense, GPrice, and PriceCV
are all positive and statistically significant. In other words: an increase in population den-
sity, grain prices, or grain market disintegration is associated with an increase in homicide
rate. This finding is consistent with our hypotheses that (a) high grain prices proxy for
food-supply stress that leads some individuals to commit crimes and (b) high population
density creates distress and increases violence among residents.
25Regression results with robust (i.e., heteroscedasticity-consistent) standard errors are similar to the
results (with normal standard errors) reported in Table 2.
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Table 2.2: Cross-provincial panel regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PopDense -0.07 1.15*** 1.15*** 1.13*** 1.21*** 1.19*** 3.47***
(0.06) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.72)
GPrice 0.33*** 0.15+ 1.85*** 0.54** 0.15+ 2.39*** 1.22***
(0.10) (0.098) (0.42) (0.24) (0.098) (0.49) (0.34)
PriceCV 0.89* 0.76* 0.82* 0.78*
(0.50) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43)
Mkt×GPrice -0.014* -0.017** -0.34**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.17)
Chong×GPrice -2.26*** -2.41*** -0.41
(0.55) (0.55) (0.52)
Gentry×GPrice -0.09* -0.11* -0.19***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
War -0.06 2.77
(0.05) (2.46)
Other controls Yes No No No No No No
Emperor FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
R2 0.53 0.36 0.19 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.09
N 394 394 394 394 394 394 361
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ’Other controls’ include Longitude
and Latitude (for provincial capital cities), three governability ratings (Chong, Pi, and
Nan; see Section A.2 in the Appendix), a dummy variable for southeastern provinces, and
year. +p < 0.15, ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
To see how different institutions can help mitigate the impact of food shocks to violence,
columns (3)-(6) investigate how the interaction of grain prices with institutional variables
affects the impact of food distress. The regression results reported in column (3) include
a term for the interaction between Chong and GPrice. The coefficient for this interaction
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term is both negative (-2.26) and statistically significant. Recall that Chong represents state
capacity in that this rating reflects the imperial court (presumably) assigning a more capable
official to govern that region. Thus, even as higher grain prices lead to higher homicide rates,
that relation is weaker when state capacity is stronger. This result supports our hypothesis
that greater state capacity effectively lowers conflict and violence.
The Gentry×GPrice interaction reported in column (4) of the table yields a similar result.
The negative (and statistically significant) coefficient for this term implies that more local
self-governance (as proxied by more gentry members) improves social order and diminishes
the effect of food distress on violence at the local level.
In column (5) we add the interaction term between Mkt and GPrice.26 This term’s co-
efficient is also negative and statistically significant, confirming our hypothesis that a grain
market that is better integrated across regions reduces the impact of food shocks on violence.
The notion of a well-connected trading network reducing violence is supported by several
recent studies. For example, Burgess and Donaldson (2010) use data from 1875 to 1919 and
conclude that ’the arrival of railroads in Indian districts dramatically constrained the ability
of rainfall shocks to cause famine in colonial India.’ Cao and Chen (2016) treats the 1826
abandonment of China’s Grand Canal as a natural experiment; these authors find that the
abandonment significantly increased the frequency of rebellions in counties bordering the
canal–a result of the subsequent collapse of the interregional trade network.
The regression whose results are reported in column (6) of Table 2.2 includes all inter-
action terms in addition to our War variable. In this regression, the coefficients for the
26Because Mkt is generated from PriceCV, these two variables are highly correlated. We therefore exclude
PriceCV from column (5) because the main purpose of that regression is to derive the coefficient for the
Mkt×GPriceinteraction.
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interactions of GPrice with Mkt, Chong, and Gentry are robust and similar to those seen in
columns (3)-(5). The coefficient for War is negative but statistically insignificant–perhaps
because our period of study here ends in 1849 and so does not include the Taiping Rebellion.
Because there are only 15 (of 420) provincial observations for which the War dummy is
nonzero, one can hardly expect that variable to have a first-order effect on the homicide rate
during this period (i.e., from 1744 to 1849).
For the regression in column (7), we use the first-difference terms for homicide rate,
Popdense, GPrice and War in order to address the issue due to the potential presence of
unit roots.27 The basic conclusions from the previous regressions remain robust, except that
the interaction term of GPrice with Chong now becomes statistically insignificant.
2.5 Explanatory narrative of the national homicide trend
In the previous section we relied on provincial panel data to investigate drivers of differences
in homicide rate among the provinces. In this section we use those cross-sectional findings to
shed light on the upward and downward trends in the national homicide rate of Qing China.
First of all, the Chinese population suffered heavy losses during the civil wars that raged
from the mid-16th to the mid-17th century; this warfare led to the Ming Dynasty’s demise
and to the Qing Dynasty’s founding in 1644. According to Cao (2001) and as shown in Ta-
ble 2.3, China’s population was160 million in 1678 and thereafter grew at an annual rate of
0.664%, reaching 306.6million by1776. Population growth continued until the Taiping Rebel-
27The Fisher-type unit root test for our dependent variable which we conducted can not reject the null
hypothesis that there exists a unit root. The homicide rate series, however, is difference-stationary, that is,
its first difference does not have a unit root. The results in column (7) are obtained under standard robust
errors. We have also tried to add year and year squared into the regression in column (6), but the results
are qualitatively robust to the inclusion of these extra terms.
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lion during the 1850s-1860s, when large-scale casualties caused the population to decline by
17% between 1851 and 1880. Population growth resumed after 1880 and recovered all of the
civil war losses by 1910. Table 2.3 shows that China’s population increased by 35% between
1678 and 1820 and then declined by 5.8% between 1820 and 1880. It follows from our results
in Section IV that the pre-1821 rise in national homicide was likely due, at least in part, to
the rapid rise in population pressure during that time,28 whereas the post-1821 decline in
homicide was due to slower growth (or no growth) in population for several decades.
Table 2.3: Population of China (millions), 17th-19th centuries
Year 1678 1776 1820 1851 1880 1910
Population 160.0. 306.6 377.1 428.2 355.0 421.6
Annual growth rate (%) 0.664 0.471 0.410 -0.646 0.573 –
Note: Reported figures are based on data in Cao (2001).
Our second insight is illustrated in Figure 2.8, which plots two time series for the 1736-
1895 period: the annual homicide rate and the national grain price (each averaged over
10-year intervals). Here the national grain price for a given year is defined as grain prices
averaged across all prefectures. The grain price exhibits a rising trend with considerable
volatility. Yet close examination reveals co-movement in the two measures except during the
civil war years. Based on estimation results in Table 2, when grain prices increase by 1%,
the homicide rate goes up by 0.15%.29 The national grain prices rose by 48.6% from 1744 to
1821, which translates into an increase of 0.07 cases in homicide rate, accounting for about
28Our estimation results in Table 2 show that a 1% increase in population density is associated with an
increase of 1.19% in homicide rate. By multiplying the population-density coefficient with the actual rate
of change in population density, we estimate that from 1721 to 1821, the population change increased the
homicide rate by 0.56 cases per 100,000 population. Since the actual homicide rate went from 0.36 in 1720
to 1.47 in 1820, the population-pressure effect probably accounted for 50.4% of the period’s net increase in
homicide rate.
29Note that changes in grain prices affect the homicide rate both directly and indirectly through the
interaction terms. In our estimation exercise here on the effect of the grain price changes, we only use the
direct effect for simplicity.
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11% of the actual homicide-rate increase for the period. Similarly estimated, the decline
in grain prices during the 1821-1850 period contributed 3% to the period’s net decline in
homicide rate.
Figure 2.8: Grain price, coefficient of variation, and national homicide rate
Note: ’Homicide rate’ represents the annual rates in Figure 2.3 averaged over 10-year intervals. ’Grain
price’ is the decadal average grain price of all prefectures (units: silver tael per shi). ’PriceCV ’ is the
decadal average coefficient of variation for grain prices across prefectures.
A positive correlation between homicide and the overall price level is also found for Eng-
land, where the homicide rate declined in periods with stable prices but increased in periods
of grain price instability (?, p.309). As grain and other prices increased, wages remained
’sticky’ and did not increase as fast or by as much; the result was a decline in real purchasing
power for ordinary people, which in turn led to more violence and homicide. In this sense,
the long-term historical experience was similar in England and Qing China.
Third, changes in Qing China’s interregional market disintegration may also have con-
tributed to homicide rate variations. Figure 2.8 shows the decadal average national PriceCV
of grain prices across all Chinese prefectures (for which data are available). Two patterns
stand out. First, PriceCV and the national homicide rate exhibited significant co-movement
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during the 18th-19th centuries. Second, market disintegration became increasingly more
severe in the 18th century until about 1821–in sharp contrast to the literature’s consensus
view that China’s market development was improving rapidly prior to the 19th century.30 As
explained in Section IV, grain market disintegration makes it more difficult for cross-regional
arbitrageurs to transport grains to areas hit by crop failure or other natural disasters; the
result is an increase in interpersonal violence. Economically, the estimation results in Table
3.4 suggest that the change in market disintegration accounted for 17% of the increase in
homicide rate from the 1740s to the 1810s and for 10% of the decrease from the 1820s to
1849.31
To understand why regional markets were becoming more disintegrated in 18th-century
China, we refer to work by Bernhofena et al. (2015). These authors also find that China
experienced a prolonged process of market disintegration from 1740 to 1821. This disinte-
gration trend is robust and holds even after removing, from the prefectural price series, the
effects of common exogenous shocks within regional and agro-climatic boundaries. Despite
the Qing state’s innovations meant to liberalize markets by establishing both government
and civilian granaries to stabilize the grain supply, government power was also employed to
interfere with markets in a number of ways: direct control of supply and marketing, policing
of supplies, forced sales at reduced prices, and disaster relief (?). In particular, Bernhofena
et al. (2015) conclude that physical barriers–such as setting up checkpoints along borders
(between provinces or across prefectures) to prevent grain transportation by speculators–
were among the most significant drivers of disintegration.32The Qing government outlawed
30According to ?, p. 70), ’18th-century China’ came closer to resembling the neoclassical ideal of a market
economy than did western Europe’ (cf. ?). That description is clearly at odds with our findings.
31Here, the exact cutoff year used is 1814 as PriceCV rose until the 1810s but dropped in the 1820s. From
Table 3.4, we take 0.8 as the coefficient for PriceCV.
32Cheung (2008) reports many instances, during the second half of the 18th century, where the emperor
warned provincial governors to permit cross-regional grain exports lest they be punished for imposing ex-
port bans. These instances indicate that barriers to the movement of cross-regional goods must have been
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grain hoarding and speculation because such arbitrage activities were viewed as being harm-
ful to society in the longrun.
Of course, Qing officials could restrict market flows only if the state had enough power
and control. The balance of power between the state and society (as represented by the rural
gentry) went through fluctuations that mirrored the rise-then-fall pattern in both homicide
and market disintegration during Qing China. Miller (2013) reports that, from 1572 un-
til the collapse of the Ming Dynasty in 1644, Ming emperors repeatedly but unsuccessfully
tried to consolidate power in the state by weakening the governance roles of the gentry and
other non-official players. Emperors of the new Qing Dynasty inherited the Ming Dynasty’s
governance structure, under which the state had little control over local affairs. Hence the
Qing emperors soon faced the same struggle with local gentry and the larger civil society.
Starting in 1661, the emperors Kangxi (1661-1722), Yongzheng (1722-1735), and Qianlong
(1735-1796) launched a series of successful efforts to concentrate power in the state. By the
end of the 18th century, China’s state power was at its peak and civil society had shrunk
considerably (Wakeman, 1998). In this process of power consolidation by the state, which
spanned nearly 150 years, not much room was given to develop bottom-up, self-governing
institutions and rules. It follows that societies dominated by a powerful state may be poorly
equipped to deal with distress events, which makes it more likely that the society’s members
will employ violence as a means of securing their ends (Anderson et al. (2013); Bai and sing
Kung (2011); Jia (2013)).
So even though the rise in state power from 1661 until the end of the 18th century should
have led to a declining homicide rate via the ’state capacity’ channel, the negative effect
of state power on local self-governance and on grain market integration probably made it
widespread, since otherwise the emperor would not have felt impelled to speak against them so frequently.
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harder for Chinese localities to cope with food distress. Thus the overall effect of increased
state power may actually have contributed to the homicide rate’s rise from 1661 until the
early 19th century.
Near the start of the 19th century, state power in China began to retreat and so the
balance of power shifted once again in favor of market and self-governing institutions (?;
Wakeman (1998)). Figure 2.8 reveals that this is about when market disintegration, grain
prices, and the national homicide rate all began to decline. The 19th-century experience
is therefore largely consistent with our explanation that more room for market and self-
governance institutions permits both market and social solutions to offer relief, reducing
the impetus for citizens resorting to violence. Market development is typically an adaptive
process characterized by many trial-and-error steps. That is, market institutions and rules
that are more egalitarian do not appear automatically; rather, they are innovative responses
to conflicts that arise because of their absence (’conflict then order’).33 Hence it is not
surprising that the increase in homicides from the mid-17th to the early 19th century was
followed by a decline in homicides.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed Qing China’s homicide history, examined its trends, and
used cross-provincial data to investigate possible drivers of its evolution. This exercise is
largely supportive of five hypotheses concerning how population change, food distress, state
capacity, gentry governance, and cross-regional grain market integration affect incentives for
violence and homicide. Although rapid population growth and rising grain prices probably
33North et al. (2009) theorize that violence ultimately leads to political and economic institutional devel-
opment that creates a more stable social order that has less violence but could be either better or worse
for economic development. Adaptive institutional development can require multiple trial-and-error rounds
before violence is significantly reduced
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contributed to the increased violence in 19th-century China, the steady rise of state power
during that period may have stifled both local self-governance and cross-regional market
integration, thereby undermining the ability of the local community and the market to miti-
gate the impact of risk events on ordinary people’s lives–thus leading more people, especially
those who experienced marginalization, to resort to violence for survival. By the same to-
ken, weakening state power in the 19th century may have resulted in more room both for the
gentry and for market forces to play their civilizing and pacifying roles, reducing the extent
of violence during that period. Our work has thus shed new light on Qing China’s history:
the rapid economic and population growth throughout the Kangxi-Qianlong Prosperity was
at the cost of increased property insecurity and rates of violence. These findings have also
enriched our understanding of the socioeconomic drivers of violence.
Our paper contributes to the literature not only by establishing China’s homicide rate
history from 1661 to 1898 but also in other ways. We establish that, at least from the
mid-17th century to the late 19th century, China enjoyed a lower homicide rate than West-
ern Europe–with the latter not approaching the former until late in the 19th century. This
quantitative finding has implications for researchers in the field of comparative civilizations
and also for the intellectual debate on the divergence between East and West. Local gentry-
based governance structure for communities below the county level may have contributed to
China’s lower violence rates.
As China’s First National Historical Archives and other archival sources have become
more available in digital formats, new research efforts are clearly feasible. These sources not
only offer new opportunities for research on various economic aspects of Qing China (e.g.,
financial contracting, interest rates, marriage patterns, family structures) but also allow us
to re-examine some conventional beliefs about life in China during that era. So even though
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the Kangxi-Qianlong Prosperity may have been the best ’boom’ period ever experienced by
the Chinese economy, it was characterized also by increasing homicide and general violence
(although the homicide rate during this period was not especially high). More efforts are
required to establish causal linkages and to gain a fuller understanding of China’s long-term
history of interpersonal violence and economic development.
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Chapter 3
Labor Unions and the Labor Wedge: A
Macroeconomic Perspective
Lijun Zhu
3.1 Introduction
General equilibrium based macroeconomic models build on two pillars: household’s present
value utility maximization, and firm’s profit maximization. Taken prices as given, the house-
hold and firm optimally make consumption/production and work/hiring decisions. In equi-
librium, demand equates supply, i.e. the regular marginal condition in each market holds,
and markets clear. The deviation from equilibrium conditions, i.e. the discrepancy between
the marginal condition between households and firms, wedges as labeled in the business cycle
literature (Chari et al. (2007)), provides a natural metric to investigate market (in-)efficiency.
In this paper, we focus on labor wedge, the wedge between the marginal rate of sub-
stitution of consumption for leisure (MRSc,n), and marginal productivity of labor (MPn).
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Without distortions, labor market efficiency requires that
MRSc,n = MPn
The labor wedge measures the violation of this condition, which could be a result of
inefficiency in either the labor market or other markets. Our paper investigates the effect
of a specific form of labor market institution, labor unions, on the labor wedge. The main
intuition lies in the following formula
MRSc,n = W
c < W u
withW c andW u denoting wages in the competitive market and wages controlled by labor
unions. From a macro perspective, the marginal rate of substitution, or people’s willingness
to work, equals to the wage level in the competitive market. Labor unions, however, demand
a wage premium and creates a wedge between unionized wages and the marginal rate of
substitution1.
Figure 3.1 presents the long run trend of the labor wedge in the US from the third quarter
of 1947, the earliest date relevant data is available, to the third quarter of 2007. The series is
truncated at 2007 to avoid the effect of the Great Recession.2 The labor wedge is relatively
stable from 1940s to 70s, and has declined continuously since around 1980. The Wald test for
structural break with unknown break point shows that 1977−Q3 is the break point3. On the
1The labor wedge MPMRS =
MP
W
W
MRS . In this paper, there is no wedge between MP and W . In Cobb-
Douglas production function, Marginal productivity is proportional to the average productivity, AP , and
the trend of APW reflects the behavior of the labor share. While the latter only declines at a small magnitude
after 1980s, the relatively large decline in the labor wedge comes mainly from the household side wedge.
2See section II for details of measurement. It is well known that the labor wedge has a countercyclical
pattern, and rises in recessions. The measured labor wedge increases from 2007 to 2010 (see Appendix for
the overall pattern.
3See appendix for details. The time series trend for labor wedge is sightly increasing before 1977-Q3 and
decreasing after that.
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other hand, the union density in U.S., measured as the percentage of union members in total
employment, follows a similar trend: relatively stable until around 1980, and declines after
that4. The correlation coefficient between the two series, measured in a yearly frequency,
from 1947 to 2007 is 0.75 and statistically significant.
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Figure 3.1: The Labor Wedge, 1947Q3-2007Q3
The labor wedge has been a focus of research especially in one branch of the business
cycle literature. Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) defines markup as the wedge between
marginal product of labor and wage, which is the first component of labor wedge, with the
second the gap between wage and marginal rate of substitution, and documents that the
markup has a countercyclical pattern. Hall (1997) decomposes the labor market equilibrium
condition, i.e. marginal product of labor equals marginal rate of substitution in order to
investigate the sources of fluctuation of hours. The residual in their decomposition equa-
tion5 is essentially labor wedge. Gali et al. (2007) uses the gap between marginal product of
labor and the marginal rate of substitution6 as a measure of economic efficiency, and uses it
to calculate the efficiency cost of business fluctuations. In an influential paper, Chari et al.
4See appendix Figure C.1 for the time series pattern of union density
5Equation 3.2 in paper
6The inefficiency gap defined this way equals to the negative labor wedge
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(2007) builds four reduced-form wedges, corresponding to productivity, labor, investment,
and government expenditure, into the stochastic Neoclassical growth model, and finds that
efficiency and labor wedges account for most of the fluctuations over business cycles.
Chari et al. (2007) has generated a series of research that has the labor wedge as the
central focus. Several papers, in particular, examined the effect of labor market frictions
on the labor wedge. Shimer (2009) reviews the labor wedge literature and suggests that
search friction combined with real wage rigidities are promising explanations for endoge-
nous cyclical labor wedge. Pescatori and Tasci (2011) augments the benchmark RBC model
with a labor market featuring search frictions, in which employed workers and firms bar-
gain over both wage and working hours. According to their results, the search friction itself
doesn’t not cause variation in labor wedge over the business cycle since the effect of search-
ing friction is completely absorbed by wage instead of working hours. Cheremukhin and
Restrepo-Echavarria (2014) decomposes the labor wedge, associated with search frictions,
and finds that fluctuations in matching efficiency account for 90% of variations in the labor
wedge. We share the same focus of labor wedge as this line of literature. Our paper, however,
concerns the long run trend, instead of cyclical patterns, of the labor wedge.
This paper is also closely related to a small but growing set of papers that incorporate
union into macroeconomic general equilibrium models. Observing the inverted-U-shape of
union density and U-shape of inequality in U.S. over the 20th century, Dinlersoz and Green-
wood (2016b) develops a model of union in a general equilibrium framework. In their model,
A continuum of firms with varied productivities hire skilled and unskilled labor in a com-
petitive labor market. Only unskilled labor can be unionized. Bearing an organizing cost,
unions target firms with relatively high productivities. In that framework, skilled-biased
technological change (or unskilled-biased in early 20th century) generates simultaneously
96
the inverted-U-shape of Union density and U-shape of inequality in U.S. in the 20th cen-
tury. Rudanko and Krusell (2015) models a monopoly union in an economy with search
frictions. Rather than determined by bargaining between firms and workers, the wage is set
unilaterally by a universal-coverage union which values the welfare of both employed and un-
employed workers. While making wage proposals, the Union takes their effect on job creation
into account. Efficiency is achieved in all but the initial periods in the case the union fully
commits to proposed wages. Without full commitment, employment is lower than efficient
levels in both the short and long run. Taschereau-Dumouchel (2015) investigates the effect
of Unions and the threat of unionization on wage distribution. Non-unionized firms respond
to the Union threat by hiring more anti-union high skilled workers, and less low-skill ones
who supports unionization. That strategy endogenously compresses the wage distribution in
non-unionized firms under the assumption of decreasing return to scale for each level of skills.
Perhaps the closest paper to ours is Cole and Ohanian (2004). That paper is motivated
by the fact that, during the Great Depression, consumption is significantly below trend in
1939, comparing to its 1929 level, while leisure time (non-working time) and wage are much
above trend. These combined, don’t satisfy the marginal condition of labor supply, c
`
= w
in the case of log utilities7. Cole and Ohanian (2004) argues that the increasing influence of
labor unions in 1930s is responsible for this divergence. In their framework, there are two
sectors, one competitive and the other unionized. Insiders in the unionized sector determine
the size of union and the wage premium each period. Outside workers has to wait to be
rationed a position in order to enter the unionized sector. The rationing creates a wedge
between wage and household’s marginal rate of substitution, with the gap reflecting the value
of waiting. Different from Cole and Ohanian (2004), in our paper where unions control both
7Cole and Ohanian (2004) doesn’t use the term ’labor wedge’ explicitly in their paper. However, the gap
between the left and right hand side of Household’s marginal condition is the first component of labor wedge
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wage and employment, in our model, Unions decides wages, and unionized firms optimally
post vacancies, taking wages as given.
The rest of paper is organized as following: section 2 provides a detailed description of
the measurement of labor wedge; sector level evidence that supports the connection between
union power and labor wedge is presented in section 3. Section 4 lays out the full model.
The quantitative results of model are explored in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Measurement of the Labor Wedge
The section details on the measurement of the labor wedge. The procedure here follows
Shimer (2009) which itself adopts the approach commonly used in the labor wedge literature.
The economy features a representative household and firm. Time is discrete and infinite.
The representative household’s problem is to maximize lifetime utility given by
Σ∞t=1β
t(log ct − γ
1 + 
n
1+

t )
where β is the discount rate, and ct and nt denotes consumption and working hours
respectively8. γ measures the disutility of working, while  > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply. The household respects its period budget constraint
ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt ≤ rtkt + wtnt
Denote λt the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint. First order conditions for
8It is assumed that the (dis)utilities from consumption and working are separable, with the former in
the form of log, and the latter CRRA. This specific functional form is to ensure the existence of a balanced
growth path
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consumption and labor supply are given by
1
ct
= λt
γnt
1
 = λtwt
A combination of the two first order conditions above leads to
wt = γctnt
1
 (3.1)
Assume a Cobb-Douglas production technology. The representative firm’s problem is stan-
dard, rent capital and hire labor in spot markets and maximizes period profit
max
kt,nt
Atkt
αnt
1−α − rtkt − wtnt
The firm’s optimal condition corresponding to its choice of labor reads
wt = (1− α) yt
nt
(3.2)
where yt = Atkαt n
1−α
t denotes total products.
Combining the labor supply and demand, i.e. (1) and (2), yields the standard labor
market equilibrium condition. Define the labor wedge as τt ≡ log( MPnMRSc,n )9, and it satisfies
τt ≡ log( MPn
MRSc,n
) = log
1− α
γ
+ log
yt
ct
− (1 + 1

) log nt (3.3)
Data from the following sources are utilized to measure the labor wedge
9Note that the labor wedge can also be measured as τt = 1− MRSc,nMPn . The two measures give very similar
long run trends. We choose the measurement above since it is in logarithm and unit free.
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• nt, hours time employment-population ratio, both taken from Cociuba et al. (2012)10
• ct, nominal personal consumption expenditure, and y(t), nominal GDP, from NIPA;
used to produce consumption-income ratio on the right hand side of equation (3).
• The value of γ
1−α , acting as a shift coefficient, does not affect the trend over time,
which is the focus of the current paper. This value is chosen such that the average
labor wedge equals 0.4.
For the baseline case, we pick 1 as the value for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The measured labor wedge is presented in Figure 3.1. Note that from the definition here,
a deviation from the Cobb-Douglas technology, e.g. a decreasing-return-to-scale production
function, does not change the trend of the labor wedge.
The representative household’s marginal condition reads
γcn = w
or equivalently,
γ
c
y
n+1 =
wn
y
The right hand side is the labor share, which declines but at a relatively small magnitude. In
this paper, we take it as constant, and focus on the behavior of the left hand side. Figures C.4
and C.5 in appendix provide the trend of working hours and Consumption-Income ratios in
U.S. from 1947 onwards. Both demonstrate an increasing trend from 1970s to 2000s. Table
3.1 lists their values for 1970s and 2000s.
10We have tried to use instead average hours time employment-labour force ratio and average hours only.
The decrease from 1970s onwards is smaller in both case. In the paper, however, we follow the literature
(Shimer (2009) etc.) and use average hours times employment-population ratio.
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Table 3.1: Working Hours and C-Y ratio
1970-1979 2000-2007
Hours-1 24.56 28.04
Hours-2 39.83 42.29
C-Y ratio-1 60.46 67.08
C-Y ratio-2 77.32 81.89
Both increases in hours and the consumption income ratio increases the measured MRS,
i.e. γ c
y
n+1. Table 3.2 shows the relative change in MRS from 1970s to 2000s, for different
values of , and under different measures. We use 0.17 as the benchmark.
Table 3.2: Changes in MRS
Measure-I Measure-II
 = 1 0.34 0.17
 = 0.5 0.44 0.24
 = 2 0.29 0.15
3.3 Sector Level Evidence
This section provides sectoral level evidence for the union-wedge connection. We have con-
structed a database which covers 75 manufacturing sectors from 2005 to 201411. Data on
union density comes from the Current Population Survey (i.e. CPS). Union density is mea-
sured as the fraction of union members in total wage and salary earners in each sector. The
industrial classification in CPS is based on 2000 Census Industry Code. One industry in
2000 Census Code might correspond to one or several 3, 4, 5 or 6 digit NAICS sectors. In
total, there are 75 Manufacturing sectors according to 2000 Census Code. Table 3.3 presents
the relevant summary statistics.
11We choose this interval since Annual Survey of Manufactures only provide publicly accessible data from
2005 onwards.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics: Union density
Year Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
2005 13.4% 7.8 1.3 35.2 75
2009 11.3 8.1 0 32.5 75
2014 10 8.2 0 42.3 75
Data Source: CPS and Annual Survey of Manufac-
tures.
The union density is in decline in the U.S.. As can be seen from the table above, over the
last decade and across manufacturing sectors, union density decreases from 13.4% to 10%.
On the other hand, there are still relatively big variations in union density across sectors.
The standard deviation of union density is stable at around 8, a relatively big number. Even
in 2014, union members in the highest manufacturing sector accounts for over 40% of total
employment. The lower bound of union density reaches its lowest possible value, 0%, in 2014.
The relatively large variation in union density provides us the opportunity to investigate its
effect on labor wedge.
To calculate sectoral labor wedge, we extracts data on value added and hours from Annual
Survey of Manufactures (i.e. ASM). ASM uses NAICS codes to define sectors (3, 4, 5, and
6 digit). We merge the two data sets using the industry crosswalk tables from the census
website. To incorporate multiple sectors, we adopt the following utility function.
U(ct, ni,t) = log(ct)− γ 
1 + 
ΣNi=1n
1+

i,t
where ct denotes aggregate consumption12. Consumption for disaggregated sectors would
be very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. The advantage of using the utility function
12See appendix for the derivation of the utility function specified here.
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above is that, only aggregate consumption is needed to calculate sectoral level labor wedge.
Labor wedge for sector i in year t is then measured as
τi,t ≡ log
MPni,t
MRSc,ni,t
= logα
yi,t
ni,t
− log γn
1/
i,t
1/ct
= log yi,t − (1 + 1/) log ni,t − log(ct) + constant
yi,t and ni,t denote sectoral level value added (deflated by GDP deflator) and employee
hours respectively13, both from Annual Survey of Manufactures, 2005-2014. ct denotes per-
sonal consumption expenditure in 2009 dollar.
Merging the two datasets produces a panel dataset for 75 sectors and over 10 years14.
To test whether a higher union density leads to a larger labor wedge, we run the following
regression
τi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ unioni,t + β2 ∗Xi + β3 ∗Dt + β4 ∗ Zi,t + i,t
• Dt: year dummies, 2005-2014;
• Xi: sectoral controls, including mean and standard deviation of annual growth rates
(in value added and employment) from 2005 to 2014 for each sector;
• Zi,t: ratio of production to non-production employees.
The baseline value of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set to be 1. Table 3.4 presents
the baseline regression results.
13calculated as total employmentproduction workers × production worker hours
14For 2012, 2013, and 2014, one new sector, 1190, is added into the census code. That is why in later
regressions, there are 753 instead of 750 observations
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Table 3.4: Dependent var.: Labor wedge ( = 1,
in log)
(1) (2) (3)
union density 0.011** 0.027*** 0.030***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
prod.emp.
non−prod.emp. -0.109*** -0.111***
(0.017 ) (0.030)
∆y −mean -0.067*** -0.068***
(0.009) (0.01)
∆y − st.dev. 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.003) (0.004)
Year Dummy No No Yes
R2 0.006 0.08 0.10
Obs. 753 753 753
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Data Source:
CPS and Annual Survey of Manufactures, 2005-2014.
Column (1) shows the univariate regression result, with sectoral labor wedge and union
density as the dependent and independent variables, respectively15. It can be seen that the
effect of union density on labor wedge is positive and significant at 5% confidence level. The
coefficient values at 0.011, which means that a 1% increase in union density leads to about
1% increase in labor wedge.
In the second column, several variables are added to the regression to control for sec-
toral level heterogeneities. In particular, we add the ratio of production to non-production
15Note that labor wedge is measured in log. We don’t use log for union density since it is already in
percentage and unit-free.
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workers, average growth rate of sectoral value added, and standard deviation of growth rate
of value added. The fraction of production workers is correlated with union density if pro-
duction workers are more likely to be unionized. It might also affect the aggregate efficiency
as represented by the marginal conditions if the two set of workers are subject to different
compensation rules in reality. Whether a sector is high-growth or low-growth, and whether
the growth rates are relatively stable over time, are also taken as controls.
The positive and significant effect of the union density is robust to additional controls,
and the coefficient increases to 0.027. This effect is stronger than that in the single variable
regression. In addition, labor wedge tends to be lower in sectors with higher fraction of
production workers, higher average growth rate, and where growth rates are relatively stable
over time. It is well known that labor wedge has a strong cyclical pattern. To control for
cyclical fluctuations, we add year dummies into the regression. The results are presented in
the third regression. All coefficients from column (2) are robust16.
The value of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, , is critical to determine the response
of labor supply to the change in wage rate. In our baseline regression, we set that  = 1. In
the RBC literature, a value as large as 4 has been employed to match the relatively large
effect of wage changes on aggregate labor supply. Micro evidence, however, usually supports
a value of  smaller than 1. To verify the robustness of the baseline results, we vary the
value of , and present regression results for  = 0.5 and  = 2 in Table 3.5. It shows very
similar results as baseline cases (i.e.  = 1), with the only exception that for  = 0.5 and
single variable regression, the effect of union density becomes insignificant.
16We have tried to measure the union density as percentage of wage earners whose wage contract are
covered by unions’ collective bargaining. The results presented above are robust to this alternative measure.
We have also tried to use unemployment rate, instead of year dummies, to control for cyclic fluctuations,
and found similar patterns. The qualitative results remain if mean and standard deviation of growth rates
in employment (instead of valued added as in the baseline case) are used as sectoral level controls
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Table 3.5: Dependent var.: Labor wedge (in log)
 = 0.5  = 2
I-(1) I-(2) I-(3) II-(1) II-(2) II-(3)
union density 0.005 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.025***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
prod.emp.
non−prod.emp. -0.032 -0.034 -0.148*** -0.149***
(0.010) (0.053) (0.017 ) (0.020)
∆y −mean -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.026*** -0.028***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.006) (0.007)
∆y − st.dev. 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Year Dummy No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.0004 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.12
Obs. 753 753 753 753 753 753
Note: ∗p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Data Source: CPS and Annual Survey of
Manufactures, 2005-2014.
3.4 The Model
This section presents the model, which incorporates union into an otherwise standard Neo-
classical growth model. The economy features two sectors, one competitive and the other
unionized. In the competitive sector, wage and employment are determined by the usual
supple and demand. Wages in the unionized sector are controlled by a monopoly union. The
union values both the wage premium and membership size. The higher wage in the union-
ized sector invites an application queue, and jobs are rationed by the labor union. The labor
rationing process and associated waiting value create a wedge between wage and worker’s
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willing to work.
Time is discrete and infinite. Within the representative household, some household mem-
bers work in the competitive sector, and some search and work for unionized firms. As
standard, household owns capital and makes investment decision. The objective of the rep-
resentative household is to maximize lifetime utility, i.e.
max Σ∞t=0β
t(u(ct)− ν(nt)) (3.4)
ct and nt are consumption and non-leisure time, respectively. There are a continuum of
firms, with index i ∈ [0, 1] in the economy. Firms locate in [0, φ], 0 < φ < 1, are unionized,
and the (φ, 1] range behave competitively. Denotes nt(i) the employment of firm i. Since
there would be wage premiums for unionized works, outsiders have to queue, and wait to
be rationed a union position. The rationing process models the practice of membership
restrictions and organization costs (such as certification elections) of labor unions in the real
world. Denote qt(i), which is determined in equilibrium, the probability of getting a union
job, total working hours is given by
nt =
∫ φ
0
nt(i)
qt(i)
di+
∫ 1
φ
nt(i)di (3.5)
Household income includes wage income of workers in both competitive and unionized
sectors, capital rental income, and firms’ profits in both sectors. The budget constraint for
the household is
ct + it =
∫ φ
0
(wut nt(i) + Πt(i))di+
∫ 1
φ
(wctnt(i) + Πt(i))di+ rt
∫ 1
0
kt(i)di, (3.6)
where wut and wct are wages in the unionized and competitive sector, and Πt(i) profits. Denote
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kt =
∫ 1
0
kt(i)di the aggregate capital stock, and it investment, the following law of motion
for capital holds
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it (3.7)
The goal of the representative household is then to maximize (4), subject to constraints
(5), (6), and (7).
The final goods is produced by combining the composite goods of the competitive and
unionized sectors, yct and yut , according to
Yt = (y
u
t
ρ + yct
ρ)
1
ρ
ρ governs the elasticity of substitution between sectoral goods, which itself is an aggregation
of intermediated goods
yut = (
∫ φ
0
yt(i)
ζdi)
1
ζ ; yct = (
∫ 1
φ
yt(i)
ζdi)
1
ζ .
ζ determines elasticities of substitution among firms within each sector. We use the final
goods as numeraire and normalize its price to 1. Denote pt(i) the price of the intermediate
goods produced by firm i, the final goods producers’ problem is
max Yt −
∫ φ
0
pt(i)yt(i)di−
∫ 1
φ
pt(i)yt(i)di (3.8)
In both sectors, intermediate goods producing firms take factor prices as given, and opti-
mally make hiring decisions. Firms in both sectors solve the following standard optimization
problem
Πt(i) ≡ max
kt(i),nt(i)
pt(i)F
i(kt(i), nt(i))− rtkt(i)− wtnt(i) (3.9)
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Note that w(t) = wu(t) for 0 < i < φ, and w(t) = wc(t) if φ < i < 1. The differences
between the competitive and unionized sectors lie in how wages are determined. In the com-
petitive sector, wages are determined by marginal conditions. Unionized wage is controlled
by a monopoly union, whose objective is to
max
wu∞t=0
Σ∞t=0β
tG(wut − wct ,
∫ φ
0
nt(i)di) (3.10)
That is, the union values both the wage premium, wut −wct , and the size of union members.
The union takes into account the hiring behavior of firms while making wage proposals.
Denote D(wut , [black, fill = black](0, 0)circle(.3ex); ) the labor demand function of unionized
firms, and the union respects the following constraint
nit = D(w
u
t , [black, fill = black](0, 0)circle(.3ex); ), for 0 < i < φ (3.11)
In addition, firms in the unionized sector should maintain a nonnegative profit
Πt(i, w
u
t , [black, fill = black](0, 0)circle(.3ex); ) ≥ 0, for 0 < i < φ
The dynamic competitive equilibrium of the economy consists of a sequence of wages in
both sectors, {wct}∞t=0 and {wut }∞t=0, interest rates, {rt}∞t=0, prices of intermediate goods,
{pt(i)}∞t=0, employment in both sectors, {nct}∞t=0 and {nut }∞t=0, job rationing probability,
{pt}∞t=0, capital employed in both sectors, {kct}∞t=0 and {kut }∞t=0, intermediate and final goods,
{yt(i)}∞t=0 and {Yt}∞t=0, consumption {ct}∞t=0, investment {it}∞t=0, and capital stock {kt}∞t=0,
such that
1. Given wages and interest rates, the representative households maximizes lifetime util-
ities, (4), subject to (5) − (7), final goods producers maximize profits in (8), and
intermediate goods producing firms in both sectors maximize profits and solve (9);
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2. The monopoly union maximizes its objective, (9), subject to (10) and (11);
3. Markets Clear17
• Capital Market ∫ φ
0
kt(i)di+
∫ 1
φ
kt(i) = kt, ∀t.
• Goods Market
ct + it = Yt, ∀t
3.4.1 A Static Case
In this subsection, we present a static version of the full model and focus on the symmetric
equilibrium, which illustrates the main mechanism at work. All notations remain the same
as the previous section. The representative household’s problem is
max
nc,nu
u(c)− ν(n)
s.t. c = φwunu + (1− φ)wcnc + φΠu + (1− φ)Πc
n = φ
nu
q
+ (1− φ)nc
Firms in both the competitive and unionized sectors take wage as given and optimally
make hiring decisions
Πi = max
ni
p(i)F (ni)− wini
Assume the union’ objective function is of Cobb-Douglas18. The union proposes wages
while taking account for the fact that firms in the unionized sector hire workers optimally.
Denote D(wu) firms’ demand for unionized workers at the wage rate wu. The problem of
17Note that the labor market clearing condition is implicitly assumed by employing the same notation for
labor demand and supply.
18Dinlersoz and Greenwood (2016b) share the identical objective function of labor unions.
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unions is
max
wu
(wu − wc)ηnu1−η
s.t. nu = D(wu, [black, fill = black](0, 0)circle(.3ex); )
To see the effect of unions on the labor wedge, note that the two marginal conditions,
w.r.t. working time in competitive (nc) and unionized (nu) sectors, are
u′ ∗ wc = ν ′
u′ ∗ wu = ν ′1
q
It is frictionless in the competitive sector. There exists a labor wedge, given by 1
q
, in
the unionized sector. Note that the labor wedge is created by the wage premium and its
associated labor rationing process in the unionized sector. Denote φ˜ ≡ φnu
φnu+(1−φ)nc the
fraction of employees that work in the unionized sector, and 1− φ˜ in the competitive sector.
We have the following relation
W = φ˜wu + (1− φ˜)wc = [φ˜1
q
+ (1− φ˜)] ∗MRS
The size of the wedge is determined by the exogenous parameter φ, endogenous variables
nu, nc, and q.
We parameterize the economy by choosing the following functional forms
u(c) = log(c); ν(n) = γ

1 + 
n
1+
 ; F (n) = nα
The labor demand function for unionized firms, D(nu), is
D(nu) = (
wu
αp
)
1
α−1
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The union’s problem becomes
max
wu
(wu − wc)ηnu1−η
s.t. nu = (
wu
αp
)
1
α−1
Note that the union takes wage in the competitive sector as given. It is straightforward to
solve the optimization above and obtain
wu =
1− η
1− η + (α− 1)ηw
c
We restrict attention to the case 1 − η + (α − 1)η > 0. Denote ∆ ≡ 1−η
1−η+(α−1)η . Since
α − 1 < 0, it follows that ∆ > 1, and wu > wc. Combining this relation with the marginal
conditions on the household side leads to
1
q
=
1− η
1− η + (α− 1)η
The intuition for this equation is, if the wage premium of unions is higher, then the queue
is longer outsize of the labor union, which implies a lower matching probability.
The union density, i.e. the fraction of union members in total employment, is
φ˜ =
φnu
φnu + (1− φ)nc =
φ
φ+ (1− φ)∆ 11−α
,
and the wedge between the average wage, W ≡ φ˜wu + (1 − φ˜)wc, and the marginal rate of
substitution, is φ˜∆ + (1− φ˜).
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Note that the way we calculate the marginal product of labor is
MPL = α
Y
N
≡ αφp
uyu + (1− φ)pcyc
φnu + (1− φ)nc
= φ˜α
puyu
nu
+ (1− φ˜)αp
cyc
nc
= φ˜wu + (1− )˜φwc ≡ W
The size of the labor wedge, defined as log MPMRS is therefore proportional to φ˜∆ + (1− φ˜).
3.5 Quantitative Analysis
This section implements quantitative analyses. We choose the following functional forms
u(c) = log(c); ν(n) = γ

1 + 
n
1+
 ; F j(k, n) = Aj(k1−αnα)χ, j = u, c.
In principle, productivities in the unionized and competitive sectors can be different from
each other19.
The objective function of the union is chosen to be20
G(wut − wnt , nt(i)) = (wut θ1 − wct θ2)η(
∫ φ
0
nt(i)di)
1−η
The union values the wage premium, wut − wct, but might have different elasticities to-
wards increases in wut and decreases in wct .
19Dinlersoz and Greenwood (2016b) documents that unions generally target more productive firms.
20A more general utility function is used since the wage premium is constant under a Cobb-Douglas
objective function.
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Several parameters are standard especially in the business cycle literature, and we choose
widely used values for these parameters. One period in the model corresponds to one year in
the data. We choose the annual depreciation rate δ to be 10%. The value of the discount rate
is set as β = 0.96 such that the annual net return of investment equals 4%. In the baseline
calibration, we set the Frisch elasticity of labor supply as  = 1. The value of γ, the weight
on working disutility in household’s preference, is chosen such that the household spend one
third of hours on working21. On the production side, we follow Buera et al. (2011a), and
choose the span of control parameter in production function χ = 0.7922. The value of α is
calibrated to be 0.81 to match a labor share of 64%, as in Kydland and Prescott (1982).
Without loss of generality, we normalize productivity in the competitive sector, Ai, φ <
i < 1 (or simply Ac), to be 1. Due to the existence of decreasing return to scale, a small
difference in wages translates into a relatively large gap in employment. That is, employment
in firms in the the competitive sector is significantly higher than unionized employment even
if the union wage premium is moderate23. Table 3.6 lists the distribution of firm size groups
among union members and regular workers. The median union worker works in a firms with
more than 1000 persons in both 1992 and 2007, while the total number of persons in the
firm the median non-union worker works in is between 100 and 500.
21This is for the year 1970. Total working hours are affected by the size of the unionized sector, as measured
by φ. The value of φ varies over years, so as the working hours.
22There are different calibrations for this span of control parameter. For example, the parameter is set as
0.85 in Midrigan and Xu (2014b).
23See Appendix for a detailed derivation. It can be seen there that the employment ratio of competitive
to unionized firms is a function of A
u
Ac and the wage ratio
wu
wc .
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Table 3.6: Distribution of workers among firm size groups
< 10 [10,50) [50,100) [100,500) [500,1000) ≥ 1000
1992
Non-Union 15.28% 11.16 16.50 16.44 5.77 34.85
Union Member 3.47 3.94 9.73 17.21 7.86 57.78
Union Coverage 3.99 4.23 10.03 17.56 8.15 56.04
2007
Non-Union 15.89% 12.25 15.15 14.11 5.98 36.62
Union Member 4.92 5.69 8.73 16.11 8.11 56.44
Union Coverage 5.00 6.12 9.53 16.00 7.98 55.36
Data Source: CPS. Firm size indicates the total number of persons who work in the firm.
The universe is workers who work for wage and salaries in the private sector.
We increase the productivity of the unionized firms, Ai, 0 < i < φ (or Au), to be consis-
tent with the fact that union members, in average, command a wage premium and as well
work in larger firms than non-union workers. In the baseline calibration, we set Au = 1.23
such that, under a 20% of union wage premium, the average employment size of unionized
firms is 20% higher than that in the competitive sector. A 26% of union density, i.e. fraction
of union members in total employment, requires 22.6% of firms to be unionized24.
The parameter ζ determines the elasticity of substitution among firms within each sector.
This parameter is widely used in the New Keynesian business cycle literature. We pick the
value of ζ = 0.83, the benchmark value used in Christiano et al. (2005). For the parameter ρ,
which governs the elasticity of substitution between sectoral goods, note that the following
24Results under different values of Au are presented in appendix.
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relation holds under the aggregate production function, Yt = (yut ρ + yct ρ)
1
ρ ,
log
put y
u
t
pcty
c
t
=
ρ
ρ− 1 log
put
pct
.
The relation between relative expenditure and relative price between the competitive and
unionized sectors from data can therefore be used to estimate the parameter ρ25. Table C.1
in appendix lists the average union density, ranked from low to high, for 2 digit sectors in
NAICS. Sectors that have a union density higher than 15% are labeled as unionized sectors,
and the rest competitive sectors26. We then run a single variable regression with relative
expenditure share and relative price27 of unionized sectors, comparing to competitive sec-
tors, as dependent and independent variables, respectively. Each year is one observation,
and there are 34 years (1983-2017). The regression results yields a value of ρ = 0.5 for all
economy28.
We normalize θ2 = 1. The Union’s optimization problem implies a relation between wages
in competitive and unionized sectors, ϕ(wu, wc, θ, [black, fill = black](0, 0)circle(.3ex); ). We
use this relation from data to estimate θ1, and obtain the value θ1 = 1.26. We jointly calibrate
parameters γ, φ, and η, to target a working hour of about 1/3, a wage premium of 20%29,
and a union density of 21%. All moments refer to their 1977 values. Table 3.7 lists the
results.
25Similar methods has been employed in Cole and Ohanian (2004), and Acemoglu (2003), to estimate the
parameter governing the elasticity of substitution between sectors.
26Defined this way, the value added share of unionized sectors is 43.1%, and 33.6% in the private economy
in 1987.
27we calculate price index for each sector as the weighted average of prices of industries within that sector,
with value added used as weights
28As robustness check, we have tried to use ρ = 0.1 and found robust the main results regarding changes
of the labor wedge
29See Table C.2 in appendix.
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Table 3.7: Calibration moments
Moments Model Data
working hour 33.63% 1/3
wage premium 20.00% 20%
union density 21.00% 21%
Table 3.8 summarizes the calibration results.
Table 3.8: Summary of Calibration
Para. Description Value Target/Source
β Discount rate 0.96 Annual 4% net return of inv.
δ Depreciation rate of K 0.1 Annual 10% depreciation
γ Disutility of work 4.04 13 working time
 Elasticity of labor supply 1 Standard
Ac Productivity in competitive sector 1 Normalization
Au Productivity in unionized sector 1.23 Relative employment size
χ Span-of-control in prod. fun. 0.79 Buera et al. (2011)
α Labor’s share 0.81 Labor share in NIPA
ζ Elasticity of sub. within sectors 0.83 CEE(2005)
ρ Elasticity of sub. btw. sectors 0.5 Expenditure-price elasticity
θ1 Union’s elasticity w.r.t. wc 1 Normalization
θ2 Union’s elasticity w.r.t. wu 1.26 See text
η Union’s weight on wages 0.38 Union wage premium
φ Fraction of unionized firms 0.18 Union density in 1977
Note: see text for details.
To see the implications on the labor wedge, note that, the labor wedge is originally from
the gap between average wage and the marginal rate of substitution, due to the wage premium
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commanded by the union and the associated job rationing. The fraction of employment in
the unionized sector is measured as φ˜ ≡ φnu
φnu+(1−φ)nc , and the economy wide wage is given by
W = φ˜wu + (1− φ˜)wc
Denote MPL ≡ αχ Y
N
the economy wide marginal productivity of labor. As in the static
case, it follows that
MPL = W = lw ∗MRS
where
lw = φ˜
1
q
+ (1− φ˜)
q is the probability of a successful job rationing in the unionized sector, which is deter-
mined endogenously. We treat each year as a steady state, and vary the value of φ across
years, by targeting union densities in data. Table 3.9 lists results for several selected years.
Table 3.9: Model moments
Period φ wu wc nu nc Union D. LW (in log)
1970-79 0.21 1.05 0.86 0.38 0.32 23.95% 5.13%
1980-89 0.16 1.04 0.85 0.40 0.33 18.22% 4.01%
1990-99 0.13 1.03 0.84 0.41 0.35 14.49% 3.23%
2000-07 0.11 1.02 0.83 0.43 0.37 12.26% 2.76%
Based on previous calculations, the labor wedge in data has declined 0.17 log points
from 1970s to 2000s. For the same period, our model, by matching the magnitude of union
density, implies a decrease of labor wedge by 0.024 log points, which accounts for 14% of the
overall decline in data.
Union premiums means a higher wage in the model. In reality, however, a large proportion
of union premium does not come in the form of wages, but in things such as a flexible working
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hours, and larger retirement benefits. To capture these non-wage benefits, we have tried an
alternative calibration to target a wage premium of 30%, instead of 20%. Table 3.10 lists
main results under these alternative calibration.
Table 3.10: Model moments
Period φ Union D. LW (in log)
1970-79 0.21 23.95% 7.99%
1980-89 0.16 18.22% 6.22%
1990-99 0.13 14.49% 3.23%
2000-07 0.11 12.26% 4.26%
Under this alternative calibration, the model generates 3.73% log points of decrease in
the labor wedge, which accounts for 22% of the decline observed in data.
3.6 Conclusion
Labor wedge, the difference between marginal product of labor and marginal rate of substitu-
tion, is a reduced form representation of deviations from competitive market and allocation
efficiency. The measured labor wedge in U.S. since world war II has been relatively stable
until early to middle 1970s, and steadily declined for the recent 3-4 decades. In this paper, we
propose that the existence of labor unions, and their power to influence wages and employ-
ment in the labor market affect the behavior of labor wedge. Overall, union density follows
a similar stable-then-decline trend. We further assemble a panel dataset of 75 manufactur-
ing sectors from 2005 to 2014, and provide empirical support for the union-wedge connection.
We developed a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the effect of union power
on labor wedge. In our model economy, there are two sectors, competitive and unionized.
Wages in the competitive market are determined competitively, while the unionized wages
are controlled by a monopolistic union. The union commands a wage premium, which invites
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job application queues and job rationing in the unionized sector. This job rationing process
creates a wedge between wages and households’ willing to work. According to our results,
approximately 20% of the decline in labor wedge from 1970s to 2000s can be accounted for
by the decreases in union density.
The long run trend of labor wedge in general, and its decline since 1970s in particular
provide a summary of market efficiency and its overall change. The decline of labor wedge,
or the improvement of market efficiency, might also be a result of changes beyond declin-
ing power of labor unions. One example is the decrease of tax rate, which also create a
wedge between marginal conditions. We leave explorations along these directions for future
research.
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K/L intensity under different technologies in Static Case. The equilibrium condi-
tion in the labor market is
w = MPLj =
[
(1− α)
(
kj
`j
)ρ
+ αγρj
]1/ρ−1
αγρj .
Note that this expression contains two γj. The last γρj captures a direct effect: technology
with a higher γj increases labor productivity and requires less labor to produce. The first γρj
captures the opposite effect—namely, that this technology allows firms to operate at a larger
scale, which increases labor demand.
Rewrite the labor market marginal condition as
(1− α)
(
k
`
)ρ
=
(
w
αγρ
)ρ/(1−ρ)
− αγρ ≡ f(γ).
A sufficient condition for a positive correlation between γ and k/` is f ′(γ) < 0. Note that
f ′(γ) =
(
w
α
)ρ/(1−ρ)(
− ρ
2
1− ρ
)
γ−ρ
2/(1−ρ)−1 − αργρ−1
and that f ′(γ) < 0 is equivalent to
γ >
(
w
α
)1/(1−ρ)( −ρ
1− ρ
1
α
)1/ρ
.
Therefore, this condition is satisfied if γ is large enough1.
Firm size and employment in general equilibrium Let MPK stand for the marginal
productivity of capital. Then the optimal conditions in a competitive equilibrium are as
1Note that it follow from the marginal condition of labor market, (1 − α)(k` )ρ = ( wαγρ )
ρ
1−ρ − αγρ, that
( wαγρ )
ρ
1−ρ − αγρ > 0, or equivalently, γ > wα ( 1α )
1−ρ
ρ .
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follows:
MPKi = ηz
1−η
i
[
(1− α)
(
ki
qγ
)ρ
+ α(γ`i)
ρ
]η/ρ−1
(1− α)q−ργ kρ−1i = r;
MPLi = ηz
1−η
i
[
(1− α)
(
ki
qγ
)ρ
+ α(γ`i)
ρ
]η/ρ−1
αγρ`ρ−1i = w.
Firm i’s demand for capital and labor may be written as
ki = zi
(
η(1− α)
r
)1/(1−η)
q−η/(1−η)γ
[
(1− α) + α
(
r
w
αγqγ
1− α
)ρ/(1−ρ)](η−ρ)/ρ(1−η)
and
`i = zi
(
ηα
w
)1/(1−η)
γη/(1−η)
[
(1− α)
(
1− α
αγqγ
w
r
)ρ/(1−ρ)
+ α
](η−ρ)/ρ(1−η)
,
respectively. Therefore, the net effect of technology on employment size is unclear. The
reason is that technology has two effects on employment, as illustrated in the static case
above.
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Data Source
• Data used to calculate labor share for 2-digit sectors are from the industry accounts
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Labor share for detailed manufacturing
sectors is calculated using data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures. A simplified
version of the ASM by 6-digit sectors is summarized in the NBER-CES data set. These
data are available for 6-digit manufacturing sectors from 1958 to 2011.
• Concentration ratios for 2002, 2007, and 2012 are from the US Census Bureau’s Amer-
ican FactFinder website and from various pre-1997 publications of the Census Bureau.
This measure gives shares of the 4, 8, 20, and 50 largest firms in total sales (receipts, or
value of shipments). For manufacturing, concentration ratios in terms of value added
are also available.
Classification of multi-establishment enterprises The NAICS is designed to facil-
itate the collection, tabulation, presentation, and analysis of data relating to establishments
(see Parker (2012)). For industry classification of multi-unit firms2 with diverse production
activities, the NAICS uses a multiple stage "hierarchical" approach. In the first stage, the
firm is assigned to a major sector based on highest share of payroll. Within that major
sector, the firm is then assigned to a subsector, based on the highest share across the subsec-
tors within the major sector (cf. Awuku-Budu and Robbins (2014)). This process continues
through to the most disaggregated level of industry classifications.
Labor Share in Census of Manufacturing versus NIPA
2"unit and "establishment" are used interchangeably. In this context,"firms", "enterprises", and "com-
panies" amounts to the same things.
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Figure A.1: MFG LS in ASM/NBER-CES and BEA-NIPA
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Offshoring index
Following Feenstra and Hansen (1996) and Feenstra and Hansen (1998), I measure sec-
tor i’s offshoring intensity as
OSi = Σj
Input from sector j
Total intermediate input in i
× Import intensity of j.
The import intensity of j is measured as the fraction of imports in expenditures, which equals
the value of shipments (plus imports and minus exports) in sector j. Offshoring intensity is
calculated using the input–output tables of 1997 and 2015 for 66 private industries. Figure A
presents the results. The measured offshoring intensity increases in most industries, but the
increases are more prominent in manufacturing than in non-manufacturing sectors.
offshoring-eps-converted-to.pdf
Figure A.2: Offshoring intensity, 1997-2015
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Table A.1: Concentration and Labor Share. Depend. var.: ∆LS, 1997-2007
OLS WLS
3 digit 4 digit 5 digit 6 digit 3 digit 4 digit 5 digit 6 digit
∆CR04 -0.239** -0.206*** -0.237*** -0.171*** -0.117 -0.175*** -0.191*** -0.156***
(0.099) (0.054) (0.033) (0.024) (0.084) (0.043) (0.032) (0.024)
R2 0.23 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.08
∆CR08 -0.213*** -0.126** -0.175*** -0.146*** -0.125** -0.132*** -0.147*** -0.125***
(0.073) (0.062) (0.041) (0.029) (0.057) (0.046) (0.037) (0.029)
R2 0.31 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.20 0.09 0.08 0.04
∆CR20 -0.318*** -0.149* -0.210*** -0.157*** -0.132 -0.203*** -0.247*** -0.169***
(0.115) (0.077) (0.049) (0.036) (0.084) (0.063) (0.053) (0.040)
R2 0.29 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.04
∆CR50 -0.347* -0.137 -0.211*** -0.124*** -0.168 -0.226*** -0.260*** -0.176***
(0.167) (0.100) (0.062) (0.048) (0.113) (0.084) (0.067) (0.054)
R2 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.02
Obs. 21 86 183 464 21 86 183 464
Note: The single variable regression results are for manufacturing sectors, at various digit levels. The
dependent variable is change in labor share and the independent variable is change in concentration from
1997 to 2007. ∆CR04 refers to the change in Share04, which itself measure the share of value added
accounted for by the largest 4 firms in a sector. In WLS regressions, the weight used is given by the
average value added between 1997 and 2007.
Table A.2: Regression with panel data; Dependent Variable.: ∆LS
(1) (2) (3)
∆CR04 -0.183*** -0.283*** -0.084***
(0.029) (0.048) (0.024)
∆ k-l ratio (ln) -0.322
(0.760)
∆ per-capita vadd (ln) -30.249***
(0.812)
∆ % production worker 0.656***
(0.081)
Fixed effect No Yes Yes
Obs. 927 927 927
Note: The panel regression results are for manufacturing sectors at
the 6 digit level. There are two period, change from 1997 to 2002, and
change from 2002 to 2007. LS is the ratio of payroll to value added.
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Figure A.3: ∆LS v.s. ∆Share04, MFG
Note: Labor share on the vertical axis is calculated as the fraction of payroll in value added. Concentration
on the horizontal axis is the value added share of 4 largest firms.
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Table A.3: Dependent Variable:∆LS
1963-1967 1972-1977 1977-1982 1987-1992
OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS OLS WLS
∆CR04 -0.101** -0.059** -0.118*** -0.023 -0.190*** -0.240*** -0.174*** -0.128***
(0.039) (0.030) (0.040) (0.044) (0.057) (0.062) (0.036) (0.032)
R2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.001 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03
∆CR08 -0.117*** -0.079*** -0.108*** -0.011 -0.164** -0.147** -0.195*** -0.121***
(0.035) (0.030) (0.040) (0.036) (0.058) (0.064) (0.040) (0.036)
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.001 0.05 0.03
∆CR20 -0.187*** -0.103*** -0.113** -0.067 -0.105 -0.180** -0.207*** -0.171***
(0.046) (0.036) (0.045) (0.053) (0.067) (0.073) (0.049) (0.044)
R2 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.004 0.006 0.01 0.04 0.03
∆CR50 -0.167*** -0.076 -0.101* -0.075 -0.134* -0.274*** -0.229*** -0.141**
(0.059) (0.048) (0.053) (0.057) (0.080) (0.068) (0.069) (0.059)
R2 0.02 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.03 0.02 0.01
Obs. 400 400 442 442 437 437 448 448
Note: The single variable regression results are based on 4 digit SIC manufacturing sectors. The
dependent and independent variables are the change in labor share and concentration, from 1963 to
1967 in the first two columns, and from 1972 to 1977 in the last two columns. ∆CR04 refers to the
change in Share04, which itself measure the share of value of shipment by the 4 largest firms in a sector.
The weights used in WLS regressions are the average value added of beginning and end years for each
period.
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Table A.4: Dependent Variable.: ∆LS, 2007-2012
LS1-OLS LS2-OLS LS1-WLS LS2-WLS
∆CR04 -0.292** -0.386*** -0.267*** -0.348***
(0.041) (0.051) (0.032) (0.043)
R2 0.23 0.25 0.29 0.28
∆CR08 -0.352*** -0.475*** -0.363*** -0.476***
(0.049) (0.061) (0.038) (0.051)
R2 0.23 0.26 0.34 0.33
∆CR20 -0.400*** -0.558*** -0.442*** -0.581***
(0.065) (0.081) (0.050) (0.067)
R2 0.18 0.22 0.31 0.30
∆CR50 -0.357*** -0.558*** -0.442*** -0.714***
(0.092) (0.115) (0.050) (0.096)
R2 0.08 0.12 0.31 0.24
Obs. 175 175 175 175
Note: The single variable regression results are for man-
ufacturing sectors at the 5 digit level. LS1 is the ratio
of payroll to value added, and LS2 the ratio of compen-
sation (=payroll+benefit) to value added. The average
value added between 2007 and 2012 is used as the weight
in WLS.
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Figure A.4: ∆LS v.s. ∆Share04, NON-MFG, 1997-2012
Note: LS in the vertical axis is the fraction of compensation of employees to value added. Concentration in
the horizontal axis is the revenue share of 4 largest firms.
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Figure A.5: ∆LS v.s. ∆Share50, NON-MFG, 1997-2012
Note: Labor share on the vertical axis is measured the fraction of compensation of employees to value
added. Concentration on the horizontal axis is the revenue share of 50 largest firms. In this graph, I made
minimum adjustments to LS in 1997 based on data in Table A.11. In particular LS for Information in 1996,
instead of 1997, and the average LS for Education between 1996 and 1998, instead of 1997, are employed.
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Figure A.6: Share of Top-4 Firms: Value Added versus Revenue, MFG 2002
Note: The vertical axis is the revenue share of 4 largest firms (in terms of revenue); and the horizontal axis
is the value added share of 4 largest firms (in terms of value added).
Table A.5: Dependent Variable: Share04 in terms of Revenue, MFG 2002
3 digit 4 digit 5 digit 6 digit
Share04_vadd 0.917*** 0.948*** 0.959*** 0.956***
(0.043) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007)
R2 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.97
Obs. 21 86 183 467
Note: The dependent variable is the revenue share of the 4 largest
firms (ranked by revenue); and the independent variable is the value
added share for the 4 largest firms (ranked value added).
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Table A.6: Concentration in the Manufacturing Sector-I
Share04 Share08
Year 3-D 4-D 5-D 6-D 3-D 4-D 5-D 6-D
1997 19.82 29.99 35.12 42.37 27.43 40.29 46.53 54.04
2002 20.81 32.19 37.52 44.84 29.38 43.01 49.05 57.40
2007 20.88 32.18 37.48 44.93 30.92 44.38 50.68 59.03
2012 21.64 32.63 38.26 44.47 32.56 45.20 51.90 59.20
Share20 Share50
Year 3-D 4-D 5-D 6-D 3-D 4-D 5-D 6-D
1997 39.82 54.59 60.98 69.59 52.61 67.00 73.23 79.15
2002 42.21 56.63 63.07 71.20 54.81 68.44 74.56 80.07
2007 44.27 58.65 65.29 73.22 56.53 70.60 76.77 83.61
2012 46.16 60.27 67.06 74.28 58.28 72.30 78.61 84.97
Note: Share04 refers to the weighted average of revenue share for the 4
largest firms, with revenue used as weights. 3-D means NAICS 3-digit sec-
tors. The total number of 6-digit sectors decreased from 467 in 2007 to 362
in 2012. Industrial classification codes are consistent over time at other digit
levels.
Table A.7: Concentration in the Manufacturing Sector-II
Year Share04 Share08 Share20 Share50 Obs.
1963 39.19% 51.22 65.28 76.63 410
1967 38.97 51.42 65.51 77.47 408
1972 39.65 51.83 67.23 79.15 449
1977 39.13 52.64 67.96 79.86 444
1982 36.83 49.82 65.39 78.96 441
1987 40.11 52.23 67.23 79.23 451
1992 40.34 52.25 67.82 79.81 455
1997 42.37 54.04 69.59 79.15 470
2002 44.84 57.40 71.20 80.07 471
2007 44.93 59.03 73.22 83.61 467
2012 44.47 59.20 74.28 84.97 362
Note: Share04 measures the revenue share of the 4 largest
firms. The indices are weighted average across SIC 4-digit
sectors before 1992 and NAICS 6-digit sectors after 1997,
weighted by revenue. The last column shows the total num-
ber of sectors.
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Table A.8: Total NO of Firms (unit: thousand)
Year 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Economy 3147.9 3604.0 4179.8 4377.1 4752.3 4908.7 5240.0 4979.5
MFG 261.2 272.9 290.8 296.0 303.2 283.4 267.8 234.4
WHO 277.9 307.6 337.0 354.8 372.9 349.6 341.4 310.8
RET 942.8 912.7 953.0 939.8 955.6 949.5 980.0 953.0
TCP 121.3 130.5 153.9 162.2 187.9 190.1 195.6 185.4
FIRE 298.0 299.5 347.2 358.1 393.7 429.8 489.7 435.9
SRV 1122.5 1288.5 1600.8 1741.6 1924.9 2055.0 2344.1 2355.5
Note: MFG-Manufacturing; WHO-Wholesale trade; RET-Retail trade; TCP-
Transportation, communication and public utilities; SRV-Services.
Source: Business Dynamics Statistics
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Relative Labor Share in the Manufacturing Sector
Table A.9: Share of Industry Statistics (%), Manufacturing
Firm groups Emp. Payroll Val. add. Rel. LP Rel. Wage Rel. LS
1997
50 largest 11.7% 17.3 24.5 205 148 72
50th to 100th largest 4.4 5.3 7.7 175 120 69
101st to 150th largest 3.6 4.2 5.2 144 117 81
151st to 200th largest 2.8 3.0 3.8 136 107 79
201st and smaller 77.5 70.2 59.3 73 91 118
2007
50 largest 9.9% 14.5 25.5 258 146 57
50th to 100th largest 5.3 6.3 9.1 141 120 85
101st to 150th largest 4.3 4.7 5.3 130 108 83
151st to 200th largest 2.3 2.8 3.6 185 107 65
201st and smaller 78.3 71.8 56.5 73 91 125
2012
50 largest 10.8% 15.5 26.1 242 144 59
50th to 100th largest 6.1 7.3 8.6 172 119 69
101st to 150th largest 4.0 4.3 5.2 123 109 89
151st to 200th largest 2.0 2.4 3.7 157 122 78
201st and smaller 77.2 70.5 56.4 72 92 127
Note: Relative labor productivity is defined as share of value added divided by share
of employment. Relative wage is the ratio of share of payroll to that of employment.
Relative labor share is the ratio of payroll share to value added share.
Table A.10: Relative LS, Relative LP and Relative Wage for Top-100 (200) MFG Firms
1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
50 largest
Rel. LS 98% 98 97 92 92 83 72 67 57 59
Rel. LP 128 134 143 150 158 169 205 209 258 242
Rel. Wage 126 131 139 138 144 141 148 140 146 144
100 largest
Rel. LS 94 93 94 90 87 79 71 68 60 66
Rel. LP 132 136 140 147 158 171 200 194 228 205
Rel. Wage 123 127 132 133 138 136 140 132 137 135
200 largest
Rel. LS 93 92 92 90 87 81 73 72 65 68
Rel. LP 131 132 137 141 150 160 181 174 200 191
Rel. Wage 120 122 125 126 130 129 132 125 130 129
Data source: Census of Manufacturers.
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Table A.11: Labor Share (%), 2-digit Sectors
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
1987 24.6 63.7 54.1 60.5 68.8 39.9 23 6.5 60.9 69.2 86.9 78.8 50.7 64.4 60.9
1988 24.9 62.4 53.9 60.5 67.5 40.5 23.1 6.7 61.4 69.5 86.5 79.8 51.6 65.2 61.4
1989 23.7 61.3 54.3 59.9 68.7 38.7 22.4 6.5 60.9 69.4 86.4 78.9 49.5 64.8 61.2
1990 23.9 61.4 54.9 60.6 69.9 39.1 22.2 6.4 60.8 69.7 87.5 79.2 48.9 65.7 62.2
1991 24.1 61.4 53.7 60.7 68.7 38.6 21.8 6.2 61.1 70 86 79.4 50 65.5 62.3
1992 24.6 61.8 54.4 60.9 69.2 38.2 22.5 6 61.5 70.3 87 79.9 49 65.7 62
1993 24.3 61 52.2 58.6 66.6 37.7 22.6 5.9 61.3 70.8 86.9 79.7 51.9 63.7 61.3
1994 23.3 59.8 50.2 58.2 65.1 38.1 22.1 5.9 61 70.7 86.1 79.6 52.1 63 60.2
1995 22.5 58.5 51.3 58.4 65.3 39.1 21.9 5.8 62.2 72.8 86.4 80.3 52.9 62.9 61.1
1996 22.9 58.1 50.7 57.7 65.9 39 22.4 5.9 62.8 73.4 86.9 81 53.6 62 61.7
1997 24.5 56.8 50.2 57.6 65.2 42.7 23.2 5.9 65 73.8 82.5 81.5 51.9 61.2 61.2
1998 26.3 58.1 51.1 57.1 64.9 43.5 24.3 6.3 67.1 76.8 86.4 82.1 55.3 62.8 61.5
1999 26.2 58.3 51.6 57.5 66.5 45.2 24.2 6.2 67.4 76.1 86.4 82.1 55.1 62.5 61.1
2000 27.9 59 52.5 58.3 66.8 52.1 24.6 6.4 70.5 77.6 86.5 82.1 55.8 61.1 61.4
2001 29.3 59.6 53.4 58.4 67.6 49.3 24.4 6.1 69 75.8 86.9 81.8 60 62.6 66.5
2002 30.3 57.5 53.3 58 67.6 41.6 23.6 6.1 65.2 75.7 89.9 81.7 59.27 60.9 66.1
2003 28.3 55.3 52.1 57.3 65.3 40.9 23.5 6 64.5 73.3 88.4 82.2 57.7 61.9 68.9
2004 27.4 54 50.8 57.2 63.2 38.3 24.5 6.2 64.2 73 87.2 82.4 56.9 62 69
2005 27.9 52.6 49.9 56.3 61.7 37.6 24.1 6.1 65.6 72.2 87.2 82.9 56 62.1 67.2
2006 26.5 51.3 49.6 56.1 59.1 38.3 24.8 6.3 67.1 73.2 86.8 83.1 56.1 61.5 67.2
2007 26.8 50.9 49.9 57.7 62.5 37.1 25.4 6.1 67.6 72 87 83.7 55.9 62.8 69.9
2008 27.9 51.4 49.6 58.5 60.5 35.3 25.8 5.8 65.7 71.6 86.5 82.8 57.5 63.9 72.5
2009 26.7 48.4 49.3 56.3 60.5 35.7 22.7 5.4 66.9 69.9 85.6 82.1 56.6 63.3 71.6
2010 25.3 46.3 47.5 55.2 57.8 34 23 5.3 66.8 69.8 85.8 82.4 55.1 62.7 70
2011 26.2 46.3 48.1 55.7 58.2 35.7 23.4 5.3 67.7 70.4 86.8 83 55.4 63.5 71
2012 26.5 46.3 47.6 54.8 58.8 36.8 23.1 5.5 68.8 71.2 87.9 83.6 54.9 64.3 70.9
2013 26.8 45.7 46.7 54.4 58 36.2 23.1 5.5 69.8 71.5 88.6 84 54.7 63.9 71.1
2014 26.3 46.2 46.9 54.5 57.7 38.3 23.1 5.7 70.4 72.3 89.1 84.1 54.8 64.6 71.7
2015 27 46.2 46.8 54.2 58.1 37.8 23.3 5.8 70.4 71.3 89 83.6 54 64.4 71.2
Note: Labor share is the share of compensation in value added. (1)-Utilities; (2)-Manufacturing; (3)-
Wholesale Trade; (4)-Retail Trade; (5)-Transportation and Warehousing; (6)-Information; (7)-Finance and
Insurance; (8)-Real Estate, rental and leasing; (9)-Professional, Scientific and Technical Services; (10)-
Administrative and Waste Management Services; (11)-Educational Services; (12)-Health Care and Social
Assistance; (13)-Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation; (14)-Accommodation and Food Services; (15)-Other
Services.
Data Source: NIPA Value-added-by-Industry.
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Figure A.7: Labor Share in Information and Administrative Sectors
There are surges in LS both in Information and Administrative (i.e. Administrative and
Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services) sectors . This is partly caused
by the realization of stock options, which is counted as labor compensation, during the
internet bubble (Moylan (2008)). In 1998, labor compensation in the Administrative sector
increased 11.7%, while the increase in value added is 7.4%, which results in an increase in
labor share by 3% in that single year.
Information sector (NAICS 51) contains 6 sub-sectors: Publishing industries (except
internet) (NAICS 511); Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries (NAICS 512);
Broadcasting (except internet) (NAICS 515); Telecommunications (NAICS 517); Data
Processing, Hosting, and Related Services (NAICS 518); Other Information Services
(NAICS 519). In 2012, the first and second sub-sectors account for 26%, and 15% of value
added in the aggregate Information sector. Broadcasting and Telecommunication accounts
for 52%, and the remaining 7% goes to the last two sub-sectors combined. Table A.12 lists
labor share, measured as share of compensation in valued added in each sub-sectors around
2000.
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Table A.12: Labor Share in Information Subsectors
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Publishing industries, except internet 56.4% 50.6 65.6 65.7 51.0
Motion Pictures and sound recording industries 39.2 32.1 37.6 35.2 31.1
Broadcasting and telecommunications 35.2 38.5 39.1 38.3 36.7
Data processing, internet publishing, and other info. serv. 66.7 105.1 170.6 103.3 54.8
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Table A.13: Relative Labor Share in Non-Manufacturing sectors, 2002
(1)-Average (2)-Weight=revenue (3)-Weight=employment
NAICS 1-4 5-20 21-50 ≥ 51 1-4 5-20 21-50 ≥51 1-4 5-20 21-50 ≥51
1997
2 digit 79.4% 88.0 84.3 104.9 56.3 86.9 67.9 109.0 79.8 93.2 85.7 104.0
3 digit 86.2 90.6 92.4 115.1 71.1 80.6 76.8 115.9 90.5 91.8 90.7 108.1
4 digit 83.4 91.8 99.4 113.5 80.8 83.4 90.1 118.3 90.0 92.7 97.4 109.1
5 digit 82.7 92.9 102.8 114.3 83.6 86.5 94.4 119.0 90.3 93.9 99.9 109.5
6 digit 84.4 95.3 103.9 113.8 83.7 86.3 94.8 120.3 90.8 94.0 100.0 110.0
2002
2 digit 79.1% 83.4 84.4 107.2 65.6 72.5 78.4 113.0 79.2 89.8 86.9 106.1
3 digit 76.7 86.3 96.4 118.5 64.8 80.5 87.1 118.9 84.2 90.5 92.7 109.3
4 digit 81.7 90.4 99.7 113.7 81.3 85.8 91.9 116.8 87.4 92.3 96.4 108.9
5 digit 81.5 92.6 102.2 115.7 82.1 89.4 95.8 116.6 87.5 94.3 98.1 108.6
6 digit 83.3 94.5 102.7 115.3 83.2 88.4 96.6 118.6 88.5 94.1 98.3 109.7
2007
2 digit 81.6% 84.4 79.2 108.0 66.1 72.3 70.7 112.8 87.0 89.8 82.4 105.9
3 digit 81.6 86.2 88.7 116.7 64.5 78.3 83.2 119.0 89.5 89.6 89.6 109.1
4 digit 83.4 89.6 97.8 112.7 82.0 84.6 87.4 116.0 89.0 92.4 93.6 108.7
5 digit 81.6 91.7 102.2 117.6 82.3 87.6 94.0 118.9 88.7 93.6 96.7 109.5
6 digit 83.0 93.6 103.4 117.1 82.6 87.8 94.5 120.6 89.8 93.5 96.9 110.4
2012
2 digit 83.8% 80.8 87.2 107.7 59.6 63.1 78.2 115.7 87.0 87.5 89.5 106.1
3 digit 83.3 88.5 89.9 117.2 62.6 77.1 84.2 122.1 90.1 93.8 91.4 109.1
4 digit 82.8 91.6 95.6 114.3 83.5 85.5 88.8 117.3 89.9 94.2 94.2 108.5
5 digit 80.6 93.6 101.7 118.0 82.6 87.7 95.3 118.6 89.5 95.8 96.1 108.2
6 digit 82.3 95.1 103.1 116.7 82.0 87.5 96.4 119.7 89.6 95.2 96.8 108.9
Note: 1-4 denotes the 4 largest firms. For services sectors in 1997, the indices are for establishments
subject to federal taxes due to data availability.
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Table A.14: Relative Labor Share, 2-digit Non-Manufacturing Sectors, 2002
NAICS Sector Rel. LS Rel. LP Rel. Wage
1-4 5-20 21-50 ≥51 1-4 5-20 21-50 ≥51 1-4 5-20 21-50 ≥51
22 Utilities 116.5% 98.0 105.3 90.7 105.4 108.2 97.8 92.5 122.4 106.1 103.0 84.0
42 Wholesale trade 10.4 35.0 61.2 123.8 834.1 343.2 210.8 79.3 87.1 120.2 128.9 98.1
44-45 Retail trade 95.7 97.9 90.1 102.2 96.2 92.7 89.0 103.7 92.0 90.7 80.2 106.0
48-49 Transportation 94.6 81.5 78.2 106.6 107.8 141.3 155.1 90.7 101.7 115.2 121.2 96.7
51 Information 84.6 74.0 88.9 130.7 125.9 165.2 107.5 70.7 106.5 122.3 95.6 92.4
52 Finance 91.0 76.1 70.9 118.4 124.2 128.0 159.1 82.0 113.1 97.4 112.8 97.0
53 Real Estate 93.9 64.1 86.4 106.9 87.4 163.2 165.3 92.6 82.0 104.6 142.8 99.0
54 Prof. Sci. Tech. 74.6 90.2 88.4 102.8 167.0 117.0 99.3 97.0 126.0 104.7 86.4 100.0
56 Administrative 68.9 124.8 100.8 99.5 281.7 80.2 121.1 96.4 195.0 100.1 122.1 95.9
61 Education 91.1 85.5 96.7 102.8 172.8 178.3 210.0 88.9 141.0 142.1 181.5 93.3
62 Health Care 73.1 91.2 91.0 103.3 139.9 138.0 111.8 96.5 108.6 126.0 102.6 98.5
71 Entertainment 53.1 69.6 69.7 99.8 218.9 102.0 142.6 93.9 95.8 70.0 97.4 102.7
72 Accommodation 94.0 104.1 99.9 99.8 121.0 126.5 127.4 94.3 113.7 131.7 127.3 94.1
81 Other Services 93.5 101.9 163.4 96.8 109.1 100.0
Note: Relative labor share for a subset of firms in a sector is calculated as the payroll share of these firms divided by their share of
value added. 1-4 denotes the 4 largest firms.
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Table A.15: Between-Within Decomposition of Labor Share, 1987-2013
(1)-vadd share, % (2)-labor share, % (3)-decompstion
Sector 1987 2013 change 1987 2013 change between within
Nonfarm Private – – – 51.82 48.90 -2.92 0.84 -3.62
Utilities 3.38 2.09 -1.29 24.59 26.84 2.25 -0.33 0.06
Manufacturing 23.58 15.83 -7.75 63.69 45.67 -18.02 -4.32 -3.43
Wholesale Trd. 7.67 7.79 0.12 54.06 46.70 -7.36 0.06 -0.56
Retail Trade 9.28 7.54 -1.74 60.48 54.41 -6.07 -1.01 -0.51
Transportation 4.11 3.79 -0.32 68.80 58.02 -10.00 -0.21 -0.38
Information 5.98 6.16 0.18 39.94 36.15 -3.79 0.07 -0.23
Finance 7.58 8.84 1.26 56.12 56.35 0.22 0.70 0.02
Real Estate 15.21 16.79 1.58 6.51 5.52 -0.99 0.09 -0.16
Prof. Sci. Tech. 6.01 8.93 2.92 60.93 69.8 8.88 1.90 0.70
Administrative 2.35 3.85 1.50 69.18 71.54 2.36 1.08 0.08
Education 0.90 1.44 0.54 86.91 88.63 1.72 0.47 0.02
Health Care 6.58 9.24 2.66 78.75 84.00 5.25 2.17 0.42
Entertainment 0.90 1.28 0.33 50.69 54.66 3.97 0.21 0.05
Accommodation 3.21 3.60 0.39 64.38 63.93 -0.45 0.25 -0.02
Other Serv. 3.25 2.83 -0.42 60.87 71.08 10.21 -0.27 0.33
Note: Labor share is measured as the fraction of Compensation of employees in Value
added.
Data source: BEA’s Value-added-by-Industry Data.
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Table A.16: Between-Within Decomposition of Labor Share (adjusted for Capital Depreci-
ation), 1987-2013
(1)-vadd share, % (2)-labor share, % (3)-decompstion
Sector 1987 2013 change 1987 2013 change between within
Nonfarm Private – – – 59.81 57.20 -2.61 0.45 -2.95
Utilities 2.98 1.73 -1.25 32.19 37.98 5.79 -0.43 0.13
Manufacturing 23.25 14.97 -8.28 74.54 56.51 -18.03 -5.56 -3.32
Wholesale Trade 8.15 8.49 0.34 58.74 50.13 -8.61 0.19 -0.71
Retail Trade 10.19 8.11 -2.08 63.58 59.15 -4.43 -1.29 -0.40
Transportation 3.85 3.75 -0.10 84.71 68.53 -16.18 -0.08 -0.59
Information 5.43 5.39 -0.04 50.71 48.28 -2.43 -0.02 -0.13
Finance 7.82 9.07 1.25 62.85 64.28 1.43 0.79 0.13
Real Estate 13.54 15.14 1.60 8.44 7.16 -1.28 0.13 -0.18
Prof. Sci. Tech. 6.53 9.52 2.99 64.68 76.62 11.94 2.11 1.00
Administrative 2.56 4.16 1.60 73.36 77.50 4.14 1.23 0.15
Edu. & Health Care 7.96 11.41 3.45 86.54 92.63 6.09 3.08 0.60
Entertainment 0.87 1.29 0.42 60.37 63.20 2.83 0.27 0.03
Accommodation 3.38 3.93 0.55 70.56 68.54 -2.02 0.38 -0.07
Other Services 3.50 3.04 -0.46 65.21 77.40 12.19 -0.32 0.42
Note: Value added is adjusted for consumption of fixed capital (depreciation). Education
and health care are merged since the adjusted labor share in educational services exceeds
100% in some years.
Data source: BEA Value-added-by-Industry Data; NIPA Table 3.4: ESI Current-Cost De-
preciation of Private Fixed Assets.
Table A.17: Share (%) of Proprietors’ Income in Value-added
Sector 1998 2013 change Sector 1998 2013 change
Nonfarm Private 6.53 6.14 -0.39 Real Estate 3.84 2.43 -1.39
Utilities 0.50 -4.49 -5.99 Prof. Sci. Tech. 19.63 16.52 -3.09
Manufacturing 1.20 1.35 0.15 Admin. & Manage. 4.10 5.12 1.02
Wholesale Trade 3.87 3.82 -0.05 Education 3.16 3.25 0.09
Retail Trade 7.34 7.91 0.57 Health Care 11.67 9.55 -2.12
Transportation 9.43 7.43 -2.00 Entertainment 15.16 14.85 -0.31
Information 1.67 2.62 0.95 Accommodation 6.21 4.49 -1.72
Finance 4.35 4.18 -0.17 Other Services 30.14 31.13 0.99
Note: Average share from 2010 to 2013, instead of 2013, for the information sector is
used. Data for proprietors’s income in administrative & waste management services and
management of companies and enterprises are merged.
Data source: BEA Value-added-by-Industry Data, NIPA Table 6.12D: Nonfarm Propri-
etors’ Income by Industry.
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Table A.18: Concentration and Relative Labor Share, Top-50 firms
CR (Share50) RLS-Top50
1997 2002 2007 2012 1997 2002 2007 2012
Wholesale Trade 20.3 27.2 24.9 27.6 39.9 36.4 30.8 26.9
Retail Trade 25.7 31.7 33.3 36.9 96.4 95.2 95.4 92.9
Transportation 30.7 33.0 42.7 42.1 103.7 86.6 81.9 80.1
Utilities 64.5 69 70.1 69.1 94.9 104.2 102.4 107.3
Information 62 62 62.3 81.2 81.2 80.7
Finance 38.6 44.9 46 48.5 77.9 77.5 78.7 72.1
Real Estate 19.5 24.4 26.1 24.9 73.4 78.7 69.1 74.2
Prof. Sci. Tech. 16.2 16.5 18.6 19.0 84.6 85.8 84.7 93.8
Administrative 22.1 21.9 23.0 23.7 96.4 101.8 109.2 125.2
Education 19.6 23.2 23.5 23.8 79.7 90.8 87.7 90.6
Health Care 18.8 17.2 17.4 19.6 86.5 84.0 86.8 86.9
Entertainment 21.8 23.5 24.1 24.3 75.3 65.2 65.8 70.2
Accommodation 21.1 23.1 23.7 21.2 100.3 100.7 100.9 102.2
Other Services 12.8 14 13.8 12.6 94.9 88.3 91.4 100.4
Note: For most services sectors in 1997, statistics are only available for establish-
ments subject to federal income taxes (instead of all establishments) in Service
sectors. To be consistent, the same criteria is applied to 2002, 2007, and 2012.
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Table A.19: Revenue Share and Relative Labor Share of Top-20 Firms
CR (Share20) RLS-Top20
1997 2002 2007 2012 1997 2002 2007 2012
Manufacturing – – – – – – – –
Wholesale Trade 12.9 18.7 16.6 18.1.6 42.1 25.2 22.4 11.1
Retail Trade 18.5 23.9 25.4 27.8 99.9 96.9 102.4 97.2
Transportation 21.8 25.2 34.9 33.7 111.3 89.2 85.3 81.1
Utilities 40.6 44.9 44.5 48 85.7 103.5 110.8 116.0
Information 48.5 49.9 50.7 79.1 77.5 69.21
Finance 22.6 28.2 28.5 31.6 80.9 81.4 81.3 68.6
Real Estate 14.1 17.1 16.3 15.8 80.9 75.4 76.7 78.8
Prof. Sci. Tech. 11.6 11.3 12.7 12.6 84.1 84.7 80.3 91.5
Administrative 14.2 14.9 15.2 16.7 88.6 102.3 117.5 133.9
Education 13.3 16 16.1 16.7 76.6 88.2 85.2 95.1
Health Care 14.2 13.3 13.1 14.9 85.9 81.9 82.3 82.3
Entertainment 15.1 14.7 15.6 15.9 70.6 62.4 62.5 63.6
Accommodation 14.8 16.5 17.4 15.1 99.3 101.1 102.5 103.4
Other Services 8.5 10 10 8.3 97.3 86.2 92.9 104.5
Note: For most services sectors in 1997, statistics are only available for estab-
lishments subject to federal income taxes, rather than all establishments. For
consistency, the same criteria is applied to 2002, 2007, and 2012.
Table A.20: Revenue Share and Relative Labor Share for Top-4 Firms, 6-digit Average
Share04 Relative LS
1997 2002 2007 2012 1997 2002 2007 2012
Wholesale Trade 24.3% 31.4 29.1 30.8 55.4% 51.3 51.2 47.0
Retail Trade 18.5 26.8 31.0 34.6 89.8 89.4 90.4 84.6
Transportation 23.6 24.5 30.8 35.2 94.7 89.6 92.5 89.7
Utilities 25.8 23.2 23.0 24.2 86.1 90.8 86.5 111.7
Information 49.83 52.4 52.0 87.1 92.7 92.5
Finance 26.0 32.0 36.1 35.4 94.1 96.2 92.5 97.8
Real Estate 18.8 24.0 25.1 23.3 92.9 76.4 72.8 83.2
Prof. Sci. Tech. 15.0 15.1 17.9 18.3 82.1 78.6 80.6 81.8
Administrative 21.8 23.1 24.4 24.4 94.3 94.5 95.5 99.3
Education 16.6 19.4 19.4 19.4 80.1 90.2 92.5 91.1
Health Care 16.2 15.1 15.1 17.0 92.0 90.1 97.6 97.4
Entertainment 19.2 20.5 21.5 21.6 86.1 79.6 87.8 80.0
Accommodation 13.8 17.4 18.5 16.0 103.4 103.5 107.9 105.7
Other Services 13.8 14.7 15.0 14.1 100.3 94.0 94.8 97.2
Note: Both concentration and Relative Labor Share are weighted average across
NAICS 6-digit sectors, with revenue as weights.
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Labor share (measured as the share of compensation in revenue). Data Source: Compu-
stat.
Figure A.8: LS in Selected MFG firms, 1970-2016
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Figure A.9: LS in Selected Transportation firms, 1970-2016
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Figure A.10: LS in Selected Finance firms, 1970-2016
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Figure A.11: Labor Productivity and Labor Share, Manufacturing 1987-2014 (1987=100)
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Note: A circle represents a year.
Data Source: The ’Labor Productivity and Costs’ program of Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Appendix B
Supplementary Material to Chapter 2
B.1 Homicide Reporting and Characteristics
B.1.1 Homicide and institutional background
In Qing China, local governors assumed administrative authority and also adjudicated legal
cases. Under the traditional Chinese legal practice of ’life for life’ sentencing, the offender in
a homicide would typically receive the death penalty. During normal times, local governors
were required to report all homicide and other death-penalty cases to the central government
(using a standardized template called Tiben), since death penalties had to be reviewed and
approved by the emperor.
The Case Summary Books are all based on the cases that were submitted by local gov-
ernors in the previous year–whether or not they had been reviewed by the emperor and
regardless of the case’s final outcome. These books are currently maintained at the First
National Historical Archives and are available for 39 (nonconsecutive) years. For each of
these 39 years, the associated Case Summary Books include case totals by province (in
China Proper, excluding Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria; the same exclusion
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applies to all the statistics studied in this paper) and by type of offense. We subtract the re-
ported non-homicide case total from the number of total cases in order to obtain each year’s
national number of homicides. Non-homicide cases account for about 9% of the reported
’homicide/robbery’ cases. We employ this procedure for each individual province.
The Case Summary Books do not include cases from the national capital (Beijing) or
those handled directly by the Ministry of Justice. Each year, the Ministry of Justice orga-
nized two rounds of case reviews: the Qiushen or Autumn Deliberations, which reviewed
death-penalty cases submitted from the provinces; and the Chaoshen or Imperial Court
Deliberations, which took place shortly after the Autumn Deliberations and reviewed death-
penalty cases that originated in Beijing or were handled by the Ministry of Justice. These
deliberations involved the classification of each case into one of several categories (e.g., ’facts
confirmed’ or Qingshi, probated, and undecided). Cases labeled ’facts confirmed’ would be
delivered to the emperor for his final ruling on whether to immediately implement the death
penalty. Cases approved by the emperor and concluded by the Ministry were recorded in
Qing Shilu (the Qing Chronicles). The data in the Chronicles indicate that Chaoshen cases
accounted for about 6% of the total before 1790 and for 3% thereafter. We adjust each
year’s original Case Summary Books homicide total by these ratios to obtain the estimated
national homicide total for each of the Books’ 39years.
During the Qing Dynasty, the time allowed for the legal process before a Tiben filing
with the Grand Secretariat was six months–excluding evidence collection time and business
travel time for the relevant officers. Because these activities (and other official delays) were
excluded from the time limit, it could actually take much longer before a local governor would
conclude a case. FigureB.1, which is based on 49,627 cases from the Case Summary Books,
plots the distribution of the time lag between a crime’s occurrence and the case’s conclusion
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by local governors for both homicide and non-homicide cases.1 For homicide, more than 75%
of the cases were concluded within 18 months and more than 90% of them within 24 months;
in contrast, the time-lag distribution for important but non-homicide cases (illustrated by the
dash-outlined bars) was relatively flatter. The implication is that homicide cases were taken
more seriously by officials and handled with greater urgency, which increases our confidence
in the reliability of Tiben-based homicide estimates.
Figure B.1: Time lag, in months, between a crime’s occurrence and the case’s conclusion (at
the province level)
There were exceptions to the procedures just described. For some homicide cases, there
could be several rounds of back-and-forth communication between the local and central gov-
ernments, resulting in multiple sets of memorials for the same case. Jiang (1988) reports
that, in the 114 years under the consecutive reigns of Qianlong, Daoguang, and Guangxu,
cases with repeated rounds of memorials accounted for less than 5% of the total Red Book
reports. Note also that such cases would not affect the Case Summary Books statistics be-
cause the counts therein included only new cases that were concluded at the province level
and submitted to the Grand Secretariat in the prior year.
1The figure’s horizontal axis is truncated at 120 months.
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During times of civil war or major rebellions, local governors and generals might be given
special authority to execute serious criminals (who violated military rules or caused major
social disorder) without due process. As a result, these periods led to under-representation
(in the memorial Archives) of the violence actually committed. Provided such periods of
conflict did not last too long, these extrajudicial executions are not likely to distort the
overall violence trend–especially since we approximate homicide occurrences for these years
using data from adjacent years.
It should be noted that ’Summary Execution without Due Course’ (Jiu Di Zheng Fa)
was practiced mostly during and after the Taiping Rebellion of the 1850s–1860s. Summary
executions occurred primarily for non-homicide cases (e.g., robbers and rebels). And even if
a homicide offender was executed without due process, the case would still be reported and
included in the Case Summary Books by the Ministry of Justice–although that procedure
was largely ignored during the chaotic period from the 1850s to the 1880s, when most such
executions occurred.
In traditional China, infanticide was not treated as homicide in Qing China, so it is
not included either in the Case Summary Books or in the extant homicide case archives.
According to Cockburn (1991), infanticide accounted for 10%-20% of all homicides in Kent
(England). During the Middle Ages, high rates of infanticide in the Christian West reflect
the Church’s prohibition against–and severe punishment of–infidelity and pre-marital sex.
Although China was not a Christian nation and hence not subject to religion-based infanti-
cidal behavior, the Chinese people inhabited a patriarchal social system with a strong and
long-standing preference for boys over girls. As a result, infanticide was concentrated on
newborn baby girls; hence infanticide, as a percentage of total homicide, should be higher
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in China than in Europe. There were also other China-specific biases that led to the under-
reporting of homicide. For example, the Confucian tradition viewed children as the father’s
property and wives as the property of their respective husbands. That tradition explains
why the killing of children (including adult children) by the father, and the killing of a wife
or concubine by her husband, were often not treated as serious offenses and thus were not
reported or prosecuted according to normal legal procedures (Cheung, 1972). Similarly, the
killing of slaves or maids by their masters was treated more lightly than other homicides.
For all these reasons, including unreported infanticide, we inflated the unadjusted homicide
rate series for China (as just derived) by25%.
B.1.2 Estimates of annual red books and homicide cases
No Case Summary Books statistics on homicide cases (and other criminal acts) are avail-
able for the period 1661-1743. We therefore rely on the estimates given by Fang (1934) as
follows. We mentioned above that two copies of Tiben memorials are reserved in the Red
Books Archives. The Tiben memorials submitted to the Grand Secretariat were mostly about
homicide cases, although some non-homicide (but serious) crimes were also included. Fang
calculated, for each month, the total number of Red Books returned from the Department
of Punishment to the Archives;2 he thus derived summary totals for each of the 540 months
spanning nearly the entire Qing Dynasty (except for 18 months that he labeled ’incomplete’).
For certain years, data were given for some months but not for all 12months.
Based on these 540 monthly observations from Fang (1934), we run a simple regression
with dummies for each month and year (to control for seasonal effects)–and also with a
dummy for whether the observation is incomplete. The coefficient for a year’s dummy rep-
2The Grand Secretariat had six departments with access to the Red Books Archives. For the purposes
of this paper, we focus on those cases returned from the Department of Punishment.
165
resents the year’s monthly average of Red Books, so multiplying this coefficient by 12 yields
the estimated total number of Red Books for that year.3 We repeat this procedure for the
years 1661-1898 and thus derive the annual Red Books estimates reported in Table2.1 and
plotted in Figure2.1.
From 1744 to 1850, the Red Book counts and the national homicide totals (from Case
Summary Books) are both available for 16 of these 107 years. The 16 years are 1748, 1751,
1754, 1755, 1759, 1760, 1762, 1809, 1823, 1826, 1830, 1834, 1835, 1837, 1844, and 1850. We
use 1850 as the stop year because–even though statistics from the Case Summary Books are
reliable with regard to homicide cases during 1851-1860, the Taiping Rebellion may have
distorted the relation between their homicide count and the Red Book count. For those 16
years, the average ratio of the Red Books estimates to the national homicide totals is2.95.
This ratio is relatively stable across these years, with a variance of 0.29. Note that this
number is higher than 2 since many non-memorial files were also recorded in the Red Book
Archives.
Between 1744 and 1850, there are 27 years with homicide data from both the Case
Summary Books and the land/marriage memorials. For these 27 years4, the average ratio of
the national homicide total (from the Case Summary Books) to the number of land/marriage
memorials is 1.66 with a variance of 0.07.
3For the year 1712, Fang (1934) estimated the number of Red Books for only one month and labeled that
year as incomplete. However, the estimate for that month is more than twice as high as for months in 1711
and1713. Since reporting errors may have led to this discrepancy, we instead take the respective totals for
1707 and 1713 and use linear interpolation to obtain an estimate for1712. This approach does not affect the
overall homicide trend discussed in thetext.
4We did not use data for 1789 and 1846 even though homicide statistics from both the Case Summary
Books and the Land & marriage memorials are available. After comparing total memorials in these two
years with their respective neighboring years, we suspected significant archive-associated losses for 1789 and
1846 and therefore excluded those years.
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B.2 Post-1860s institutional change
Several changes were made after 1860 in response to the Taiping Rebellion and other conflicts.
First, the emperors began issuing orders to pardon certain categories of alleged criminals,
such as some homicide cases awaiting the Ministry of Justice’s review;5 In order to evaluate
the impact of increased pardons on different types of crime, in FigureB.2, we plot the number
of cases per year for different types of crime (i.e., robbery, adultery and rape, murder, or-
dinary dispute-related killings, and offenses against Confucian values) as summarized in the
surviving Case Summary Books. It is clear that reports of pardonable offenses, such as ’rob-
bery’ and ’ordinary dispute-led killing’, declined much more after 1860 than did such serious
and non-pardonable crimes such as ’murder’ and ’adultery and rape’. We therefore conclude
that these changes in pardon policy rendered the Case Summary Books less useful, for our
purposes, as regards years after1860. Yet because the land/marriage Tiben case counts were
not affected, they remain reliable indicators for inferring rates of homicide violence.
5As Emperor Qianlong stated: ’Pardons of criminals may sometimes be issued during national celebrations
or during drought, flood or other natural calamity as a way to provide relief’ (Xue, 1905, vol.2). As for
pardons of death-penalty offenders, the 1861 rules allowed for sentencing to be reduced by one ’degree’ or
more–for example, from ’death by hanging’ to ’remote-area exile’–and for the death penalty to be removed
except for certain types of offense (e.g., treason, anti-government rebellion, killing of parents by their children,
killing of grandparents, organizing civil war, husband killing, killing of a household head by a slave or maid,
massacring a family, murder, manslaughter, robbery, and witchcraft; see Qing Huidian, vol.731). After
1860, pardons by the emperor became more frequent and the Case Summary Books practice was changed
to exclude certain cases (e.g., criminal sentences reduced by the Ministry of Justice without the emperor’s
review).
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Figure B.2: Trends for different types of criminal offenses (based on Case Summary Books)
Note: Because some pardons were granted to perpetrators of both homicide and non-homicide capital
offenses, the latter are not excluded in these plots.
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B.2.1 Provincial Data and Tables
Table B.1: Homicide Cases and Homicide Rates across Provinces
Province No. of Cases Rate Obs. Province No. of Cases Rate Obs.
Anhui 141 0.48 26 Shaanxi 121 1.21 29
(46) (0.12) (56) (0.51)
Jiangsu 138 0.39 27 Yunnan 73 0.78 29
(28) (0.10) (27) (0.20)
Zhejiang 110 0.44 32 Guizhou 102 1.50 30
(28) (0.12) (41) (0.41)
Fujian 117 0.81 31 Henan 170 0.67 31
(48) (0.40) (32) (0.12)
Sichuan 357 1.70 31 Guangdong 172 0.88 32
(148) (0.56) (51) (0.31)
Hunan 134 0.77 30 Shanxi 183 1.40 30
(47) (0.22) (52) (0.47)
Hubei 136 0.77 28 Shandong 150 0.49 30
(33) (0.20) (44) (0.12)
Guangxi 76 0.87 28 Jiangxi 142 0.70 29
(32) (0.27) (31) (0.15)
Gansu 78 0.45 30 Zhili 199 0.98 26
(35) (0.18) (65) (0.33)
Note: Homicide cases and rates refer to annual total of homicide and homicides per
100,000 population, respectively, for each province from 1744 to 1849. Numbers in
brackets stand for standard deviation
169
Table B.2: Summary Statistics for Provincial Panel
Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Homicide rate 0.83 0.43 0.16 2.60 439
Panel Date
PopDense 124 87 26 422 445
GPrice 161 50 82 329 429
PriceCV 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.41 445
Mkt 0.27 0.45 0 1 445
War 0.06 0.33 0 2.98 445
Cross-sectional Date
Chong 0.76 0.12 0.52 0.94 15
Gentry 4.20 1.44 2.22 8.39 15
Note: Homicide rate refers to homicide cases per 100,000
population. Panel A contains variables with panel data.
PopDense is population divided by total area (square
kilometers), with population data from Cao (2001).
GPrice is average grain price of each province in the unit
of tael per shi; grain price data if from the Grain Price
Database for Qing Dynasty, Institute of Modern History
at the Academia Sinica. PriceCV is coefficient of vari-
ation for grain prices across prefectures, averaged over
the last 5 years. Mkt values 1 if PriceCV is below the
25th percentile, and 0 otherwise. War denotes the per-
centage of counties in war, data from The Chronologi-
cal Timetable of War for Qing China. Gentry denotes
number of local gentry in Qing dynasty (unit: 10,000)
from Zhang (1991). Chong is the average value of Chong
ratings (geographic/strategic importance) across prefec-
tures for each province.
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Union density, 1930-2007
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Figure C.1: Union Density
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Labor Wedge, 1947-2011
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Figure C.2: Labor Wedge, 1947-2011
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Structural break for the labor wedge series, The break point: 1977-Q3
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Figure C.3: Structural break test for the labor wedge series
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Working hours are measured in 2 ways. In the baseline measure, it equals to average
weekly working hours (from CPS) times the ratio of employment to working age population
(i.e. population from 16 to 64 years old). The ratio of employment to labor force is used in
the second measure.
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Figure C.4: Working Hours
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C-Y ratio is also measured in 2 ways. It is the share of Personal Consumption Expenditure
of GDP in the baseline measure. As an alternative, consumption is measured as personal
consumption expenditure plus government consumption expenditure.
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Figure C.5: Consumption-Income Ratio
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Labor wedge with multiple sectors Consider a more general utility function with dif-
ferent sectors. Let utility from consumption be
max ΣNi=1θi ln ci
s.t. ΣNi=1pici = C
ΣNi=1θi = 1
where C denotes total expenditure on all consumption goods. Denote λ the Lagrangian
multiplier for budget constraint. The first oder conditions are given be
θi
ci
= λpi i = 1, ..., N
ΣNi=1pici = C
It follows that λ = C. Then aggregate utility from consumption is
ΣNi=1θi ln ci = Σ
N
i=1θi ln
θiC
pi
= lnC + const.
Though widely used in economics, we should caution that these results follow directly from
the Cobb-Douglas utility function across different consumption goods. Deviation from C-D
utility function might generate an aggregate utility function where ∂U
∂C
depends on the vector
of prices, {pi}Ni=1, which complicates the calculation of sectoral labor wedge.
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Employment in competitive and unionized sector Labor and capital demand in
unionized sector is
pu(1− α)χ ∗ Au ∗ (ku)(1−α)χ−1 ∗ (nu)α∗χ = r
puαχ ∗ Au ∗ (ku)(1−α)χ ∗ (nu)α∗χ−1 = wu
It follows from the two optimality conditions that labor demand is given by
nu = (χAu)
1
1−χ ∗ (1− α
r
)
(1−α)χ
1−χ ∗ ( α
wu
)
1−(1−α)χ
1−χ
Similarly, we can solve the labor demand in the competitive sector, which is
nc = (χAc)
1
1−χ ∗ (1− α
r
)
(1−α)χ
1−χ ∗ ( α
wc
)
1−(1−α)χ
1−χ
The ratio of employment in the unionized sector to that in the competitive sector is
nu
nc
= (
Au
Ac
)
1
1−χ (
wc
wu
)
1−(1−α)χ
1−χ
Note that the exponent 1−(1−α)χ
1−χ > 1, if A
u = Ac, a relatively moderate difference in wc and
wu translates into a large difference in the nu
nc
ratio.
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Table C.1: Union density across sectors
Naics Industry Union density, % Sector
52 Finance and Insurance 2.0 c
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Serivices 2.1 c
11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 2.6 c
81 Other Services (except Public Administration) 3.2 c
72 Accommodation and Food Services 3.3 c
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 4.5 c
53 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 5.7 c
42 Wholesale Trade 6.4 c
56 Administrative Support and Waste Management ... 6.6 c
44-45 Retail Trade 7.5 c
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 8.2 c
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 11.0 c
21 Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 14.0 c
51 Information 14.8 c
31-33 Manufacturing 18.8 u
23 Construction 20.2 u
92 Public Administration 31.2 u
22 Utilities 33.3 u
61 Education Services 34.8 u
48-49 Transportation and Warehousing 39.1 u
Note: Union density is the average from 1983 and 2007.
Table C.2: Union Wage Premium
1983-1984 1985-1995 1996-2007
Non-Union 2.84 2.81 2.87
Union 3.05 3.04 3.07
Premium 0.21 0.23 0.20
Data Source: CPS, Western and Rosenfeld (2011).
Listed are hourly wages in log.
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